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Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems are substantially different from their more 
common and ubiquitous information technology system counterparts.  Industrial control systems, 
such as distributed control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are 
used for controlling the power grid, were not originally designed with security in mind. 
Geographically dispersed distribution, an unfortunate reliance on legacy systems and stringent 
availability requirements raise significant cybersecurity concerns regarding electric reliability 
while constricting the feasibility of many security controls. Recent North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards heavily emphasize 
cybersecurity concerns and specifically require entities to categorize and identify their Bulk 
Electric System cyber systems; and, have periodic vulnerability assessments performed on those 
systems. These concerns have produced an increase in the need for more Critical Infrastructure 
Industrial Control Systems specific cybersecurity research.  
 
Industry stakeholders have embraced the development of a large-scale test environment through 
the Department of Energy’s National Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Test-bed 
program; however, few individuals have access to this program. This research developed a 
physical industrial control system test-bed on a smaller-scale that provided an environment for 
modeling a simulated critical infrastructure sector performing a set of automated processes for 
the purpose of exploring solutions and studying concepts related to compromising control 
systems by way of process-tampering through code exploitation, as well as, the ability to 
passively and subsequently identify any risks resulting from such an event.   
 
Relative to the specific step being performed within a production cycle, at a moment in time 
when sensory data samples were captured and analyzed, it was possible to determine the 
probability of a real-time risk to a mock Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System by 
comparing the sample values to those derived from a previously established baseline. This 
research achieved such a goal by implementing a passive, spatial and task-based segregated 
sensor network, running in parallel to the active control system process for monitoring and 
detecting risk, and effectively identified a real-time risk probability within a Critical 
Infrastructure Industrial Control System Test-bed. The practicality of this research ranges from 
determining on-demand real-time risk probabilities during an automated process, to employing 
baseline monitoring techniques for discovering systems, or components thereof, exploited along 
the supply chain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my dissertation committee, chaired by Dr. James Cannady.  Dr. Cannady 
has remained patient and steadfast throughout the entire dissertation process.  His demeanor has 
been professional and unwavering, as has been my experience with him since beginning the 
program’s course work at Nova Southeastern where he was the first instructor I had.  His interest 
and passion in the area of AI and neural networks has guided my own interest into the area of 
immunological computation.  It is my ambition to further this research into the area of adaptive 
machine learning, building off of his work and from that of his prior students.  I am glad to have 
had the privilege of Dr. Cannady being a part of my committee.  I thank Dr. Liu for his reviews 
among the many iterations of perfecting a quality product and his participation as a committee 
member.  Much thanks and a tremendous amount of debt and gratitude of appreciation is 
extended to Dr. Craig Miller, as the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association’s Chief 
Scientist, who, without hesitation, accepted my request to participate on my committee as an 
external subject matter expert.  Dr. Miller recognized this research early on as an important 
contribution to the overall effort of securing the nation’s electric grid, as well as, the additional 
layer of security it can provide for other critical infrastructure control systems.  I want to thank 
my parents, Don and Sheila, for never doubting my ambitions.  Lastly, I express a heartfelt 
thanks to my significant other, Joyce, and our four children, Alexis, Micheal, Austin, and 
Isabella, who have provided support and encouragement, along with copious amounts of patience 
and tolerance, during this long journey. This work would not have been possible without their 
continuous encouragement and support.
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract   iii 
List of Tables   vi 
List of Figures   vii 
 
Chapters 
 
1. Introduction   1 
Background   1 
Problem Statement   3 
Dissertation Goal   3 
Relevance and Significance   4 
Barriers and Issues   10 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations   15 
Definition of Terms   17 
List of Acronyms   23 
Summary   26 
 
2. Review of the Literature   29 
Context   29 
The Theory and Research Literature Specific to the Topic   41 
Summary 75 
 
3. Methodology   78 
Overview   78 
Research Methods Employed   79 
Sample Design  102 
Data Analysis   105 
Formats for Presenting Results   108 
Resource Requirements   109 
Summary   109 
 
4. Results   111 
Introduction   111 
Benefits of Continuous Real Time Independent Risk Monitoring of CI2CS   111 
Data Analysis   112 
Findings   169 
Summary of Results and Outcomes of the Research   170 
 
5. Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary   172 
Introduction   172 
Conclusions   172 
Implications   174 
Constraints and Limitations of the Study   175 
Recommendations for Additional Research   178 
Summary   179 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
A. Baseline Accelerometer Data Sample from Robotic Arm Interval   180  
B. Random Accelerometer Data Sample (Normal) from Robotic Arm Interval   186 
C. Random Accelerometer Data Sample (Exploited) from Robotic Arm Interval   192 
 
References   206
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Tables 
 
1.   Summary of IT vs IC System Differences 
 
2.   Sensor and Detection 
 
3.   Steps, Tasks, and Sub-Tasks Research Requirements 
 
4.   List of Automation Assets used in CI2CS Test-bed 
 
5.   List of Cyber Assets used in CI2CS Test-bed 
 
6.   List of CI2CS Process Control Assets used in Test-bed 
 
7.   List of Senses and Corresponding Sensor Type 
 
8.   List of Proposed Sensor Assets 
 
9.   Sample Stimuli Assignment Values 
 
10. Example of Conditional States of Motion or Rest 
 
11. SEIG VAC data 
 
12. Average pumping times for batch processing 
 
13. Sample serial capture of DHT11 raw data using Cool Term 
 
14. Sample serial capture of flow rate raw data (PumpPA) 
 
15. Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw data - pre-fill 
 
16. Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw data – begin product tank fill  
 
17. Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw data – after PumpPA finished and PumpPB has 
started 
 
18. Sample serial capture of accelerometer raw data using Cool Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figures 
1.   PLC Control System Implementation Example 
2.    Three mode proportional-integral-derivative 
3.    DCS Implementation Example 
4.    Test-bed components with spatial sensory module 
5.    Defense-in-Depth Strategy for Control Systems 
6.    Close-up of recommended Defense-in-Depth network architecture for CI2CS showing 
integration of Risk Detection Sensory System within Control Zone 
 
7.    Controller.Micro850.CI2CS_circuit showing TON function (rung one) and variable 
conversion block (rung two) 
 
8.   Formulas for determining true, reactive, and apparent power 
9.      Tag 1 Motor Start/Stop Data, 00:00:30  
10.    Motor sound data (Amplitude Readings of Motor Sounds) 
11.    Pumping System (front-right PumpPA, left PumpA, rear-right PumpPB, left PumpB) 
12.    PumpPA ladder logic instruction started the “pumping” cycle 
13.   PumpsPB, A, and B ladder logic shown representing sequence of pumping process 
14.   PLC ladder logic time values 
15.   Tag 2 PumpPA Start/Stop Data, 00:02:05 
16.   Tag 3 PumpPB Start/Stop Data, 00:02:26 
17.   Tag 4 PumpA Start/Stop Data, 00:02:18 
 
18.   Tag 5 PumpB Start/Stop Data, 00:02:23 
 
19.   Robotic arm ladder logic 
 
20.   Robotic arm ready position in stand-by (start) state (y-axis avg .224) 
 
 
 
 
21.   Robotic Arm Start/Stop Data, 00:00:01 (00:02:18 Arduino run-time) 
 
22.   Arduino’s Sketch void setup function – normal (baseline) operation 
 
23.   Arduino’s Sketch void loop function – normal (baseline) operation 
 
24.   Robotic arm position for collecting product sample (product sample simulated) 
 
25.   Robotic arm position for placing product sample into centrifuge rotor (product sample          
simulated) 
 
26.   Robotic arm vibration (V) data, accelerometer y-axis 
 
27.   Robotic arm sound (S) data 
 
28.   Centrifuge showing solid-state relay 
 
29.   Centrifuge ladder logic 
 
30.   Tag 7 Centrifuge Start/Stop Data, 00:02:00 
 
31.   Centrifuge vibration data 
 
32.   Sound recorder, vibration (accelerometer), temperature and humidity (DHT11) sensor for 
spatial environment 
 
33.   Vibration (V) graph, selected at random, of one complete production cycle 
 
34.   Sound (S) graph of one complete production cycle 
 
35.   Relational frame of reference to spatial sensory module located adjacent to robotic arm 
 
36.   Perspective view of FLIR camera 
 
37.   Thermal image near start of batch process (screen shot 17:51)  
38.   Thermal image of same pumping process (screen shot 17:57) 
39.   Thermal image of same batch process finishing, PumpB motor and valve energized, 
PumpA  motor and valve de-energized (screen shot 18:11) 
 
40.   Thermal image of subsequent batch process with PumpPB motor and valve energized and    
PumpPA motor and valve de-energized (screen shot 18:18) 
 
41.   Sound graph showing intervals and transitions of the robotic arm process 
 
 
 
 
42.   Robotic arm vibration data, y-axis (see appendix A for full page view) 
 
43.   Sound graph of full production cycle showing deviant behavior caused by an altered 
robotic arm controller program 
 
44.   Normal sound signature from one cycle of the robotic arm process 
 
45.   Sound signature of robotic arm process after malicious code upload 
 
46.   Vibration signature of robotic arm process after malicious code upload  
 
47.   Modified Arduino code having a direct impact on robotic arm’s actions 
 
48.   Sleep instructions showing delay commands commented out 
 
49.   Example of capture files and default file names generated by Cool Term 
 
50.   Cool Term data logger with realtime capture capability 
 
51.   Logging features of Cool Term showing timestamp feature 
 
52.   Baseline vibration sample 
 
53.   Random sample one – normal 
54.   Random sample one data compared with baseline 
55.   Random sample two – abnormal (malicious) 
56.   Vibration data showing sample two data deviating from baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
 
The economy of the Twenty-First Century is fueled in significant part by America’s 
energy infrastructure.  Without a stable energy supply, the U.S. economy could be destabilized 
and the health and welfare of the U.S. would be threatened.   A heavy reliance exists on both 
rail and pipelines for the distribution of fuel products across America, and highlights the 
interdependencies between multiple critical infrastructure sectors, particularly the energy sector 
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS] & Department of Energy [DOE], 2010).  As a result 
of this dependency, as well as the daily and unrelenting attacks against the electrical grid, the 
energy sector began a significant effort for increasing its planning and preparedness against 
vulnerabilities that confront it (DHS & DOE, 2010).  
In 2003, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) began conducting vulnerability assessments 
on information technology (IT) systems focusing on automation and control systems used in 
U.S. Critical Infrastructure (CI).  SNL’s report identified several reasons for security 
vulnerabilities in CI (Stamp, Dillinger, Young, & DePoy, 2003).   The findings of SNL imposed 
consequences on CI sectors, particularly the energy industry, as legislation was enacted to 
define, identify, and secure the most critical Bulk Electric Systems (BES) in North America.  
The electric utility industry responded with Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. 
(North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC], 2013; NERC, 2015). 
Results from subsequent vulnerability assessments conducted by SNL during the 
development of the CIP standards, demonstrated that the potential for disrupting Critical 
Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems (CI2CS) devices could be caused by vulnerability 
scanners and should be used with caution on production CI2CS networks (Stouffer, Falco, & 
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Scarfone, 2013; as cited in Franz, 2003).  Identifying vulnerabilities within a CI2CS requires a 
slightly different approach from that of typical information systems (IS) since they have real time 
potential considerations. (Stouffer et al., 2013).  CI2CS include skid-mounted programmable logic 
controllers (PLC), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and distributed 
control system (DCS) in control system configurations.  The mutually dependent and often 
highly interconnected systems that these control systems operate are vital to the CI of this nation 
(Stouffer et al., 2013).   
Traditional information processing system’s characteristics differ from that of CI2CS 
because logic executing in CI2CS directly affects the physical world. (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology [NIST] SP800-82, 2015).    However, there are some similar 
characteristics which includes health and safety risks, financial issues, damage to the 
environment, and security of confidential information. (Stouffer et al., 2013). Originally, CI2CS 
components were not attached to information technology (IT) systems or connected to networks 
and were located in physically secured areas, as a result, the security concerns pertained only to 
local threats. However, because today’s CI2CS are less isolated, there is more concern about 
increased threats from remote, external actors and the necessity for greater system security.   
Additionally, since wireless networking is used more frequently, CI2CS implementations are 
exposed to more risk (Stouffer et al., 2013).   
Control system threats can come from a number of sources. Security objectives for 
CI2CS are conventionally prioritized in the order of: availability, integrity, and confidentiality 
(Stouffer et al., 2013).  The possible outcomes that might occur, as a result of a CI2CS incidents, 
are blocked or delayed flow of information through CI2CS networks, unauthorized changes to 
instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, inaccurate information sent to system operators or 
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to cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, CI2CS software or configuration settings 
modified, or CI2CS software infected with malware, or interference with the operation of safety 
systems, which could endanger human life. All of these are grave concerns and priorities for our 
nation. 
 
Problem Statement 
 
Because of their unique architecture, sensitive and volatile environments, and real-time 
physical and critical processes, CI2CS currently lack the capability for effectively monitoring 
real-time vulnerabilities across their critical cyber assets.   Energy delivery control systems can 
be easily disrupted or broken by the cybersecurity technologies developed for protecting business 
networks and IT computer systems (Idaho National Laboratory [INL], 2011). The networks and 
computers that control our Nation’s power grid and other critical processes are very different 
from those on our desks. 
Real-time risk monitoring, network penetration testing, and vulnerability assessments 
conducted on live industrial control system (ICS) environments have resulted in systemic and/or 
operational failure causing both a safety and reliability concern (Duggan, 2005).  Therefore, as a 
precaution, CI2CS vulnerability assessments are often conducted and performed in a laboratory 
environment with the resulting states compared to that of a live environment (Stamp et al., 2003). 
Unfortunately, this method fails to observe the various dynamic states and conditions that some 
ICS, such as generating facilities and critical manufacturing, continue to operate under due to the 
constraints and limitations of a simulated ICS environment, including, but not limited to, 
network noise, number and device types, varying temperatures, and networking schemes.  A 
significant and necessary capability would include a passive real-time method or process for 
monitoring and alerting to a systemic threat within an operational CI2CS environment by 
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considering the inclusion of stimuli emitted during its operation as part of the risk detection 
equation. 
Dissertation Goal 
The primary goal of this research was to develop an approach that takes into account the 
unique architecture; sensitive and volatile environments; and real-time physical and critical 
processes of a CI2CS environment in identifying and alerting an operator to a real-time 
suspected or actual risk across its network of critical cyber assets. Alternatively, such a goal 
increases the opportunity for discovering and mitigating any vulnerabilities or threats that may 
otherwise go unnoticed for a prolonged period of time until an off-line assessment can be 
conducted.  It is crucial that threat and vulnerability detection is done in a timely fashion. 
Relevance and Significance 
 
The goal in developing SCADA protocols, so that task constraints on the network would 
be met, was to emphasize features that would ensure good performance (Stouffer, Falco, & 
Scarfone, 2013).  At the time, network security was not much of a focus (Chen et al., 2013).  The 
infection vectors that were initially most common include: exploitation of hardware/software 
vulnerabilities, unauthorized access to Internet facing devices, malware transfer via removable 
media, spear-phishing attacks, and probing and scanning of publicly accessible assets.  The 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) estimates that many 
more incidents are occurring than are reported on the basis that cyber incident reporting is done 
on a voluntary, and not required basis (National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center [NCCIC], 2015). 
In 2014, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 
addressed 245 reported incidents of asset owners or related entities (NCCIC, 2015). CI 
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organizations that operate ICS reported that the majority of these incidents were initially detected 
in their business networks. In each case, ICS-CERT evaluates the incident to determine the 
presence and extent of the intrusion with a focus on identifying lateral movement into the control 
environment or ex-filtration of sensitive CI2CS information from the business network (NCCIC, 
2015). 
There has been a misconception, until recently, regarding the security of SCADA 
networks.  The most common misconception was that attackers could not access these networks 
because they were electronically isolated from all other networks (Carlson, 2005; Risley, 
Roberts, & LaDow, 2003).  The security goal for industrial plants has typically been in placing 
more focus on heightening physical security. What used to be an isolated and simple control 
network has been altered into a member of a complex inter-network by increasing the 
connectivity between the corporate network and production floor. The demands for increased 
connectivity continues to grow.  
Security concerns relating to these SCADA networks continue to be raised over this 
increase in network interconnectivity. SCADA networks, as with any network, can have multiple 
access points using current networking technology.  There is also no guarantee that physical 
isolation equals network security.  However, there are some occasions where it is necessary to 
have the local network connected to the external network, typically through a modem or 
corporate local area network (LAN).  The two most common “external” connectivity scenarios 
involve either an engineer having to troubleshoot and/or configure a system remotely, or the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) requiring access as part of a service agreement.  In 
either of these two scenarios, the connection could be exploited, thus enabling access to 
machines inside the factory network by a determined attacker (Cervin, Henriksson, & 
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Årzén,2003). 
Although it was believed that attackers would have difficulty accessing SCADA network 
information, this is not the case (as cited in Byres & Lowe, 2004), because the proprietary 
SCADA communication protocol’s standards, once used in the automation industry, have now 
been moved towards open international standards.  Ironically, one of the down sides to open 
standards, however, is that the workings of SCADA networks are readily available to attackers.  
Attackers are able to get an in-depth knowledge of these standards and use it to their advantage 
(as cited in Byres & Lowe, 2004). 
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software and hardware used in SCADA networks is 
another factor that contributes to CI2CS security vulnerabilities.  Although costs and the time it 
takes to design can be reduced with COTS software, the security is compromised. (SNL, 2003). 
COTS software provides a target that tempts attackers because it is often weak on security.  Fail-
safe mechanisms that could be disabled, if exploited by an attacker, exist as security 
vulnerabilities in COTS software, unlike non-COTS devices.  Non-COTS devices are usually 
designed to failsafe since they are intended to operate in safety-critical environments; however, 
this safety issue, caused by the result of the security issue, is another reason why designers of 
COTS devices should not just consider security issues, but safety ones too. 
SCADA Events 
 
There are a number of incidents that highlight CI2CS type events which have taken place 
where CI2CS or CI information systems have been exploited.  There are also certain 
environments where control systems are not able to perform control and monitoring functions, 
thus resulting in some failures not being detected at all (Stouffer et al., 2013).  
Air Traffic Communications 
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March 1997, (Worcester, Massachusetts) – Part of the public switched telephone network 
was disabled by a teenager using a dial-up modem (Stouffer et al., 2013).  The weather service, 
control tower, carriers that used the airport, the airport fire department, and airport security all 
lost phone service. Also, a printer that controllers used to monitor flight progress and the tower’s 
main radio transmitter were shut down, as well as, another transmitter that activated runway 
lights (Stouffer et al., 2013).  Phone service to 600 homes and businesses in the nearby town of 
Rutland were also disabled by the attack (Stouffer et al., 2013; Teen Hacker Faces Federal 
Charges, 1998).  
Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill 
Spring 2000 –A former employee of an Australian organization (that developed 
manufacturing software) was rejected for a job by the local government (Stouffer et al., 2013; 
Smith, 2001).  This employee supposedly became disgruntled, and reportedly, over a two-month 
period, using a radio transmitter, remotely broke into the controls of a sewage treatment system 
on as many as 46 occasions (Stouffer et al., 2013).  The electronic data for particular sewerage 
pumping stations was altered causing their operations to malfunction which ultimately led to the 
release of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks (Stouffer et al., 2013; Smith, 2001).  In all, 
the release totaled about 264,000 gallons (Stouffer et al., 2013; Smith, 2001). 
CSX Train Signaling System 
 
August 2003 - The train signaling systems along the U.S. east coast were shut down by 
the Sobig computer virus.  The signaling, dispatching, and other systems were all shut down by 
this virus as it infected the CSX Corporation’s computer system located at its Jacksonville, 
Florida headquarters. There were ten Amtrak trains affected the morning of the event.  Dark 
signals caused trains between Florence and Pittsburgh, South Carolina to be halted.  There was 
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also more than a two-hour delay of one regional Amtrak train from Richmond, Virginia to 
Washington D.C. and New York (Stouffer et al., 2013; Hancock, 1999). A delay between four 
and six hours also affected the long-distance trains (Hancock, 1999). 
Davis-Besse 
 
 
January 2003 - In August 2003, it was confirmed by the Nuclear Regulatory 
 
Commission, that a private computer network at the idle Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak 
Harbor, Ohio was infected by the Microsoft structured query language (SQL) Server worm 
known as Slammer.  This caused the safety monitoring system to be disabled for nearly five 
hours. It additionally took about six hours before the failed plant’s process computer became 
available again.  The Slammer virus propagated so quickly that it was able to affect 
communications on the control networks of at least five other utilities which resulted in 
successfully blocking control system traffic (Stouffer et al., 2013; Poulsen, 2003). 
Northeast Power Blackout 
 
August 2003 - First Energy’s control room operators had inadequate situational 
awareness of critical operational changes to the electrical grid when their SCADA system 
prevented them from recognizing an alarm processor failure (Stouffer et al., 2013).  Additionally, 
when the failure of the state estimator at the Midwest Independent System Operator occurred, 
due to incomplete information on topology changes preventing contingency analysis, it resulted 
in the prevention of effective reliability oversight (DOE, 2003; Stouffer et al., 2013).  Several of 
the key 345kV transmission lines that came into contact with trees in Northern Ohio tripped.  
This led to an uncontrolled cascading failure of the grid, a loss of 61,800 megawatts (MW) load, 
which was caused by cascading overloads of additional 345kV and 138kV lines relating to 265 
power plants. (DOE, 2003). 
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Zotob Worm 
 
August 2005 - For almost an hour, 13 of DaimlerChrysler’s U.S. automobile 
manufacturing plants were knocked offline by a round of Internet worm infections referred to as 
Zotob (DOE, 2003; Stouffer et al., 2013).  During that time, workers were stranded as infected 
Microsoft Windows systems were patched (DOE, 2003).  Plants in Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, Delaware, and Ohio were knocked offline (DOE, 2003).  Although the worm 
affected some early versions of Windows XP, it primarily affected Windows 2000 systems.  The 
computer’s repeated rebooting and shutdown were noted as part of the symptoms.  Aircraft-
maker Boeing, several large U.S. news organizations, and heavy-equipment maker Caterpillar, 
Inc. all suffered computer outages because of Zotob and its variation (Lemos, 2005). 
Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam Failure 
 
December 2005 – A catastrophic failure of the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam caused 
the release of a billion gallons of water.  The reservoir having been overtopped or simply filled to 
capacity may have caused the failure.  The overtopped theory remains to be the current version, 
as it is speculated that the routine nightly pump-back operation failed to cease filling the 
reservoir which ultimately resulted in the reservoir's berm being overtopped (DOE, 2003; 
Stouffer et al., 2013). AmerenUE stated that the gauges at the Osage plant at the Lake of the 
Ozarks, which monitors and operates the Taum Sauk plant remotely, read differently than the 
gauges at the dam (DOE, 2003; Stouffer et al., 2013)).  A network of microwave towers link the 
stations together.  Taum Sauk had no operators on-site (FERC, 2005). 
Stuxnet Worm 
 
W32.Stuxnet was first categorized in July of 2010 and targeted ICS in order to take 
control of industrial facilities, such as power plants. It has been speculated that the most 
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probable intent was industrial espionage.  Stuxnet malware contained two strikingly different 
attack routines.  Both attacks were aimed at damaging centrifuge rotors, but used different 
tactics. The first attack attempted to over-pressurize centrifuges.  The second attack tried to over-
speed centrifuge rotors and take them through their critical (resonance) speeds (Langner, 2013). 
It is important to note that the electric segment’s current CIP regulatory standards only 
require vulnerability assessments every 15 calendar months (NERC, 2013).  In a situation, such 
as Stuxnet, where the attack operated periodically about once a month over the lifetime of the 
attack, vulnerability risk assessments every 15 calendar months are not sufficient (Langner, 
2013). 
 Heartbleed 
 
Heartbleed was a vulnerability with a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code discovered by 
Google Security and a team of security engineers at Codenomicon.  Private secure sockets layer 
(SSL) keys used in OpenSSL Versions 1.0.1 through 1.0 were exposed due to a flaw in a 
“transport layer security/datagram transport layer security” (TLS/DTLS).   There were twelve 
electric segment asset owner/operators that observed scanning and/or exploitation activity in the 
first 14 days after the Heartbleed vulnerability was announced.  There have been over 200 source 
IP addresses known to be performing scanning and/or exploitation since the exploit was publicly 
announced. 
Although not affecting the utility’s control system, one utility confirmed their video 
teleconferencing system was successfully exploited.  Initial detection of this activity was 
performed by network intrusion detection systems. This was escalated by their managed security 
services provider.  An assessment confirmed that the device was vulnerable, and that network 
traffic suggested information was successfully accessed by the attacker (DHS, 2014).       
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Barriers and Issues 
Test-Bed Design 
 
This research attempted and succeeded in scaling a CI2CS environment, taking into 
account the dynamic swings from operational and environmental conditions that mimic a specific 
type of facility’s operating environment for the express purpose of achieving better success in 
determining a more precise representation of the data.  Essentially the scaled environment 
consisted of a minimal number of devices necessary for performing particular tasks and 
producing an expected and anticipated outcome within an enclosed and defined space. The scaled 
environment or test-bed, is explained in greater detail in chapter three.  
Test-bed designs include both virtual and physical models performing simulations or 
actual functions, or sometimes a combination of the two, as in this research.  An issue with any 
test-bed design is the ability to reconstruct or create an environment that mimics an actual system 
so that the results obtained in that environment are valid and reliable enough for representing the 
same or similar outcome in an actual system.  Some physical design issues for consideration 
include the number of objects, the space occupied by the objects, the properties and attributes of 
those objects, and the thousands of operational and mechanical processes performed by that 
system. Since physical models typically exist in a controlled environment, as most often they are 
actual laboratory environments at universities or governmental facilities, dynamic swings in 
operational and environmental conditions are not always accounted for or even considered. 
The test-bed used in this research was a scaled down model of a chemical processing 
facility.  It included both a production and control system component, as well as the typical 
network infrastructure found in many CI processing industries. These are commonly referred to 
in the power generation and manufacturing industry as the corporate, automation, and application 
networks (relative to the control system vendor).  The automation network is for the 
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communication that occurs between the processes taking place on the production floor and the 
control system within the facility. The application network handles the communication between 
the control system and application services.  Depending on the control system’s vendor, it may 
simply and most commonly be referred to as the control system network.  Automation and 
application network terms are used almost exclusively by Siemens.  As in many cases with CI 
networks (especially the electricity sector), it is not an uncommon security practice to place an 
air-gap between the corporate and control system network, as will be the situation in this case. 
The production facility was a near replica of an industrial type facility fabricated with 
steel construction, concrete floors and environmental conditioning-as determined by equipment 
performance.  A dehumidifier was ultimately the only environmental conditioner required.  This 
structure, although built to withstand the outdoors and being exposed to the same conditions as 
any other stand-alone facility could be subjected to, was located in a basement area that 
maintained an average temperature of 64 degrees Fahrenheit with a relative humidity of 47 
percent, as shown in chapter four.  Security controls were in place to prevent tampering or other 
malicious activities that could interfere with the validity of the research results. There were a 
sufficient number of operational assets, each with its own function, performing a variety of tasks; 
therefore, producing an ample number of stimuli to monitor while the automated process took 
place. 
The control area, commonly referred to as a control room, was a typical environmentally 
conditioned and secure room.  This was quite similar, if not an exact representation of a control 
room located at an industrial facility that is more suited for housing information systems, and not 
the more industrial environment of a shop floor, or mechanical building containing power 
generation equipment.  The test-bed design combines the implementation of both the control 
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room and production facility as a whole, as one cannot function without the other, and the test-
bed would not be complete otherwise.  This test-bed model, as described and further illustrated 
in chapter three, could pass industry verification, validation and/or certification and ultimately 
withstand industry scrutiny even if using an internationally recognized test-bed, such as Idaho 
National Lab’s (INL) DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security Training test-bed, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho, as a comparison.  The INL test-bed was the inspiration behind the basic 
functionality for the test-bed used in this experiment. 
Data Acquisition/Accuracy/Validity 
 
Another potential issue in this research, and still relating to test-bed design, was acquiring 
an ample amount of data from enough actual objects and controller processes, so that a sufficient 
number of values could be used for comparative analysis.  As the sensory data acquisition 
processing unit (SDAPU) is a passive system, it can be placed into many CI2CS environments 
with very low implementation overhead.  The SDAPU itself takes up a miniscule amount of 
physical space.  Significant effort went into fitting and tuning the test-bed, as it was one of the 
more crucial aspects in obtaining accurate and valid data.  Because this research was designed 
using a linear approach in the type of processing cycle it performed, it is important to note that 
simultaneous, multi-function processing would require a somewhat different approach and 
method in data collection, analysis and formulation.   
This research could potentially be validated against an actual commercial CI2CS, albeit 
using a smaller data set and not in real- time by evaluating logs, packet captures, and sensor data 
that would be matched and analyzed, off-line, using date-time stamps from various points in time 
to determine if object and operational attributes can be used to actually develop a modeling 
baseline before going live.  However, as the overall test-bed results from this research proved to 
indicate accurate, reliable and conclusive findings there was no benefit to be realized in applying 
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it within an actual commercial environment until a more robust solution using a non-linear 
method for placement in a closed-loop design is developed.  
Live CI2CS Operational Volatility 
 
Another issue is that commonalities among the suggested CI2CS actions do not generate 
traffic against production systems or on production operational networks; thereby, necessitating 
that this research be carried out in a test-bed environment.  Less intrusive methods are preferred 
over more active methods for minimizing the risk of causing a failure during testing (Stouffer et 
al., 2013).  In fact, non-real-time less intrusive methods, can gather all, or at least most, of the 
same information.  However, this method would fail to accomplish the goal and achieve the 
intended purpose of this research (Duggan, 2005), as this research challenges the current static 
state and non-operational environmental process of determining risk to a CI2CS by introducing a 
novel and passive approach for identifying real-time risk probabilities in CI2CS. 
It is imperative that CI2CS personnel understand the CI2CS being tested and related risks 
so they are aware and prepared to immediately address any problems that may arise while testing 
is being performed during a CI2CS assessment; especially in a production environment (Stouffer 
et al., 2013). Personnel able to perform manual control, if manual control of the system is 
possible, should be present during the testing (Stouffer et al., 2013).  Personnel must be able to 
immediately address any unintentional stimulus or DoS that may affect the CI2CS (Duggan, 
2005).  Establishing a passive non-intrusive process for determining risks in a real-time operating 
environment eliminates the necessity for testing and additional personnel to perform manual 
controls.  However, it does not exclude periodic audits, during facility outages, for verifying and 
validating the accuracy of real-time processes. 
 
Another factor considered in choosing CI2CS testing methods for this research is that 
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compared to IT systems, CI2CS have little spare capacity and are designed to have much greater 
longevity than their IT counterparts (Stouffer et al., 2013). CI2CS hardware and software is 
typically far from being state-of-the-art and can easily be overtaxed (Stouffer et al., 2013).  If 
CI2CS systems are run on legacy networks, they may run at slow speeds.  Active testing may 
generate a lot of traffic which may overwhelm the system.  (Stouffer et al., 2013). A passive 
process used for determining real-time risk occurs as a result of both log and data analysis (i.e. a 
listening approach with “offline” processing), thereby eliminating any undue burden on the 
capacity limitations of either storage or bandwidth. 
 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
 
Assumptions 
 
As the focus of this research effort was centered around the cyber security domain, it can 
be assumed that there are potentially inherent risks with any device that has integrated chip(s) or 
micro controllers/processors, no matter their function or purpose, and could by design, be 
deliberately and intentionally embedded with malware.  It should, therefore, stand to reason that 
an assumption was made that all of the production and cyber assets used in this research were 
free of deliberate or intentional manufacturer injected malicious exploits spanning the entire 
supply chain in order for the study to be effective and useful. To date, activities leading up and to 
the end of this research have included an investigation into the discovery of any knowledge base 
(KB) information that would indicate whether or not the assets used in this experiment had 
vulnerabilities introduced at any point in the supply chain.  Throughout the research, no supply 
chain threat was ever discovered.  An objective of this and future research is the ability to 
recognize peculiar behavior and occurrences from controller based objects along with their 
performance over time.  This research demonstrated the capability for establishing and 
16 
 
 
determining operational baseline normalcy, so that during an event when a device acted 
abnormally, the anomaly did not go unnoticed. 
Limitations 
 
 
The test-bed used in this experiment was a closely controlled environment explicitly used 
for the purpose of scaling an actual environment into a more manageable project.  As a result, 
sensor and production/processing equipment quality varied from that of commercial and 
industrial sensor and production equipment.  This limited the placement, purpose, and 
application of such sensors and equipment due to durability and lifecycle issues. This disparity in 
quality limits any kind of stress testing desired to help in differentiating major variations in the 
production environment with that of minor ones.   
Spatial parameters limited the size of the overall test-bed.  Although the size was 
sufficient to conduct and perform the research experiment with meaningful results, the size 
constraint limited the distances at which vibration and sound data could be captured.  As it was, 
the sensors were located within inches and a few feet of the stimuli producing sources.  
Extending the distances between sources of stimuli and risk detection sensors could help 
determine sensor sensitivity. 
Delimitations 
 
 
In order to constrain the scope of the study in a way that made it more manageable, the 
research was conducted in a test-bed; however, there was an express intent of placing a SDAPU 
in a power block at a generating facility and evaluating its environmental spatial data to that of 
offline and historical log data generated from within the control system network.  As not all 
power blocks or test-beds are created equal, the test-bed used in this research was designed and 
developed to model and control variables to the degree necessary for discovering whether or not 
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this experiment would achieve its intended goal of identifying a potential risk introduced within 
a CI2CS.  Because the processes in this research were performed in a linear fashion, the 
experiment did not garner the necessary qualifications applicable to a non-linear process; 
therefore, the research was not applied within an actual power block at a generating facility. 
The testing schedule for the test-bed had to be carefully planned, so that while testing was 
taking place, the least number of exterior stimuli were present.  Unwarranted external stimulus 
would undoubtedly affect the quality of the data.  This was especially true and most critical 
during baselining.  Anomalies or intentionally created stimuli were anticipated and even 
expected after baselining had been accomplished.  
Definition of Terms 
 
 
The following terms will be used in this research and are specific to the subject topics to 
be discussed in the study. 
Amplitude—The maximum absolute value reached by a voltage or current waveform 
 
(InfoComm, 2006). 
 
Bulk Electric System (BES)—Essentially consists of Transmission Elements operated at 100 kV 
or higher and Real Power and Reactive Power resources connected at 100 kV or higher. This 
does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy (specific inclusions and 
exclusions have been omitted from this definition for brevity) (NERC, 2015). 
Connected Components Workbench (CCW) software—a set of collaborative tools supporting 
Allen Bradley’s safety relay, PLCs, drives and component operator interface products for small 
machines.  It is based on Microsoft Visual Studio technology and offers controller programming, 
device configuration and integration with HMI editor (Rockwell, 2015). Control System (CS)—
An interconnection of components (computers, sensors, actuators, communication pathways, 
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etc.) connected or related in such a manner to command, direct, or regulate itself or another 
system, such as chemical process plant equipment/system, oil refinery equipment/systems, 
electric generation/distribution equipment/systems, water/waste water systems, or manufacturing 
control systems (MSISAC, 2016). 
Data Acquisition—Sampling of the real world to acquire data that can be recorded and/or 
manipulated by a computer. Sometimes abbreviated DAQ, data acquisition typically involves 
acquisition of signals and waveforms and processing the signals to obtain desired information 
(MSISAC, 2016). 
DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol)—DNP3 is a set of communications’ protocols used 
between components in process automation systems. Its main use is in utilities such as electric 
and water companies. Usage in other industries is not common. It was developed for 
communications between various types of data acquisition and control equipment. It plays a 
crucial role in SCADA systems, where it is used by SCADA Master Stations (aka Control 
Centers), RTUs, and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). It is primarily used for 
communications between a master station and RTUs or IEDs. ICCP, the Inter- Control Center 
Communications Protocol (a part of IEC 60870-6), is used for inter-master station 
communications (Triangle MicroWorks, 2016). 
Data Historian—a centralized database for logging all process information within a CI2CS. 
Information stored in this database can be accessed to support various analyses, from statistical 
process control to enterprise level planning (Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone, 2008). 
Distributed Control Systems (DCS)—are used to control industrial processes such as electric 
power generation, oil refineries, water and wastewater treatment, and chemical, food, and 
automotive production. DCS are integrated as a control architecture containing a supervisory 
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level of control overseeing multiple, integrated sub-systems that are responsible for controlling 
the details of a localized process. Product and process control are usually achieved by deploying 
feedback or feed forward control loops whereby key product and/or process conditions are 
automatically maintained around a desired set point. To accomplish the desired product and/or 
process tolerance around a specified set point, specific PLCs are employed in the field and 
proportional, integral, and/or derivative settings on the PLC are tuned to provide the desired 
tolerance as well as the rate of self-correction during process upsets. DCS are used extensively in 
process-based industries (NIST, (2015). 
Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)—A test conducted at the Vendor’s premise, usually by a third 
party, to verify operability of a system according to specifications (United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team, 2015). 
Fieldbus—A digital, two-way, multi-drop communication link among intelligent measurement 
and control devices. It serves as a LAN for advanced process control, remote input/output and 
high speed factory automation applications (TradesInfo, 2015).  
HART—is a bi-directional communication protocol that provides data access between intelligent 
field instruments and host systems. A host can be any software application from a technician's 
hand-held device or laptop to a plant's process control, asset management, safety or other system 
using any control platform (Greenfield, 2013). 
Heartbeat Signals—A heartbeat can be described as regularly repeated signals generated by 
hardware, software, or firmware to indicate normal operation or for synchronization with other 
components within an energy delivery system. Also known as watchdog timer, keep-alive, health 
status. The signals indicate the communication’s health of the system (DOE, 2014). 
Human Machine Interface (HMI)—HMI is software or hardware that enables individuals to 
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control a process under review, or to change controls or to effect an override manually if there is 
an emergency.  An operator can use an HMI to configure set points or control algorithms and 
specifications as needed. Operators can obtain process information and historical data with an 
HMI.  There are great variations in the type of platform or location that then affects the 
interactions. (SCADA Systems, 2014).  
Metasploit—a penetration tool used in the process of identifying security gaps in an IT 
infrastructure by mimicking an attacker (Metasploit, 2014). It is different from port scanning in 
that: 
• Port scanning identifies active services on hosts, 
• Vulnerability management identifies potential vulnerabilities on systems based on the 
installed software version of the operating system or applications, and  
• Penetration testing involves trying to take control over the systems and obtain data 
(Metasploit, 2014). 
 
 
Modbus—is a serial communication protocol developed by Modicon in 1979 for use with its 
PLCs.  It is a method used for transmitting information over serial lines between electronic 
devices (TradesInfo, 2015). 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner—provides patch, configuration, and compliance auditing; mobile, 
 
malware, and botnet discovery; and sensitive data identification (Nessus, 2014). 
 
Nmap—a free and open source utility for network discovery and security auditing. It is useful for 
tasks such as network inventory, managing service upgrade schedules, and monitoring host or 
service uptime. Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine what hosts are available 
on the network, what services (application name and version) those hosts are offering, what 
operating systems (and OS versions) they are running, what type of packet filters/firewalls are in 
use, and dozens of other characteristics (Fyodor, 2013). 
Noise—Undesired or irrelevant elements in a visual image; a sound of any kind; an electric 
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disturbance in a communications system that interferes with reception of a signal; a disturbance, 
especially a random and persistent disturbance that obscures or reduces the clarity of a signal; 
irrelevant or meaningless data (Copley, 2015). 
 
Nonrepudiation—The sender cannot deny that he/she sent the data in question to ensure that a 
traceable legal record is kept and has not been changed by a malicious entity (Stouffer, Falco, & 
Scarfone, 2008). 
 
Offline or Non Run-time—When the control system and network assets are at operational 
readiness, but the production equipment is not producing or operating (i.e., a generator is off- 
line, but ready for start-up if scheduled or dispatched). 
 
Online or Run-Time—When the control system and network assets are at operational readiness 
and the production equipment is producing or operating. 
 
OPC—is the interoperability standard for the secure and reliable exchange of data in the 
industrial automation space and in other industries. It is platform independent and ensures the 
seamless flow of information among devices from multiple vendors. Initially, the OPC standard 
was restricted to the Windows operating system. As such, the acronym OPC was borne from 
OLE (object linking and embedding) for Process Control. These specifications, which are now 
known as OPC Classic, have enjoyed widespread adoption across multiple industries, including 
manufacturing, building automation, oil and gas, renewable energy and utilities (OPC, 2015). 
 
Outage- 
 
 
Scheduled—Normally a pre-determined maintenance interval when the production 
system or individual assets, and control system network can be taken offline, and out of a 
scheduled operational or production state. 
22 
 
 
 
Unscheduled—Typically an emergency condition which has occurred and has taken the 
production system or individual assets, and/or control system network off line, although not 
scheduled for operation or production state. 
 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)—A programmable microprocessor-based device 
 
designed to control and monitor various inputs and outputs used to automate industrial processes. 
PLCs are used in both SCADA and DCS systems as the control components of an overall 
hierarchical system to provide local management of processes through feedback control as 
described in the sections above. In the case of SCADA systems, they provide the same 
functionality as RTUs. When used in DCS, PLCs are implemented as local controllers within a 
supervisory control scheme. PLCs are also implemented as the primary components in smaller 
control system configurations. PLCs have a user-programmable memory for storing instructions 
for the purpose of implementing specific functions such as I/O control, logic, timing, counting, 
three mode proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control, communication, arithmetic, and data 
and file processing.  The PLC is accessible via a programming interface located on an 
engineering workstation, and data is stored in a data historian, all connected on a LAN (Stouffer, 
Falco, & Scarfone, 2008). 
Process Control—is an engineering discipline that deals with architectures, mechanisms and 
algorithms for maintaining the output of a specific process within a desired range. It is 
extensively used in industry and enables mass production of consistent products from 
continuously operated processes such as oil refining, paper manufacturing, chemicals, power 
plants and many others. It enables automation, by which a small staff of operating personnel can 
operate a complex process from a central control room (Söderqvist, 2014). 
Process Field Bus (PROFIBUS)—is a standard for fieldbus communication in automation 
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technology. It is standardized in IEC 61158 – the foundation has therefore been laid for 
interoperability and compatibility (Felser, 2001). 
Radio Telemetry Unit (RTU), also called a remote telemetry unit—a special purpose data 
acquisition and control unit designed to support SCADA remote stations. RTUs are field devices 
often equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remote situations where wire-based 
communications are unavailable. Sometimes PLCs are implemented as field devices to serve as 
RTUs; in this case, the PLC is often referred to as an RTU (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, 
Abrams, & Hahn, 2015). 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)—systems are used in distribution systems 
such as water distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and natural gas pipelines, 
electrical power grids, and railway transportation systems.  They are highly distributed systems 
used to control geographically dispersed assets, often scattered over thousands of square 
kilometers, where centralized data acquisition and control are critical to system operation. A 
SCADA control center performs centralized monitoring and control for field sites over long-
distance communications networks, including monitoring alarms and processing status data. 
Based on information received from remote stations, automated or operator-driven supervisory 
commands can be pushed to remote station control devices, which are often referred to as field 
devices. Field devices control local operations such as opening and closing valves and breakers, 
collecting data from sensor systems, and monitoring the local environment for alarm conditions 
(Campbell, 2015). 
Sensory perception—occurs in organisms capable of performing neurophysiological processing 
of the stimuli in their environment, and covers the processes commonly called "the senses": 
hearing, vision, taste, smell and touch (Gene Ontology Consortium, 2016). 
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Site Acceptance Test (SAT)—A test conducted at the customer location, often by a third party, to 
verify operability of a system according to specification immediately prior to commissioning 
(Ameren, 2015). 
 
Acronyms 
 
The following acronyms will be used in this research and are specific to the subject topics to be 
discussed in the study. 
ARP  Address Resolution Protocol 
ADC Analog-to-Digital Conversion 
AC Alternating Current 
BES Bulk Electric System 
CCE Common Configuration Enumeration 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CI2CS Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System 
COTS Commercial off the Shelf 
CPES Cyber Physical Energy System 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CSIRT Cyber Security Incident Response Team 
CSSP Control System Security Program 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
DCOM Distributed Common Object Model 
DCS Distributed Control System 
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
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DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
DNP Distributed Network Protocol 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
FERC  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICCP  Inter Control Center Communications Protocol 
ICS  Industrial Control Systems 
ICS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency 
Response Team 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IO Input/output 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPS  Intrusion Prevention System 
ISO International Standards Organization 
IS Information Systems 
IT Information Technology 
KB Knowledge Base 
LAN  Local Area Network 
MitM Man-in-the-Middle 
NERC  North American Electrical Reliability Corporation 
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NIPP  National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NSA  National Security Agency 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OLE Object Linking and Embedding  
 OPSEC Operational Security 
OPC OLE for Process Control 
OSRAD  Operating and Sensory Risk Analysis Detection 
OT Operation Technology 
PC Personal Computer 
PLC   Programmable Logic Controller 
RPC   Remote Procedure Call 
RMF   Risk Management Framework 
RTR Real-Time-Risk 
RTU   Remote Telemetry Unit 
SCADA                                                                            Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SEIG Self-Excited Inductive Generator 
SIEM                                           Security Incident Event Management 
SDAPU Sensory Data Acquisition Processing Unit 
SQL   Structured Query Language 
SSM Spatial Sensory Module 
TIA Technology Industry Association 
TCP   Transmission Control Protocol 
US-CERT   U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
 
27 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
Our nation’s CI2CS are constantly under attack by a number of rogue nation states 
determined to exploit one of our most vulnerable areas when it comes to the defense and 
security of the United States. In the not so recent past, these cyber vulnerabilities were largely 
contributed to legacy systems, some designed twenty years ago, or more, that were built with 
little to no security in mind.  Now, more regularly, those legacy systems are being replaced by 
control systems that incorporate the most current COTS software integrated with the most 
current COTS networking and system hardware.  This marrying of technology for the sake of 
streamlining protocols and standards throughout certain industries that are reliant and dependent 
upon automation; although, expedient and efficient, poses its own set of challenges and security 
risks.  To this end, government has reacted to such a degree, that they have intervened and 
imposed extensive and burdensome regulatory compliance standards, particularly for that of a 
specific industry; that being the electricity sector. This includes the implementation of ten cyber 
security standards, with an additional one (regarding the supply chain) on the way, addressing 
several areas but not limited to: categorization of assets; change control; and, incident response 
and restoration. 
Compounding the issue of regulated cyber security controls and policies are the 
requirements that vulnerability assessments on control system networks are performed 
periodically to ensure that vulnerabilities are discovered and mitigated to the extent possible, 
but not necessarily in a “timely” manner.  Because CI2CS are more volatile than their IT 
system counterparts, vulnerability scans are not routinely conducted.  Passive network devices 
such as IDS, IPS, file integrity monitoring and other such tools may be placed throughout a 
network, and user dependent change management integrity systems are beginning to emerge, 
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such as, Plant Automation System’s (PAS), Integrity,  for example as a way of detecting 
potentially malicious activity; however so, a relatively closed network where IDS signatures for 
example are not and cannot be regularly updated, without knowing what an anomaly in a closed 
network may even look like, remain to offer little protection if devices or systems within the 
network have been internally compromised either through a malicious actor or exploited 
controller/processor that has made its way through the supply chain. 
The aim of this research was to develop a method of passively monitoring a control 
system network, and randomly comparing its activity and that of the production or processing 
environment’s actual spatial state to that of previously defined operational baselines of that 
same network and production environment during various operational states for identifying and 
determining whether or not potential risks have been introduced into the system. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Context 
General 
This review walks through the literature beginning with a general and broad description 
of issues having direct implications to a number of security problems currently facing CI2CS and 
the causes leading up to them.  Much of this relates to the intermingling of proprietary methods, 
devices, and protocols from proven legacy systems, with that of traditional IT systems and 
applications of today that are constantly plagued with security issues. The review continues by 
organizing not just the sections relating to specific CI2CS security issues and test-bed 
development, but to other areas, such as governance and standards, security, risk, and modeling.  
These areas will address CI2CS: risk assessments, standards and research development, sensory 
and environmental factors, and some probability methods which will be applied in determining 
risks.  
The private sector owns a majority of the energy infrastructure.  The energy sector 
supplies the transportation industry, provides electricity and energy vital to the nation (DHS & 
DOE, 2010).  The (DHS) divides energy infrastructure into three interrelated segments 
consisting of petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. The electricity segment of the energy 
infrastructure contains in excess of 6,413 power plants (DHS & DOE, 2010).  DHS estimates 
that 22 percent of electricity is produced by combusting natural gas, another 20 percent by 
nuclear power plants, and that the bulk of electricity production, 48 percent, is by combusting 
coal. The remaining ten percent of generation is provided by oil, renewable (wind, geothermal, 
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and solar), hydroelectric plants and other sources.  A heavy reliance exists on both rail and 
pipelines for the distribution of fuel products across America which highlights the 
interdependencies between multiple critical infrastructure sectors (DHS & DOE, 2010). 
This interdependency between the transportation and energy system's sector further 
illustrates how all other sectors are in some way dependent upon the energy sector.  As a result 
of this dependency, as well as the attacks against the electrical grid, the energy sector began an 
effort to increase its planning and preparedness against the vulnerabilities (DHS & DOE, 2010). 
It has been a benefit to industry, as a result of the cooperation among the various energy sector 
groups, to participate in substantial information sharing, especially relating to that of best 
practices. Although many sector owners and operators have had extensive infrastructure 
protection experience abroad, their recent attention has been in placing more emphasis and focus 
on domestic cybersecurity issues (DHS & DOE, 2010). 
Power plants generate and transmit electricity over 203,930 miles of transmission lines, 
and electricity is subsequently distributed to millions of customers (DHS & DOE, 2010).  DCS 
or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are used by regional grid 
operators and utilities to keep the electricity infrastructure system in balance (DHS & DOE, 
2010). These are highly automated and sophisticated energy management systems. 
SNL began conducting vulnerability assessments on IT systems in 2003, focusing on 
automation and control systems used in CI.  Their report concluded that most security 
vulnerabilities in CI included failures to: sufficiently define the security sensitivity for data 
relating to automation systems; grant authenticated users the proper access control privileges to 
services and data based on operational requirements; identify and protect a security perimeter; 
and, establish comprehensive security through defense-in-depth (Stamp, Dillinger, Young, & 
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DePoy, 2003).  It was determined that security vulnerabilities were due to deficiencies in 
security, budget pressures, loss of employees and administration concerns (Stamp et al., 2003).  
Also, during this time the industry was not focused on security and in large part unaware of the 
adversaries’ capabilities and threat environment. Ultimately, much of the security deficiencies 
were due to the lack of adequate security education and training of the complex modern 
information technology equipment being used in control system automation (Stamp et al., 2003). 
The findings of SNL imposed consequences on CI sectors resulted in legislation to 
define, identify, and secure the most critical BES.  This legislation was enforced by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as industry stakeholders were tasked through the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a set of comprehensive standards 
that would identify, assess, and correct those deficiencies identified by SNL’s report.  
At that time, the electric utility industry responded with the following nine CIP standards: 
Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets, Critical Cyber Asset Identification, Security 
Management Controls, Incident Reporting and Response Planning; Personnel and Training, 
Physical Security of Cyber Assets, Systems Security Management, Electronic Security 
Perimeter, and Sabotage Reporting.  While one standard, Sabotage Reporting, has been removed 
from the initial set of standards, two additional standards have been added.  These are Protection 
of BES Cyber Information, and Incident Recovery.  These eight revised CIP standards along 
with the two new standards, CIP-002 thru CIP-011, although originally slated for an April 2016 
effective date, became enforceable July 2016 instead (North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation [NERC], 2013; NERC, 2015). 
Results from subsequent vulnerability assessments conducted by SNL during the 
development of the CIP standards, and later included in the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-
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82 (2015), Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, demonstrated that the potential 
for disrupting CI2CS devices could be caused by vulnerability scanners and should be used with 
caution on production CI2CS networks (Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone, 2013; as cited in Franz, 
2003).  A major concern cited was an accidental denial of service (DoS) to devices and networks. 
While attempting to verify vulnerabilities, the actual scanning process creates additional traffic 
that is otherwise not present on the network. This traffic is a result of the representative set of 
attacks and extensive probing conducted against those connected devices. CI2CS are built and 
designed to automate and control equipment or real-world processes. An interruption to this 
process and the delivery of incorrect instructions to the system may cause it to malfunction and 
perform improperly.  This could result in damage to the equipment, a loss of product, injuries, or 
worse; death (Stamp et al., 2003). 
Identifying vulnerabilities within a CI2CS requires a slightly different approach from that 
of typical information systems (IS) (Stouffer et al., 2013).  Generally, devices of an IS can be 
replaced, restored, or just simply rebooted, leaving the end user with only a slight interruption of 
service.  Since a CI2CS determines a physical process it has effects which can be extremely time 
sensitive. (Duggan, 2005). 
CI2CS include skid-mounted PLC, SCADA systems, and DCS in control system 
configurations.  Control systems are found in the industrial control sectors.  SCADA systems can 
be used to distribute assets while maintaining central control.  (Bobat, Gezgin, and Aslan, 2015).  
SCADA has been evolving with the changes in technology since they first started being used in 
the 1960s.  SCADA systems have evolved from mainframe-based to client/server systems that 
use central communication protocols to send data from peripheral units to a master unit. (NCS, 
2004).  With the evolution of SCADA protocols, the once closed proprietary systems have now 
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become open systems.  Although this may be a benefit to designers, allowing them to select 
equipment that can assist them in monitoring their unique system using assets from a variety of 
vendors, it has likewise opened up a number of attack vectors (NCS, 2004).  
Generally, DCS’s are used within a local area, such as a factory using supervisory and 
regulatory control, to control production systems (Stouffer et al., 2013).  PLCs, on the other 
hand, typically provide regulatory control and are used for discrete control for specific 
applications (Stouffer et al., 2013).  Other types of devices used with CI2CS, such as field 
devices, include: remote telemetry units (RTU), used interchangeably with radio telemetry 
units; alternating current (AC) drives; solenoid valves, photo eyes, motors, lights and various 
sensors. 
The mutually dependent and often highly interconnected systems that these control 
systems operate are vital to the CI of this nation (Stouffer et al., 2013). The majority (90 
percent) of America’s CI2CS mentioned above are owned and operated by private industry.  
There is a small percentage operated by federal agencies, such as materials handling and air 
traffic control (Stouffer et al., 2013). 
CI2CS started out as isolated systems that ran proprietary control protocols using 
specialized software and hardware; unlike that of traditional IT systems with their publicly 
available protocols, and general software and hardware.  Table 1 shows the earlier differences 
between IT and ICS.  Because of the low-cost and widely available IP devices now replacing 
proprietary solutions, the potential and possibility for cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities 
have increased (Stouffer, Lightman, Pillitteri, Abrams, & Hahn, 2015).  CI2CS are starting more 
and more to resemble IT systems, particularly as they begin adopting IT solutions to promote 
corporate remote access capabilities and business systems connectivity (Stouffer, Falco, & 
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Scarfone, 2013).  CI2CS are now being developed with COTS computers, operating systems 
(OS), and network protocols (Stefanini et al., 2005). 
 
Table 1. Summary of IT vs IC System Differences (NIST SP800-82, 2015) 
Category 
Information Technology 
System 
Industrial Control System 
Performance 
Requirements  
Non-real-time  
Response must be consistent  
High throughput is demanded  
High delay and jitter may be 
acceptable  
Less critical emergency 
interaction  
Tightly restricted access 
control can be implemented to 
the degree necessary for 
security  
Real-time  
Response is time-critical  
Modest throughput is acceptable  
High delay and/or jitter is not 
acceptable  
Response to human and other 
emergency interaction is critical  
Access to ICS should be strictly 
controlled, but should not hamper or 
interfere with human-machine 
interaction  
Availability 
(Reliability) 
Requirements  
Responses such as rebooting 
are acceptable  
Availability deficiencies can 
often be tolerated, depending 
on the system’s operational 
requirements  
Responses such as rebooting may not 
be acceptable because of process 
availability requirements  
Availability requirements may 
necessitate redundant systems  
Outages must be planned and 
scheduled days/weeks in advance  
High availability requires exhaustive 
pre-deployment testing  
Risk 
Management 
Requirements  
Control physical world  
Data confidentiality and 
integrity is paramount  
Fault tolerance is less 
important – momentary 
downtime is not a major risk  
Major risk impact is delay of 
business operations  
Manage data  
Human safety is paramount, followed 
by protection of the process  
Fault tolerance is essential, even 
momentary downtime may not be 
acceptable  
Major risk impacts are regulatory non-
compliance, environmental impacts, 
loss of life, equipment, or production  
System 
Operation  
Systems are designed for use 
with typical operating systems  
Upgrades are straightforward 
with the availability of 
automated deployment tools  
Differing and possibly proprietary 
operating systems, often without 
security capabilities built in  
Software changes must be carefully 
made, usually by software vendors, 
because of the specialized control 
algorithms and perhaps modified 
hardware and software involved  
Resource Systems are specified with Systems are designed to support the 
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Constraints  enough resources to support 
the addition of third-party 
applications such as security 
solutions  
intended industrial process and may not 
have enough memory and computing 
resources to support the addition of 
security capabilities  
 
 
 
Today’s CI2CS are significantly less isolated from the outside world than their legacy 
CI2CS were in the 1960’s; in large part, due to the new IT capabilities that are supported by 
CI2CS integration.  This creates a greater need for securing these systems; however, there must 
be special precautions taken when introducing security solutions, especially those that were 
designed to deal with conventional IT systems, but are now being used for securing CI2CS.  
New security solutions are necessary in some cases, and others must be tailored to accommodate 
a particular CI2CS environment (DHS & DOE, 2010). 
Traditional information processing system’s characteristics differ from that of CI2CS; 
although, there are some similar characteristics as shown in Table 1 (NIST SP800-82, 2015). 
The differences are because logic executing in CI2CS directly effects the environment.  The 
characteristics are health and safety risks, damage to the environment, financial issues, and 
breaches of confidential information (Stouffer et al., 2013). General IT personnel may consider 
the use of some CI2CS applications and operating systems unconventional with their unique 
reliability and performance requirement.  Sometimes control systems design and operation are 
conflicted with the goals of efficiency and safety (Stouffer et al., 2013). 
Originally, CI2CS components were not attached to IT systems or connected to 
networks and were located in physically secured areas, as a result, the security concerns 
generally pertained only to local threats. However, because today’s CI2CS are significantly 
less isolated from the outside world than their legacy CI2CS were in the sixties, there is 
naturally more concern about increased threats from remote, external actors and the necessity 
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for greater system security.  Additionally, since wireless networking is used more frequently 
CI2CS implementations are exposed to more risk from equipment that is in close location even 
though it may not have direct physical access (Stouffer et al., 2013). Control system threats 
can come from a number of sources, such as disgruntled staff, natural disasters, terrorist 
organizations, complexities, accidental or malicious actions, malicious intruders, hostile 
governments, and accidents. Security objectives for CI2CS are conventionally prioritized in 
the order of: availability, integrity, and confidentiality (Stouffer et al., 2013). 
Duggan (2005) lists some of the possible outcomes that might occur, as a result of a 
CI2CS incident as: 
 
• Blocked or delayed flow of information through CI2CS networks, 
which could disrupt CI2CS operation. 
• Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm 
thresholds, which could damage, disable, or shut down equipment, 
create environmental impacts, and/or endanger human life. 
• Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise 
unauthorized changes, or to cause the operators to initiate 
inappropriate actions, which could have various negative effects. 
• CI2CS software or configuration settings modified, or CI2CS 
software infected with malware, which could have various negative 
effects. 
• Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger 
 
human life. 
 
There are some CI2CS across America that are still reliant upon legacy components.  
Although they may be more prone to physical threats, they are less susceptible to cyber threats 
due to their proprietary nature.  However, since the advent of IT systems and their overwhelming 
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popularity and ubiquity in almost everything we do, they have also integrated their way into 
CI2CS.   
The lack of change management and the application of patch management are arguably 
the most significant contributing factors to many of today’s CI2CS security problems.  Together, 
they have largely led to an increase in attack vectors, not only within the system itself, but also 
within their networks. Newer CI2CS are not solely built upon typical IT systems, and the fact 
that they are used quite differently, makes protecting these systems and networks somewhat 
more challenging, even so, Igure, Laughter, and Williams (2006) argue that CI2CS must be 
regularly maintained with the latest firmware, updates, and patches, as it applies to either its 
hardware and/or software extended across the entire network.  However, Stouffer, Falco, and 
Scarfone (2013) go into great detail explaining the proper procedures for applying patches to 
CI2CS and the consequences that could result if those procedures are not followed.  They 
unequivocally state that the “latest patches”, as stated in Igure et al. (2006), cannot be applied 
without going through a proper vetting process.  The proper vetting process would require that 
patches be tested off-line on a comparable CI2CS.  Stouffer et al. (2013) demonstrate that other 
software can be adversely affected by patching.  Patching can be used to eliminate a 
vulnerability.  However, the use of patching can also result in production or safety risks. 
(Stouffer et al., 2013).  It may additionally cause the functionality of the control application to be 
lost by altering the way it performs with the application or OS the patch was applied to (Stouffer 
et al., 2013). 
Mainly citing NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, r.2, Security and Privacy Controls 
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Igure et al. (2006) simply draw attention to 
the fact that resources for securing the more recent generation of CI2CS do exist.  NIST SP 800-
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53 contains a set of comprehensive security management practices.  In NIST (2013) many IT 
system security management practices have been developed and are routinely used across a 
number of industries and academia.  Lastly, Igure et al. (2006) failed to consider that many 
CI2CS systems continue to use older operating systems.  At some point, vendors stop supporting 
these OS, so patches for them either do not exist or may no longer be applicable (Stouffer et al., 
2013).  Since Igure et al. (2006) work, NIST SP 800-53, r4 (2015) has been published.  NIST 
(2015) revision 4, unlike previous revisions, devotes much of the document to cross referencing 
IT system’s security and privacy controls to that of their corresponding CI2CS where applicable 
and as appropriate.  Not all IT system security and privacy controls correspond with CI2CS 
functions or capabilities. 
NERC (2016) recognized and adopted Stouffer et al. (2013) advice, when it drafted CIP 
Standard CIP-007-6 and included a requirement in regards to “vetting” patches before they are 
permanently applied to a CI2CS.   NERC (2016) CIP-007-6 outlines a process for monitoring, 
analyzing and installing patches as appropriate for Cyber Assets.  It includes identifying 
source(s) that a “Responsible Entity” tracks and determining whether a patching source exists. 
(NERC, 2016). 
NERC (2015) takes into account that CI2CS patch management, for the purpose of 
enforcement, must be implemented according to Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone (2013) and NIST 
(2014) using a systematic, accountable, and documented process for managing exposures to 
vulnerabilities.  However, the enforcement process introduces an entirely different set of 
challenges that often requires the necessity of a third-party auditor to evaluate an organization’s 
CI2CS infrastructure, up to and including network diagrams, physical layout, IP addresses, open 
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ports and services, etc.  This often creates a dilemma on a number of levels, as it exposes what 
NERC (2015) standard, CIP-011-2, refers to as BES Cyber System Information.   
BES Cyber System Information is information about the system that poses a security risk 
because it can be used to access the system.  The information on its own may not necessarily 
pose a risk (i.e. device names, ESP names).  Procedures and information relating to BES Cyber 
Systems is usually confidential.  It can be used to allow access or distribution that is not 
approved. NERC (2015) 
Many sectors classified by the DHS as CI rely heavily on individual third-parties to 
provide their IT support (Igure, Laughter, and Williams, 2005).  This is especially common for 
CI2CS that still have proprietary operational characteristics or strictly OEM contractual 
agreements (due to warranties), even if much of the system is comprised of other typical IT 
components.  This arrangement for third-party CI2CS support creates somewhat of a paradox 
from a compliance perspective in that it cannot directly vet those that are part of the process, 
other than through non-disclosure agreements and contractual promises that these individuals are 
in compliance with NERC standard CIP-004-6 requirements pertaining to personnel risk 
assessments.  This dilemma and argument can extend all the way back through the supply chain.      
An entirely new effort is underway by FERC that directs NERC to develop and include 
supply chain standards to their already vast set of cyber and physical security compliance 
documents.  The NIST (2013), DHS (2009), and Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group 
(ESCSWG), (2014) are addressing supply chain concerns, focusing on information and 
communications technology (ICT) issues.  Although NIST continues to develop a national 
standard regarding the supply chain, the ESCSWG remains committed to developing their own 
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reference pertaining to the energy sector.  The ESCSWG was formed to take over the DHS 
(2009) product that first addressed supply chain concerns.  ESCSWG members include a variety 
of expertise from the energy industry making it more conducive for developing a product the 
energy sector can benefit from.  It stands to reason that NIST (2013) and ESCSWG (2014) could 
add some narrative to any future NERC supply chain standard to include establishing its 
foundation. 
Other aspects contributing to CI2CS security shortfalls point directly to failures in an 
organization’s configuration management program.  Most often the case is that there is no 
program.  However, the change management process is an issue for a CI2CS network with 
numerous “distributed limited-functionality nodes” (Igure, Laughter, and Williams, 2005).  
Ironically, the problems that exist with the configuration management of many regular corporate 
networks are neither dissimilar nor irregular from those of CI2CS NERC’s (2016) new CIP-010-
2 standard, which went into effect July 1st, 2016, requires a “configuration” change management 
program for utility entities registered with NERC, but does not go so far as to require a 
comprehensive change management program.   
This new change management requirement found in NERC’s CIP-010-2 standard, will 
make configuration change management a regular maintenance process.  Configuration changes 
alone are not necessarily effective if physical hardware modifications are made.  This is 
especially troubling considering FERC’s (2016) latest interest concerning supply chain issues 
previously mentioned.  Igure, Laughter, and Williams (2005) also assert that attacks against 
typical IT systems and networks are as, if not more, prevalent against CI2CS and networks.  As a 
result, these systems should be constantly monitored for signs of intrusions and vulnerabilities.   
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Theory and Research Literature Specific to the Topic 
Overview and Historical Perspective 
As cited in Ralston Graham, and Patel (2006) and DHS (2013) we are reminded of how 
important the protection of America’s CI is, and without its very existence the tremendous 
detriment it would cause to its citizens.  There is no doubt it is essential to their physical and 
economic security.  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
Commission Report (2004) made it apparent that America was very complacent with its then 
current CI schema.  It illustrated the highly-interconnectedness and dependencies that existed 
between various industries and the reliance they had on each other.  It also showed how little 
there was in a way of protection. 
The protection of our nation’s infrastructure is ultimately managed by the DHS.  
Although it may seem a daunting task, there are a variety of other agencies and groups that 
participate in this effort.  Some of those agencies and groups include the: DHS National Cyber 
Security Division (NCSD) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), US-CERT (Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team), and CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC).  The national 
comprehensive initiative is led by the CSSP.  Its goal is to identify, analyze and reduce the cyber 
risks associated with CI2CS.  The US-CERT was established in 2003 to protect the nation's 
Internet infrastructure by coordinating responses to and defenses against cyber-attacks (as cited 
in Ralston Graham, & Patel, 2006).  US-CERT is responsible for publishing documents that 
assist in improving control system security and determining vulnerabilities (as cited in Ralston et 
al., 2006; Nash, 2005; Nelson, 2005).  Over 250 organizations related to cyber security response 
worldwide use the name "CERT”.  In 1988, CERT/CC was established at Carnegie Mellon 
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University.  They work jointly with DHS to protect the nation's information infrastructure, and 
similar to US-CERT, contribute expertise in coordinating responses to and defenses against 
cyber-attacks (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
In order to meet a number of the Commission Report (2004) goals, the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP v.2, Jan. 2006) had to accomplish several objectives which 
included maximizing the use of resources, assessing risk and implementing risk reduction 
programs, and establishing and building security partnerships to foster the implementation of CI 
protection programs. As a way to unify the national cyber security structure and provide the best 
effort at protecting it, risk assessments for all CI2CS and other cyber systems became an integral 
part of fulfilling the purpose for the NIPP v.2 (2006) document.  Academia, industry, and 
government are working together on issues addressing infrastructure security in a cooperative 
effort to provide those with a need-to-know with information that is necessary, and about events 
or situations that are occurring (NIPP v.2, Jan. 2006; as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
Nicholson, Webber, Dyer, Patel, and Janicke (2012) focus on the three components 
paramount to CI2CS security.  They include a) administration, b) platform security mechanisms, 
and c) architecture.  The successful attacks against ICS worldwide, both real and simulated were 
the focus of this work.  Specific examples were cited in illustrating some identified then patched 
vulnerabilities from real world systems.   
A literature review and classification of the international journal articles, standards, and 
reports between the period from 1999 to 2010, provided Yusta, Correa, and Lacal-Arantegui 
(2011) the necessary tools, methodologies and applications for conducting studies in CI 
protection concepts based on the selection of their applicability and best-practice methodologies 
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(Yusta, Correa, & Lacal-Arantegui, 2011). A critical analysis of the specific considerations on 
electric infrastructures and methodological approaches just mentioned was also presented.  
Essential concepts around international strategies on infrastructure protection plans and energy 
security were included in the review.   
Test-bed—System Design, Modeling, and Prototypes  
Deveza and Martins’ (2009) research suggests that the practical test of a control and 
automation process, controlled by PLCs, can be problematic.  They recommend an approach 
using PLC Control and MATLAB/Simulink simulations along with the implementation of 
several solutions such as: batteries, LED’s and switches, SCADA systems, a HMI, and 
simulation tools or scale models.  However, the utilization of scale models performing real 
processes is difficult to adapt to different processes and very expensive (Deveza & Martins, 
2009).  They strongly support using simulations for teaching PLC controlled processes.  They 
illustrate how doing so allows students to test their projects in an almost real environment; 
although, they also point out that the cost often prohibits its use (Deveza & Martins, 2009).  They 
submit that the use of switch sets and LED’s are uninteresting and extremely confusing, and that 
the student’s motivation is severely reduced by this approach because they are only valid when 
small processes are considered (Deveza & Martins, 2009).  Because of current microcontroller 
technology, PLCs that would once only work with a specific type of simulation tool will now 
work with any type (Deveza & Martins, 2009).  SIMTSX, PSIM, and PC-SIM are also available, 
as other types of commercial PLC simulation tools; however, they are often not suitable to be 
integrated with other simulation tools (Deveza & Martins, 2009). 
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Kabilan and Manohar (2013) examine a power system scenario that is exposed to outages 
resulting from component malfunction and overdraw of power as a result of high demand.  
Farmers using pumps for supplying water, as a way of protecting the crops, contributed to this 
demand.  The crops are threatened by a below par monsoon and extreme heat.  Chaos, brought 
on by blackouts, erupts everywhere.  The blackout causes essential services like traffic lights, 
metros, and trains to be halted (Kabilan & Manohar, 2013).  The researchers are challenged by 
the policy of the country and the growing complexity of the power grid in this scenario due to the 
disruptions on the efficiency, availability and reliability of the power delivery system because it 
shows a high degree of uncertainty in accurately determining its overall impact (Kabilan & 
Manohar, 2013).   
Uncertainty causes decision makers to hesitate before committing to managing the grid 
using smart systems. Kabilan and Manohar (2013) observe that the human element involved in 
near real time decision making is still limited, despite the aid of analysis and simulation tools to 
help with that process.  Large amounts of data are used in representing the status of the grid at 
any given time.  Considerable research remains to be done before fully automated control of the 
electrical grid is passed over to software agents, but the human limitation continues to be a factor 
in driving that research. 
Kabilan and Manohar’s (2013) blackout scenario above, and the paragraph following it, 
sets the stage for understanding how multi-agent systems can be applied in a power system. They 
recognize the tremendous challenge in trying to fully automate the grid with multi-agent systems.  
A significant amount of experimentation and research will be required to develop agents capable 
of functioning on par with human experts based on the variety of scenarios that can occur within 
the smart grid (Kabilan & Manohar, 2013). A number of security issues would be presented as a 
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reliance on autonomous agents became more prevalent (Kabilan & Manohar, 2013).  
Communications and decisions of an agent could be manipulated by an attacker hacking in and 
then controlling an agent to perform malicious behavior. 
As cited in Ralston et al., 2006; Schneider, Lima, Scherer, Camargo, and Franchi (2012) 
chose to simulate and emulate systems of a micro hydropower plant for performing a feasibility 
study in what they proposed as a new field of research. The research was in response to the 
restriction in the production of fossil fuels causing increased energy costs. Access to real-time 
data was available through a SCADA system. SCADA was connected to the emulated power 
plant over a Modbus network. Modbus has a faster speed and is more robust than OPC servers 
used in other tests, so it was naturally the preferred communication method at points where 
larger data streams were required (Schneider, Lima, Scherer, Camargo, & Franchi, 2012) 
The primary machine used in the Schneider et al. (2012) model for process emulation 
consisted of a self-excited induction generator (SEIG) coupled to an electric motor driven by a 
frequency converter. An asynchronous electric induction machine, usually used in an electric 
motor application, performed as an electric generator. This type of unit was used for their 
project, not only because of its relative low cost and maintenance, but mainly for its reported 
robustness.  (Ofualagba & Ubeku, 2011; Schneider et al., 2012).  
Patel (1999); Ofualagba and Ubeku (2011) explain that except for the fact that a SEIG 
has capacitors connected across its stator, an electric motor or generator’s stationary portion, 
terminals for excitation, it performs in a manner similar to an electric machine operating by 
electrostatic induction in the “saturation region”.  SEIGs have become an ideal choice where the 
grid’s reactive power is unavailable for generating electricity, such as stand-alone hydroelectric 
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dams (Patel, 1999; Ofualagba & Ubeku, 2011).  Reactive power is typically delineated for 
alternating current (AC) electrical systems” (Sauer, 2003).  Without an adequate remanent 
magnetic field, excitation will not occur through the external capacitor.  The load, the 
capacitance value in farads, and speed affect generator output voltage and frequency in the self-
excited mode (Patel, 1999; Ofualagba & Ubeku, 2011). 
Schneider et al. (2012); as cited in Ralston et al. (2006) also proposed using a SCADA 
system to collect data of the emulated dynamic response from the dynamic turbine simulation. 
The SCADA system made it possible for some parameters of the simulated hydropower to be 
changed which made analyzing a number of situations the system responded to possible.  For the 
management of distributed generation, SCADA makes a great tool (Schneider et al., 2012). 
Without using a real turbine, Schneider et al. (2012) proposed system shows to be an important 
resource, particularly for testing the topology for new voltage control.  Integrating the SCADA 
system with the hydropower plant simulation/emulation interface allowed monitoring in real-
time with an added benefit of a pleasant interface.  An analysis of the system’s performance was 
allowed using the responses stored by the SCADA database (Schneider et al., 2012).  
Schneider et al. (2012) research helps in the development of new technologies by 
eliminating the need for constructing a primary machine prototype.  This results in lower costs 
and allows testing prior to implementing actual equipment.   Lastly, it is easier to modify a 
system incorporating the supervisory control capability by exposing the parameters in a simple 
way.  
Atlagic, Sagi, Milinkov, Bogovac, and Culaja (2011) also explore a model-based 
approach, as they develop and compare various SCADA applications.  In explaining the need for 
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modeling, they describe industrial plants as being more complex than their IT counterpart, both 
in the way they are operated, real-time by an IT-based control system, and their size.  Their 
reference to size does not just pertain to the physical facilities where production and operations 
take place, but also to the geographical size where supervisory and control functions and 
capabilities exist.  As it relates to their research, a control system is described as a SCADA 
system that performs supervisory control along with an underlying field installation of IO 
modules/controllers, control devices transmitters, cabinets, wiring, etc.   
As a whole, both software and hardware design essentially make up SCADA application 
development.  This includes the verification of a set of control and guided user interface (GUI) 
procedures (software design) and a field solution (hardware design) (Atlagic et al., 2011).  In 
order to organize input/output (IO) communication to the field devices, a designed field solution 
is needed that produces a specification of protocols, IO signals and other parameters (Atlagic et 
al., 2011). The specification Atlagic et al. (2011) used for building an IO model for an industrial 
plant, and development of control application and a configuration model, is actually a good 
starting point.   
Contemporary SCADA solutions have to provide a specialized tool set for designing and 
developing a system in order to meet time and budget constraints, user requirements, and 
generally coping with its overall complexities; which includes the verification of the control 
application with an emphasis on design and coding. The object of the SCADA program’s final 
model will be to represent, in real-time, a particular type of industry plant; including information 
from each of the tools (Atlagic et al., 2011). 
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Part of the development process in Atlagic et al. (2011) work was to derive an application 
specific simulation tool, suitable for testing and debugging a control application before its final 
installation in a factory, from a process/configuration model.  Likewise, the primary challenge 
confronting Atlagic et al. (2011) centered around designing such a general purpose SCADA 
model with those capabilities.  It also raised a key question as to how SCADA solutions could be 
implemented more easily in an actual, yet complex, industrial plant using a chain of development 
tools.  They develop and present a general purpose SCADA methodology for the express 
purpose of fulfilling the various requirements of an actual industrial application, to the extent it 
includes the most complex batch control (Atlagic et al., 2011).  A well-defined framework, 
provided by a set of specialized tools, is used for the development and design of a control 
application (Atlagic et al., 2011).  
The main concept used in Atlagic et al. (2011) was based on a previously designed 
system called GAUS.  GAUS already included the long-term experience in design and 
implementation of a SCADA system (Atlagic et al., 2011).  This SCADA solution had already, 
at least partially, implemented most of the issues relating to models already mentioned.  GAUS 
was proven to be superior in memory consumption and data processing efficiency compared to 
other SCADA systems they accessed.  This research led to the need for developing a new 
solution (Atlagic et al., 2011).  The idea for their solution was to add important new features, 
especially for future applications, that would handle the most demanding processes while still 
preserving the level of efficiency GAUS demonstrated (Atlagic et al., 2011).  
Chabukswar, Sino'poli, Karsai, Giani, Neema and Davis (2010) describe a typical 
SCADA system consisting of a network, actuators, and sensors, for providing the 
communication between the RTUs and the SCADA master, where the SCADA master provides 
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overall control and monitoring of the system.  The life spans of SCADA systems are designed to 
be quite long.  They are usually measured in decades.  Chabukswar et al. (2010) reiterate that 
unlike today, security was not part of the systems design for many of the SCADA systems still in 
use today.  These legacy systems were subjected to physical threats.  Today’s systems are 
connected to the internet where they are both monitored and controlled.  As a result of this 
internet connectivity, network security problems remain the primary threat of remotely 
connected systems. 
Industry is well aware of these security risks, as they are quite evident; however, there is 
no simple task of merely “upgrading” SCADA systems.  Upgrades are cumbersome for a number 
of reasons.  The primary reason being that there is often an undesirable lengthy down time 
associated with the addition of security features, especially to traffic control systems and power 
plants. Secondly, new security protocols would have to be added to completely replace the 
embedded codes of existing SCADA devices.  Lastly, SCADA system networks cannot typically 
be generalized because they are usually customized for that particular system. In order to make 
dependable and reliable security features that address security vulnerabilities for both legacy and 
in the design of future SCADA systems, their implementation must be assessed and rectified in 
realistic settings (Chabukswar et al., 2010). 
In Chabukswar et al. (2010) a familiar security attack was simulated on a SCADA system 
and reasonable effects of the attacks were observed in the functioning of the system. This system 
was composed of models in different simulation environments and domains, implemented as a 
proof-of-concept at a chemical plant. Command and Control Wind Tunnel (C2WT) was used for 
facilitating the data transfer and interaction between the environments.  C2WT is a visual space 
for designing and bringing into effect and action diverse C2 simulation states.  It facilitates the 
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expeditious growth of ‘integration models’, which it then uses during the entire cycle of the 
simulated space. (Hemingway, Neema, Nine, Sztipanovits & Karsai, 2011). 
There has recently been a significant increase in the exploration and development of 
renewable energy resources.  Because of their abundance and availability, solar power and wind 
systems are the more popular ones.  However, these systems are not without implementation 
caveats such as sufficient wind speed and space.  This location dependency must account for an 
ample amount of space for solar plants absorbing the sun’s energy and wind plant’s receiving not 
just wind flow, but wind speed.  They are usually located separately and installed in rural areas. 
As such, SCADA systems are required to remotely control and monitor them.  In another study 
consisting of a wind-PV-battery renewable energy system, Soetedjo, Lomi, Nakhoda and Tosadu 
(2013) proposed a SCADA system for monitoring the real-time electrical data using a remote 
controller and measurement devices by employing a PLC and digital power meters. The intranet 
was used for sending data to the monitoring center from remote devices (Soetedjo et al., 2013). 
The SCADA system was used for failure detection and monitoring the wind turbine. An 
observation of anomaly data taken from several measurements was used in detecting wind 
turbine failure (Soetedjo et al., 2013). 
Morris, Srivastava, Reaves, Pavurapu, Abdelwahed, Vaughn, McGrew and Dandass 
(2010) introduces a cyber‐physical energy system (CPES) that combines “computing, 
communication and control capabilities” and the physical world.  In order for CPES to function 
properly, it must occur in real-time and provide a dependable, safe, secure, and efficient 
integration (Morris et al., 2010). Every physical component in CPES generally has its cyber 
capability embedded in it. Multiple scales are used in networking CPES components. Self-
assembly, adaptation, learning, self‐organization, and higher performance are integrated from 
51 
 
 
both the cyber and physical components.  An incomplete knowledge of the system operating 
state, time-varying utilization, physical degradation and malfunction, and hardware and software 
component failures are multiple factors that cause a dynamic and uncertain environment that 
these complex systems typically operate in (Morris et al., 2010). 
The work of Morris et al. (2010) provides CPES research with: a set of challenges; a road 
map of research required to secure these systems; and lastly, a current survey of research results 
within this domain. There continues to be a significant challenge in securing CPES. As with 
many researchers in this field, Morris et al. (2010) also recognize that at the time when many 
process control systems were designed, there was not a security requirement in mind nor such a 
networked world used for controlling CPES.  Recently, corporate networks having internet 
connectivity are connected to these same process control systems (Morris et al., 2010).  
The security by the obscurity concept has traditionally been the basis for the protection of 
SCADA systems. (Giani, Karsai, Roosta, Shah, Sinopoli, & Wiley, 2008).  Insufficient 
knowledge due to proprietary protocols once prevented an attacker from breaking into the 
system.  Policies, recommendations, standards, and suggestions for possible countermeasures are 
mainly what much of today’s protection relies upon (DOE, 2005; NERC, 2013).  The 
development of a SCADA system test-bed is essential to gaining a better understanding of how 
SCADA systems can be protected.  Security controls must be developed to protect SCADA 
systems from attacks. (Chabukswar et al., 2010).   Giani et al. (2008) describe the reference 
architecture, detailed implementation, attack scenarios and SCADA security test-bed status of 
that research.   
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Chen, Peng, and Wang (2013) note that there are many cybersecurity researchers on the 
CI2CS side of research, but that only a few of them are focused on the control equipment itself.  
More important is the realization of how few conclusions are made public from that research. 
Chen et al. (2013) present a design and development of a process control test-bed for control 
system security studies using several different PLCs and a DCS.  Because their research focused 
on the cyber layer, and the advantages associated with simulated process, the simulated 
Tennessee-Eastman process was adopted in that study.  
Because of the differences between IC systems and IT systems used in business 
applications, it is difficult to use IT cybersecurity techniques available directly for tackling 
problems within CI2CS.  For example, CI2CS may work continuously for several years without 
incident, yet any modification or updates to the on-line control system may cause unexpected 
damages to the process and equipment.  Countermeasures to mitigate the control system risk 
should be tested carefully before they are put into use (Chen, Peng, & Wang, 2013). Therefore, it 
is important to develop a test-bed, instead of using a live industrial processing control system, for 
the study of cybersecurity research.   
The cybersecurity test-bed serves as a platform for validating research cybersecurity 
solutions serving both government and industry.  It is used to identify common cybersecurity 
deficiencies in need of solutions development through the development of vulnerability 
taxonomies.  It is also used in the identification of existing ICS vulnerabilities (DOE, 2008; as 
cited in Morris, Srivastava & Reaves, 2011).  Test beds provide a low cost means for modeling 
the effects of cybersecurity attacks on ICSs (DOE, 2008).  The Idaho National Labs (INL) 
National SCADA Test bed, supported by DOE, is a large-scale test-bed dedicated to control 
system cybersecurity training, assessment, outreach, and standards improvement (DOE, 2008).   
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A process control system test-bed known as the Industrial Instrumentation Process 
Laboratory is housed at the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT).  A power boiler, 
fully operational distillation column, evaporator, a chemical blending reaction process, and a 
batch pulp digester are included in the BCIT lab (DOE, 2008). There is also a variety of SCADA 
equipment in the lab that includes field devices, such as valves and measurement 
instrumentations, GE/Fanuc Series 90/70 and 90/30 PLCs with Genius I/O, Emerson Delta V and 
PROVOX DCS, Bailey Net90 DCS, Honeywell TDC 3000 DCS, Rockwell PLC-5s, Foxboro 
I/A DCS, Schneider 984 and Quantum PLCs, and F&P MC5000 controllers (BCIT, 2005). 
CI2CS Governance and Standard Bodies 
As cited in Ralston et al. (2006), although they are independent organizations, 
Presidential Directive 63 created the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC’s), with 
the assumption that important information, between industry sectors and the government relating 
to anomalies, threats, vulnerabilities and intrusions could be shared with one another.  
Information sharing is only as productive as the information that is shared.  Some companies are 
hesitant to “share” information with government agencies.  Likewise, government information 
often does little to benefit industry, especially relating to classified information. 
The Center for SCADA Security was created by SNL where SCADA training, research, 
standards development, and red teams (hacking) take place. A functioning synergistic cyber and 
wireless test-bed, and power grid were created in a test-bed setting by the SNL in conjunction 
with the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (INL, 2011; as 
cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  It is referred to as the National SCADA Test Bed.  There they 
develop control system cyber security standards for industry.  Other types of supporting work 
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and pure research are performed at the National SCADA Test-bed Program.  Reports that have 
emerged are Carlson (2002) and Carlson, Dagle, Shamsuddin, and Evans (2005) which 
summarizes some of the activities taking place there.  Another report was the release of Kilman 
and Stamp (2005) SCADA Security Policy Framework (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
Singer and Weiss (2005) list a number of standard’s bodies and industry groups that 
perform work addressing control system security needs. There are also additional activities being 
researched and taking place at the national labs.  These include, but are not limited to: NERC, 
NIST, AGA (American Gas Association), CIGRE (International Council on Large Electric 
Systems), IEC (International Engineering Consortium), Chemical Sector Cyber Security 
Program organized by the Chemical Information Technology Council (ChemITC), and ISA 
(Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society) (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
Documents relating to cyber security and risk assessment have been published by all of them (as 
cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  AGA has prepared reports on communications encryption to 
various systems during different processes. (AGA 12, Part 1, 2006, final document, and ongoing 
work parts 2, 3 and 4).   ISA published two technical reports addressing security technologies 
and their application to control systems (ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01-2004, ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.02-
2004) (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).   
Cyber security standards (CIP-002-6 – CIP-011-2, 2015) have been finalized by NERC 
(2015).  These standards establish the requirements pertaining to recovery plans, security 
management programs, personnel, electronic and physical protection, and incident reporting for 
certain entities within the electric sector.  However, since the time of their approval by FERC, 
the NIST has defined a baseline set of cohesive, cross industry common security requirements 
for existing and new control systems for various industries through its Process Control Security 
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Requirements Forum (PCSRF) (Melton, Fletcher, & Earley, 2004; Stouffer et al, 2004; Falco, 
Stouffer, Wavering, & Proctor, 2004). 
FERC, DOE, and DHS all recognize and acknowledge NERC, as the energy sector 
coordinator.  In early 2000, NERC developed a set of defined security requirements (NERC 
1200), the “Urgent Action Cyber Security Standard”.  It specifically related to the electrical 
industry as a temporary standard for reducing risks, resulting from a compromise, of any critical 
cyber assets impacting the reliability of the BES.  It was adopted for a one-year period beginning 
August 2003.  That standard matured into more permanent Cybersecurity Standards, CIP-002-3 
through CIP-009-3, that have been in place since 2007.  The most recent version of CIP, version 
6, consisting of ten standards, went into effect July 1, 2016 (NERC, 2015).    
API 1164 is a SCADA security standard for operators of oil and gas liquid pipeline 
systems.  It provides guidance for managing SCADA system security and integrity. However, the 
standard is not limited to pipelines and can be used for developing standards for SCADA 
systems as part of a best practice program. API 1164 does not cover refineries to date, and 
currently only applies to pipeline operators.  Refineries continue to use cybersecurity guidelines, 
considered adequate by API, released prior to that time.  Access control and cybersecurity are the 
primary emphasis of this standard, in fact, physical security is not addressed at all.  API 1164 
provides operators with descriptions of practices used by industry for securing SCADA systems 
along with a framework for developing sound security practices throughout the organization 
(American Petroleum Institute [API], 2005). 
Similar to the NERC CIP standards, API 1164 includes such areas as: field devices 
configuration and local access, access control, network design, management systems, physical 
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issues (including business continuity plans and disaster recovery), information distribution 
classification, data interchange between enterprise and third-party support/customers operating 
systems, and communication security (including encryption) (Radvanovsky & McDougall, 2009; 
API, 2005). 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) developed the Power 
Engineering Society/Substations 1402-2000 guide that discusses and identifies issues 
surrounding security related to human intrusion at electric power supply substations (IEEE, 
2008). 
In 1999 the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) developed and circulated 
report 62210, “Data and Communications Security,” throughout the IEC.  It included stakeholder 
identification, security definitions, threats and prioritization of threats, a “Common Criteria” 
protection profile, policy, attacks, and consequence analysis (DOE, 2003).  The security of the 
TC 57 protocols was assessed using the consequence analysis security methodology.  The IEC 
combined “Common Criteria” with consequence analysis in the development of a security 
specification that establishes a cryptographic communication channel, containing an example 
protection profile, between a master station and a substation. 
As in many cases, the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) forms 
the basis for many TC 57 communication profiles.  The industry continues to investigate a 
security solution common to that protocol. There is a consideration to use Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) as a way of securing IEC TC57 protocols and their derivatives.  To ensure 
interoperability certificate revocation, roles in renegotiation of keys, certificate field, and 
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certificate size issues will be standardized (International Electrotechnical Commission [IEC], 
2013). 
Spoofing, message replay, modification of packets, and to some extent denial of service 
are all threats addressed in the development of the IEC 62351-5 (2013) standard (DOE, 2003).  
Its purpose is to secure IEC 60870-5 and its derivatives.  Distributed network protocol three 
(DNP3) is the derivative in this case.  Therefore, supporting non-secure systems, conducting 
communication authentication at the application layer only, using default pre-shared keys when 
necessary, allowing bi-directional authentication and following a challenge/response model are 
all IEC 62351-5 primary design principles (IEC, 2013).  
IEC 61850 (2013) standard entitled: “Communication networks and systems in 
Substations,” currently applies to substations; however, there are discussions within the IEC that 
61850 should expand its scope and include the power system from the switchgear up to the 
master station in serving their control and communication needs.  A completed set of IEC 61850 
standards will essentially form one integrated system comprising substation equipment. This 
system includes HV (high voltage)-switchgear, control systems, protective relays, and instrument 
transformers.  The communication network will be used for receiving trip commands from the 
protective relays, and measurements from the instrument transformers.  
In IEC 61850, all substation objects that communicate with each other are defined by the 
object-oriented data model. The respective object’s data and attributes are contained in logical 
nodes.  Each physical device’s properties and function allocation are contained in a device model 
within the node (IEC TC 57, 2003).  
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Security enhancements are required to implement and use IEC 61850 communication 
profiles in non-secure environments.  IEC 62351-6 is packaging five IEC 61850 security 
profiles: Sample Measured Values (SMV), GOOSE (analogue and digital multicast primarily for 
protective relaying), GSSE Management, and Client/Server (using TLS and MMS) (DOE, 2003).  
“IEC 62351-6 references IEC 62351-5” (DOE, 2003; IEC TC 57, 2003). 
The Process Control Systems Forum (PCSF) was created and funded by the Homeland 
Security/Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (DHS/HSARPA) (as cited in 
Ralston et al., 2006).  For the interim, it is being managed by a private/public Governing Board 
since being established in February 2005.  It was created with a focus on infrastructure control 
systems in response to the growing number of vulnerabilities in the increasingly automated, 
interdependent, and computerized operating environment (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  The 
design, development, and deployment of more secure legacy and control systems, crucial for 
securing CI, require an accelerated implementation plan; this is the mission of the PCSF 
(Ravindranath, 2006).  The PCSF interfaces with other organizations through working groups 
including international groups (DOE, 2003). There is still guidance needed on the actual analysis 
of the risk assessment that all of these groups’ risk analysis and assessment reports and 
guidelines highlight the need for, because they are not always specific. 
The Process Control Securities Requirements Forum (PCSRF) has formally stated the 
security requirements associated with CI2CS within a System Protection Profile (SPP).  The 
capabilities and security issues relevant to the national critical information infrastructure are 
discussed within those requirements.  ICSs comprised of electronic programmable components 
were defined as products where security capabilities would exist (National Information 
Assurance Partnership [NIAP], 2002). 
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A consortium of nonprofit, government, and academic organizations founded the Institute 
for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) in 2001 through the DHS (Trellue, 2005; as cited 
in Ralston et al., 2006).  Their purpose was to coordinate fundamental development efforts and 
research in information infrastructure protection. The I3P funded a research endeavor “Unifying 
Stakeholders and Security Programs” for addressing infrastructure interdependencies and 
SCADA vulnerabilities (Trellue, 2005; as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  Developing a risk 
assessment tool and methodology for supporting the development of inherently secure SCADA 
and PCS systems continues to be the main task of the I3P (Kertzner, Bodeau, Nitschke, Watters, 
Young, & Stoddard, 2006).  Another report relating to cyber security documents, Stoddard, 
Bodeau, Carlson, Glantz, Haimes, Lian, Santos, & Shaw (2005), included an extensive 
bibliography with a risk analysis overview.  It also explained how some of the existing security 
metrics’ tools identified applied to PCS (DOE, 2003).  
Over the past few years there has been a significant increase in the number of SCADA 
and PCS articles and guides published for providing assistance to users and vendors of those type 
of systems (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). The DOE, working with the President's Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board, has made available DOE (2005) white paper, 21 Steps to 
Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). The United 
Kingdom’s National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) has a similar guide 
entitled Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control 
Networks (2005) and has other security documents related to SCADA available (Chandia, 
Gonzalez, Kilpatrick, Papa & Shenoi, 2007; as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  There are also 
many PCS and SCADA white papers and guidance documents available from the Chemical 
Industry Data Exchange. 
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Risk Assessment Methods and Modelling 
Miller and Byres (2005) notes that the relative risk of particular control system 
implementations has yet to be articulated in many of the papers on the topic of control system 
vulnerabilities.   The procedures, policies, or technology used to protect cannot be determined 
until the vulnerabilities that can become threats and the resources needing protection are 
identified (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).    
RiskWatch is a commercial system that performs vulnerability assessments and 
quantitative or qualitative risk analyses provided by an automated tool.  The tool includes proven 
risk analysis analytic techniques, predefined risk analysis templates, comprehensive knowledge 
databases, data linking functions, and user friendly interfaces (RiskWatch white paper, 2002). 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) was 
developed at Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT Coordination Center.  Threats to critical assets 
are modeled using event/fault tree analyses.  It also provides a framework for identifying and 
managing information security risks that are used for setting a security strategy, identifying the 
risks to critical assets, and defining the current state of security. Its greatest value is gained in the 
fact that it only requires a small team to lead the assessment, although it relies on the knowledge 
of many employees to complete it (Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens, & Woody, 2003). 
There has been much work published relating to the assessment of risk, as such, an effort 
to categorize it has been somewhat challenging and difficult because in many instances the 
research is defined by several different aspects.  The major aspect considered in categorizing this 
research depends on which area (when assessing risk) and how much of that particular process is 
addressed.  
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In a manner that allows users the ability to select the most appropriate risk assessment 
method(s), the level of detail and approach were determined to be two of the more important 
attributes chosen by Campbell and Stamp (2004) to be used as a way of classifying them.  Their 
focus was on the overall availability of risk assessment tools. Risk assessment involves 
identification, analysis, evaluation and ranking of risk, and its management and treatment. (as 
cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
Qualitative risk assessment approaches have been described in some of the industry 
publications and government guidelines mentioned previously (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006). 
Georgia Institute of Technology (2003) researchers present a very systematic, but qualitative 
approach to assessing the general risk of information systems.  A procedure describing the 
benefits of countermeasures and threats resulting in computing losses, and the problem of risk 
management is organized and presented using a three-axis view of the threat space (Georgia 
Institute of Technology, 2003). 
CI have behavioral and operational characteristics that SNL have been able to provide 
valuable insight into by directly addressing these interdependencies through the development of 
several simulation and modeling approaches. As cited in Ralston et al. (2006), they created the 
following categories of detailed simulations and model interdependencies: 
• Aggregate supply and demand tools which evaluate the total demand for 
an infrastructure service and the ability to provide it, 
 
• Dynamic simulations to examine infrastructure operations, disruption 
effects, and downstream consequences, 
 
 
• Agent based models which model physical components and their 
interactions and operational characteristics, 
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• Physics based models that analyze aspects of infrastructure with standard 
engineering techniques, 
 
 
• Population mobility models primarily for transportation and social 
network study, and 
 
 
• Leontif Input-Output models which provide an aggregated, time-
independent analysis of generation, flow, and consumption of commodities 
among infrastructure sectors (Rinaldi, 2004). 
 
  
An integral part to infrastructure risk analyses includes such simulation modeling and abilities.   
Haimes (1981, 1998) declares hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) to be the most 
comprehensive risk identification methodology in such cases.  The diverse characteristics and 
attributes of a system are represented in this method.  All conceivable sources of risk to any 
infrastructure that uses SCADA, as well as the SCADA systems themselves, can be identified by 
using this method.  HHM is the ideal application for SCADA systems and their associated 
interconnected and interdependent infrastructures because risks in the total system, through the 
evaluation of subsystem risks and their corresponding contributions can be easily facilitated 
through its use (Ezell, 1998).  The railroad sector identified sources of SCADA system risk using 
this method (Chittester and Haimes, 2004). 
The risk filtering, ranking, and management method (RFRM), as described by Haimes, 
Kaplan, and Lambert (2002), identifies risks by building off HHM.  RFRM takes HHM a number 
of steps further in risk prioritization by applying filters and assigning rankings.  RFRM begins by 
using HHM to identify risk in the initial step of its eight-phase process.  Once those risks are 
identified, they proceed through phases involving a variety of risk filtering scenarios where   
quantitative ranking is determined, before ultimately finishing with the management and 
feedback phase. 
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Many coupled CI are rendered to be at great risk from cyber-attacks due to their 
interdependencies where, most often, SCADA systems are used to remotely manage and control 
them.  Although HHM can be used for identifying risk sources, inoperability input-output 
modeling (IIM) is needed to quantify the efficacy of risk management.  Accounting for both the 
intra and interconnectedness with each infrastructure is enabled by using Leontief’s-based IIM.  
An attack triggers the initial perturbation providing input to the system which returns the risks of 
inoperability results as outputs. The percentage of dysfunctionality and economic inoperability, 
measured in dollars lost, represent two different output metrics.  This method is used by Haimes 
and Chittester (2005) for quantifying economic losses and their propagation through the various 
economic sectors where SCADA systems are used for controlling large scale civil infrastructures 
over IP communication networks.  A cyber intrusion into the telecommunication sector and the 
perturbation that resulted is presented in a case study by Haimes and Chittester (2005).  Crowther 
and Haimes (2005) describes IIM in more detail and provides additional case studies. 
The methods of IIM, RFRM, and HHM were applied, by Crowther, Dicdican, Leung, 
Lian, Haimes, Lambert, Horowitz and Santos (2004), to Virginia’s Interdependent transportation 
system as a way of assessing and managing the risk of terrorism.  Interdependent sectors can be 
adversely affected through propagation of a failure in the transportation infrastructure.  Crowther 
et al. (2004) assessed the consequences of those failures by applying a methodology and using a 
computer tool they developed.    
Chance processes are studied in modern probability theory.  This is when predictions for 
future experiments are influenced by the outcomes from knowledge gained by previous 
experiments.  It is postulated that an event’s collective past outcomes could have an influence in 
predicting the next experiment through an observation of a sequence of chance experiments.  A. 
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A. Markov began studying an important new type of chance process in 1907 (Jurafsky & James, 
2006).  In this process, which is called a Markov chain, the outcome of the next experiment 
could be affected by the outcome of the given experiment.  (Jurafsky & James, 2006). 
The characterization of an infrastructure’s performance and condition requires 
developing metrics that can be used in furthering the research of interdependent systems. Nozick, 
Turnquist, Jones, Davis & Lawton (2005) applied Markov and semi-Markov processes to 
network links as way of reflecting their uncertain capacity.  An analysis of both steady-state and 
transient concerns regarding service availability is allowed using this Markov-based approach.  
They used a small-scale SCADA system for demonstrating this approach.  Although difficult to 
obtain, empirical data is needed for parameter estimates in many model structures.  It is 
imperative that these estimates are good since valid outcomes are dependent upon it. 
As a way of observing real world events and determining the likelihood that those events 
may re-occur it is useful to utilize a Markov chain.  Unfortunately, some of the events we have 
an interest in cannot be observed directly; they are hidden.  As such, a Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) considers events that can be viewed as well as hidden events all in the context of a 
probabilistic model (Jurafsky & James, 2006). 
Pak (2011) argues that risk assessments conducted on IS today may not be valid 
tomorrow due to the dynamics of the computing environment.  Pak (2011) further states that 
although manual risk assessment methods are good for evaluating threats and vulnerabilities, 
they are not adequate for operational networks.  In order to respond to today’s changing threat 
environment, risk assessments must be proactive, timely, and be able to predict future risk 
factors (Pak and Cannady, 2009).  To cope with the dynamics of today’s ISs, a risk assessment 
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must be able to continuously calculate risk in a dynamically changing environment (Pak and 
Cannady, 2010).  Pak (2011) used HMM’s to develop a near real-time risk assessment 
methodology.  Future risk levels of organizational assets were predicted by applying the HMM 
successfully; thereby, providing a prompt and current threat environment risk assessment in a 
near real-time manner.  Using this method, organizational stakeholders were able to see near 
real-time mission-critical asset risk levels and plan countermeasures, mitigate the vulnerabilities, 
and justify their options based on a cost-benefit analysis (Houmb, Franqueira & Engum, 2009). 
 PRA is a method used to analyze risks relating to all aspects of a technological entity.  It 
reviews the entire process, including potential design, building and operation, and end of use. 
(Stamatelatos, 2000).  Unlike HMM, a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) does not provide a 
guidance method; although the risk identification phase is technically included, it assumes the 
risk can be identified by the designer.  PRA includes methods other than use logic diagrams and 
directed graphs; there is also event tree analysis (ETA), all fault/attack (FTA) tree analyses, 
cause/consequence analysis (CCA), and failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) or 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996).  A combination or 
extension of these methods make up most of the other methods.  Varying degrees of the methods 
mentioned earlier are incorporated into many of the tools (as cited in Ralston, et al., 2006). 
The characterization of risk can be described as the likelihood of an action occurring 
resulting in an adverse consequence, as measured by its magnitude (or severity), and the given 
adverse consequence. Consequences are expressed numerically in PRAs, and frequencies or 
probabilities express their likelihood to occur.  Answering just three questions is generally 
acceptable for determining risk: Can something go wrong - what? Is it likely – how? Are there 
consequences – what are they? (Kaplan and Barrick, 1981).  PRA answers these by: initiating 
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events or using a set of developed scenarios for discovering what can go wrong; the probability 
that any of the scenarios occur; and, lastly their consequential estimates (as cited in Ralston, et 
al., 2006).  The PRA is helpful in making informed decisions through the development and 
presentation of a set of scenarios, frequencies, and associated consequences (Kaplan and Barrick, 
1981).  PRA evaluates “risk metrics”, which refers to the probability of an event (Stamatelalos, 
2002) (as cited in Ralston, et al., 2006).  Applying this technique is the most difficult task, as it 
requires determining needed probabilities of basic events.  
What is needed as a way of reducing risks is a quantitative way for determining an 
attack’s particular probability impact and countermeasure outcome based on the determined risk 
reduction.  As cited in Ralston, Graham, & Patel (2006), it is important that after applying 
modifications there is the ability for determining whether risk reduction is achieved or not.  
There are many published works containing simple risk reduction calculations (Tolbert, 2005). 
Tolbert (2005) used three factors: frequency product; occurrence likelihood; and severity (based 
on an arbitrarily selected scale of one to five) for calculating a risk metric.  It is applied before 
and after a system is modified. 
Ralston et al., 2006 analyzes the stages of a possible attack in conjunction with the 
attacker’s skill level (as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  McQueen, Boyer, Flynn and Beitel (2006) 
offers remedial actions for a set of control systems and a calculation for estimating risk reduction 
to a SCADA system.  
Calculating risk reduction applicable to SCADA security can also be performed using 
PRA. The effect of an overall attack on the highest event probability can be computed by setting 
a specific threat probability of a lower event to zero simply by adding a security enhancement. 
67 
 
 
Other work by Graham, Patel and Ralston (2006) combines vulnerability tree and attack tree 
methods making use of augmented vulnerability trees.  They have also developed a tool for 
quantifying SCADA systems risk that employs two indices for modeling risk. 
Cyber & Physical Security/Threats  
Attacks on SCADA and DCS are more prevalent than ever before due to the internet’s 
widespread use, the attack vectors available, and the vulnerabilities they face.  Researchers and 
plant managers have been alerted by industry, security experts, system vendors, and the 
government who have all recognized the vast amount of information available through the many 
discussions, reports, and papers. Because emphasis in the electricity sector has largely been on 
performance and reliability, and not security, since historically many of these systems stand 
alone and are isolated, the move to accept these SCADA and PCS vulnerabilities have been slow 
by many in the industrial community.  Novak (2005) points out that typical network threats now 
make these systems vulnerable because of their connections to company networks and the 
internet, and that these threats are exacerbated by the business and economic processes that are 
tightly integrated with SCADA systems.  
There has been a tremendous increase in security awareness for PCS and SCADA 
systems with an emphasis on the growing problem of being able to recognize threats, then using 
the vast amount of information available, learning how to find solutions to preventing them 
(Alper, 2005; Miller, 2005; Singer & Weiss, 2005; Byres & Lowe, 2005).  Much of this security 
technology information is introduced and explained in detail.  This information covers areas such 
as: hardening operating systems (Geer, 2006); system hardware hardening and network 
architecture (Creery and Byres, 2005); vulnerability testing and assessment (Strickles, Ozog & 
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Mohindra, 2003; Byres & Franz, 2006); and security monitoring of networks, encryption, and 
intrusion detection (Peterson, 2004; as cited in Ralston et al., 2006).  It is pointed out in Geer’s 
article that network access to systems where the proper functioning of the control application is 
required, could ultimately be closed as a result of hardening the operating system.  It is further 
noted that employees will most likely circumvent security in situations where control systems 
become difficult to use as a result of the improper implementation of the controls used to secure 
them.  Geer (2006) goes on to warn users about attempting to adopt an ideal security approach, 
all the while leaving a gap in search of the perfect solution.  Instead, Geer (2016) advises that 
users should take interim steps to use what is effective and available now.   
There is the potential an attacker may carry out a range of attacks against the network 
should they gain unauthorized access to the SCADA network.  Literature from Carlson (2002); 
Risley et al. (2003), and Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone (2013) describe many of these possible 
attacks.  Some appliances used for defending against unauthorized network access, which work 
well in conjunction with one another, include IDSs and firewalls. Stamp et al. (2003) notes that it 
is many IDS are not able to review SCADA information for questionable activity; this is a 
similar problem with firewalls. However, the development problem with firewalls for SCADA 
networks are not as complicated as the development problems of IDS solutions.  Simply by 
knowing a SCADA’s protocol structure, firewalls can be developed.  However, knowledge of the 
SCADA protocol’s vulnerabilities are required for developing IDS rules to recognize an attack. 
A considerable number of vulnerability assessments of SCADA protocols were conducted to 
acquire this knowledge (Igure, Laughter, and Williams, 2005).  
There has been a push by the federal government, particularly from the DOE and DHS, 
encouraging ICS vendors to have their products include built-in security (Carlson, 2005).  There 
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is also a need for investing more in securing private sector networks by CI owners.  Many of 
these vendors are addressing this concern.  One example is the Experion Process Knowledge 
System R300 by Honeywell.  It protects the controller network, using embedded cyber security, 
against message flooding and denial of service attacks. Other vendors include Plantdata 
Technologies (Pollett, 2006) and Rockwell Automation.  Plantdata boasts that the new type of 
firewall they recently developed delivers a higher level of network segmentation and defense due 
to the way it is distributed throughout the control system environment. 
Communication and software vulnerabilities are as important as security vulnerabilities in 
control hardware (Byres & Franz, 2006).   Byres and Franz (2006) state that software failures are 
not responsible for many of the ICS vulnerabilities, but instead have resulted from failed 
procedural or administrative security controls.  Mis-configuration vulnerabilities, inherent 
protocol vulnerabilities, implementation vulnerabilities, and product design vulnerabilities are all 
part of a product’s lifecycle.  Byres and Franz (2006) suggest that vulnerabilities be classified as 
to how and where in the lifecycle they entered.  The last point they make is that ICS security will 
become an expected quality assurance issue as these controls are embedded into the products and 
cooperation between the users, vendors, and standards bodies result in proper security 
expectations that lead to more experience and testing.   
As a way of improving business and government processes discussed repeatedly in the 
media, an exploitation of IS efficiencies are being explored by James, Mabry, St. Leger, Cook 
and Huggins (2012).  Therefore, an estimation of the cyber-physical situation requires 
capabilities for the continuation of incremental fielding.  James et al. (2012) proposes an 
approach that achieves a science and framework for subjective validation of compositions of 
components that comprise an approximation of the behaviors of objective experimentation and 
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the domain of interest in order to achieve incremental fielding capabilities with tools used to 
estimate the cyber-physical situation (James et al, 2012).  
There is a new emphasis in the response to physical breaches (break-ins) and 
unauthorized entries into unmanned CI locations and sites where these incidents have been 
historically viewed as traditional property crimes only (Henry, 2006).  Today it is necessary to 
consider the possibility of dispatching the cyber security incident response team (CSIRT) to 
those facilities containing ICS after such an incident. Although, this might not seem to apply 
where it is apparent the incident was obviously a case of vandalism, theft or trespass and 
considered to be the intruder’s sole motive.  However, when electrical power substations are 
involved, an emerging concern to consider is what was traditionally thought of as typical 
physical crimes may now have more nefarious implications, as those tactics become a ruse for 
shielding a more sinister cyber-crime, especially with an increase in the use of remote control 
and monitoring of unmanned facilities (Swartz and Assante, 2014).  An example is breaching the 
security of an electrical substation or unmanned generator facility and stealing equipment or 
materials.  Although this could genuinely be an actual property theft or burglary, in this day and 
age, an event such as this may be a decoy to a real, more insidious motive of distracting the asset 
owner’s investigation and attention elsewhere.  Swartz and Assante (2014) inquire about the 
effect if the motive is access to the systems and devices within an area such that the individual 
can conduct future attacks, and misappropriate confidential and proprietary information. 
Today’s open market offers literally thousands of readily available network surveillance 
products and high-capacity keystroke loggers.  In fact, many remote-access Trojans (RAT) 
include key loggers.  Although they are extremely easy to use, they can be difficult to detect.  
They can be wireless or wired, and/or software or hardware based. USB keyboard emulators also 
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possess the potential for exploiting systems.  Because emulators are used for initiating keystrokes 
versus simply recording them, some emulators could be designed for malicious purposes posing 
an even greater threat than key loggers (Swartz and Assante, 2014). 
Swartz and Assante (2014) growing understanding of the Stuxnet worm, originally 
carried in on a USB stick, demonstrates the effectiveness of surreptitiously gaining physical 
access to private or isolated networks. Security professionals often employ such tactics when 
conducting sanctioned network penetration tests for corporate clients. Another timely article 
reported that an unmarked computer had been discovered running in a spare room of Iceland’s 
Parliament (Swartz and Assante, 2014).  It was seized by police, and its exact purpose has not yet 
been determined or revealed.  However, the fact that it was an unauthorized device connected to 
their network and was devoid of fingerprints or identifying serial numbers suggests malicious 
intent (Swartz and Assante, 2014). 
Production Facility Electrical, Construction, and Maintenance  
Understanding the various sources of noise is essential in recognizing the interference of 
legitimate signals and data degradation transmitting across the network.  The reference to noise 
is not confined to acoustics alone.  Identifying and eliminating noise (Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 
2005) is a key part of continuous network troubleshooting and maintenance, and remains to be a 
major concern of LAN network certification, testing, and installation. Poor workmanship 
performed on cabling can create internally generated noise along with that emanating from 
external sources such as that of nearby transmission lines and equipment in the form of 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) (Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 2005). 
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Managing noise becomes an increasingly important issue as network performance levels 
and bandwidths continue to escalate.  There is a greater susceptibility to interference from 
shorter signal pulses, and more data is packed into shorter time cycles for achieving higher 
speed.  Most often there is an unfortunate subtle degradation of performance before there is a 
hard failure of the network caused by the negative effects of noise.  Noise interference can cause 
data to be improperly received resulting in retransmission of data which essentially creates 
network congestion all the while slowing down the completion of the data transfer (Pivonka and 
Mazzuchelli, 2005). 
Normal mode and common mode network noise are just a few types of noise varieties 
Pivonka and Mazzuchelli (2005) explain in their literature.  There is no relationship to the 
fundamental frequency bearing from the disturbance of a waveform representing noise at its 
basic level, and; thereby, interfering with its capabilities of carrying the waveform's signal. Since 
a dependency exists with signal integrity to maintain the differential relationship between the 
wiring pairs, common mode noise in twisted-pair networks is of particular importance.   
The difference in potential between two physically remote grounds creates common 
mode noise.  An antenna can be created from an ungrounded shielded cable or poor ground 
system causing an induced voltage to be gathered and applied to the input.  This type of noise, 
particularly with today's high frequency networks, is becoming more problematic by increasing 
the frequency of the noise, thereby, making it hard to eliminate (Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 
2005).  Pulses from individual signals become much less distinct when a data signal which 
contains a lot of noise is severely differentiated, or attenuated through natural capacitance, thus 
making data reaching the far end of the transmission less likely to be received correctly (Pivonka 
and Mazzuchelli, 2005). 
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With network speeds constantly increasing and circuit logic voltage levels simultaneously 
decreasing, the ability to maintain precise waveforms is becoming even more difficult.  As 
described by Pivonka and Mazzuchelli (2005), major effects to a link's data-carrying capabilities 
can occur in the presence of noise levels at less than 1V and can have a major effect even when 
using 3V logic at 350 MHz rates for transmitting signals. 
A major factor contributing to test failures in LAN links is caused by external noise, such 
as EMI sources.  Unintentional radio frequency (RF) signals can be emitted from a variety of 
devices, such as office equipment, power lines, fluorescent lights, computers, stereo and 
television sets, power tools, and factory floor production equipment, and thus can radiate EMI 
(Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 2005).  Particularly difficult environments, causing cross-coupling 
across nearby cable links and providing routes to ground from many different signals, include 
wiring closets and patch panels. 
Data cables in areas where the surrounding building is poorly grounded can suffer from 
the radiated effects imposed on them as a result of the prevailing neutral-to-ground voltage 
conditions.  The use of shielded cabling may seem obvious for reducing external radiated energy; 
however, there is a side issue to consider.  The building ground should be an important aspect of 
shielded cable worth remembering since the shielding is typically tied to it. Therefore, it follows 
that in a poorly grounded building, the cable shielding does not provide a benefit by cancelling 
or eliminating the noise, but in fact may actually contribute to it (Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 
2005).   
The first and most critical step in troubleshooting noise-related failures, relating to noise 
detection and analysis, is the ability to distinguish between different sources and types of noise.  
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However, some test instruments see different types of noise the same.  These testers may see 
what looks like radiated noise from external sources when in fact it is nothing more than a form 
of crosstalk caused by the energy radiating between pairs (Pivonka and Mazzuchelli, 2005). 
Technicians may discover a “false failure” in instances where cabling proximity is too close to 
external noise radiation; resulting in wasted time troubleshooting a non-existent problem. 
In Pivonka and Mazzuchelli (2005) final analysis, field test instrument requirements are 
re-emphasized to ensure they have the capabilities for conducting noise testing throughout the 
entire network.  They must be able to isolate, identify, analyze, and measure the noise in that 
environment within close precision to the specifications required or recommended by 
International Standards Organization (ISO) and Technology Industry Association (TIA) 
standards. 
Sensors 
The normal or typical PC has no “senses” per se, in that it does not “know” what is 
happening in its surroundings; as the typical PC configuration is not set up to distinguish or 
determine whether it is noisy or quiet, dark or light, or cold or hot (Copley, 2015).  However, 
there are onboard components that can provide that information and make it interactive with the 
user.  For example, modern tablets, laptops, notebooks, and cellphones use either an ambient 
light sensor or camera lens to adjust the screen brightness depending on the environment’s 
ambient light and user settings.  Also, digital thermal sensors (DTS) used for measuring a PC’s 
central processing unit (CPU) temperature will activate and control the performance of that 
system’s cooling fan.  Unfortunately, the DTS may not be able to reconcile the CPU temperature 
with that of the environmental temperature of the user.  Unlike the DTS, some components are 
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purpose built for more user specific functions, such as the camera functionality simply being 
there for taking pictures or making movies.  PCs can, however, obtain additional functionality 
and utility by knowing its environment with the addition of specific types of sensors.  A sensor 
can record real-world activity (i.e. temperature) into information that can be analyzed by a 
computer.  temperature) (Copley, 2015).  The senses we use as humans for knowing what is 
happening within our environment are our: skin, nose, mouth, ears, and eyes.  Table 2 lists the 
types of sensors and their corresponding detection properties.   
Computer and industrial control systems rely extensively on sensors for performing data 
logging, measuring, and monitoring tasks.  A sensor is used to measure a specific property which 
Table 2. Sensor and Detection (Copley, 2015) 
Sensor What it Detects 
Movement Motion-Still/Active 
Proximity Distance-Far/Close 
Switch or button Contact-Open/Closed 
Pressure Resistance-Negative/Positive  
Moisture Wet/Dry 
Temperature Hot/Cold 
Light Bright/Dark 
Water-level Empty/Full 
is received and processed by the computer.  An Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) is used for 
converting analog signals into digital data a PC can process (Copley, 2015). 
Summary 
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The literature review begins with an administrative overview to explain and provide a 
better understanding of the importance and expectations that the federal government, through its 
rules and regulations, has placed upon industries that make up our nation’s CI, in an effort to 
make them more secure.  The electricity sector has had mandates placed upon it by the federal 
government so that they must comply with a set of prescriptive measures in implementing cyber 
security requirements.   In order to understand all the attention that industries reliant upon control 
systems are receiving, it is necessary to recognize their function and the role they play in our 
everyday life.  
The literature review concentrates on the area pertaining to ICSs such as SCADA, PLC’s, 
and DCS’s and the security challenges surrounding it.  Control systems are used in a variety of 
industries such as manufacturing, power systems, and water treatment.  Some of these industries 
are critical to the safety and economic security of our nation.  These industries have been 
categorized by the DHS as CI.  The power industry particularly has not only come under 
tremendous regulatory scrutiny on environmental issues, but also of that pertaining to its cyber 
security state and the rigid security controls now placed upon it.   
ICS used in our nation’s CI are under constant attack.  Early on there was a clear 
distinction between the particular functions and purposes that information and control systems 
performed; however, within the past ten years, control systems have evolved to integrate more 
with information systems.  This makes for a less than desirable situation as aging control systems 
are being replaced with these hybrid systems. Whereas control systems had little in the way of 
security, information systems had and continue to place more focus on this area.  However, 
unlike information systems, the reliability and dependability of a control system is vital, and the 
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processes are more volatile; therefore, current security controls are often an impediment to those 
two factors. 
The literature review continues by expanding the focus from CI2CS into other areas that 
elaborate on details relative to the proposed research.  These other areas consider: differences 
between control and information systems; functions they perform; environments in which they 
operate; communication standards between them; vulnerabilities and how one might be 
introduced; types of sensor input and sensory receptors; automation concepts; network 
configurations; and risk mitigation methods.  The review also includes and concludes with 
current literature addressing industry best practices and other research focused around control 
system security. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Overview 
 
 
Building off previous research models and designs for determining near real-time risk 
assessments using HMM’s by Pak (2011), Pak and Cannady (2009), and Pak and Cannady 
(2010); and, SCADA test-beds by Moore, Ellison, and Linger (2001), Jung, Song, and Kim 
(2008), Hahn, Ashok, Sridhar, and Govindarasu (2013), Richardson and Chavez (2008) and 
Giani et. al. (2008), this research was conducted in a physical test-bed environment. By 
segregating networks and using independent sensor-based spatial supervision, as well as 
appropriately applying mean and variance equations, current risk levels of control system 
performance were determined; thereby, providing a prompt and current threat environment risk 
assessment of control system assets in a real-time manner. 
The test-bed was designed in a manner similar to those from prior research models.  
Idaho, Argonne, Sandia, and Pacific Northwest National Labs, and the British Columbia Institute 
of Technology are all nationally recognized SCADA test-beds.  On a smaller scale, Morris 
(2010), as previously referenced, has been conducting SCADA research since 2010, using a 
government funded test-bed at Mississippi State University.  This research design closely 
resembled the Morris (2010) model, as there were certain requirements necessary for it to be 
recognized as a “legitimate” SCADA test-bed.  The factors listed in Morris’ design were 
considered in choosing the control system components and designing the architecture used for 
this test-bed. 
A test-bed permits the design of a custom fitted environment that allows more control 
over the variables; thereby, enabling the research to be conducted more efficiently and precisely 
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by further decreasing the incremental frequency involved in fine tuning the production 
environment to that of its spatial sensors.  This control allowed the processes’ inputs and/or 
outputs (I/O), and reaction or response to the activity, to be properly scaled and calibrated before 
contemplating the application of applying it to a real-world application. 
Research Methods Employed 
 
This research considered a quantitative approach that took into account the actual real- 
time spatial, along with the physical, operating environment of a CI2CS, by using a variety of 
sensory inputs during random sampling, and evaluating that data against the system’s operational 
assets and network activity (i.e., motors, pumps, real-time packet captures) and log data which 
arguably reflected the anticipated and expected condition of the operating environment it in 
essence created during that sampling instance. The functions and processes of a CI2CS 
environment, including its spatial conditioning, are accomplished through the control system (not 
withstanding any air-gapped safety controls such as halon fire suppression, safety disconnect 
switches, etc.); therefore, its entire environmental state can be considered a by-product of that 
space along with the objects it comprises and controls. 
In an effort to effectively achieve detecting probabilities of a near to real-time risk (RTR), 
an actual CI2CS type of network environment (test-bed) comprised of a HMI, PLC, field 
device(s), and data historian along with access to electronic perimeter protection safeguards, such 
as a firewall, IDS, and IPS was assembled.  As Pak (2011) suggests, it is more feasible to use a 
prototype network using a virtual environment such as Simulink and MATLAB applications, 
albeit in this case a physical control system versus a virtual one was employed as the test-bed, 
but a prototype none-the-less.  All the necessary threat analysis and risk assessments were 
conducted in the prototype network (Pak, 2011). 
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This approach required several steps made up of tasks and sub-tasks, with the first step 
being the selection of a CI sector whose business process involved an operational or production 
environment that created a sufficient amount of production activity. The second step required 
determining the physical environment and defining the space(s) and objects that fulfilled the 
business process of that environment (test-bed development). The third step was to define or 
describe the function(s) and processes of that environment.  In this case, the test-bed environment 
mimicked a chemical processing plant.  The fourth step involved the development of a control 
system network and automating the processes.  The fifth step involved developing a sensory 
programming module, known as a SDAPU.  The sixth and fundamentally crucial step of the test-
bed development was the establishment of an operational baseline to comparatively model data 
captured from the affected CI2CS and its environment, both in and out of operation/service.  The 
baseline was used as the underlying foundation in recognizing and illustrating “normalcy”, and it 
essentially set the gold standard for future system modeling and initial algorithm design. The 
seventh and final step required evaluating the data with an algorithm for processing the data in a 
way to determine and alert to a suspected or known risk emanating from within the system’s 
internal virtual or external physical environment, but still within its confined space. 
Other activities involved sub-tasks such as performing ongoing “tuning” (necessary in 
determining the threshold values required for comparing sensory to system data over a set period 
of time), acquiring and installing assets and sensors, and automating the production environment. 
Table 3 shows the steps and related tasks, as discussed above, that were used in carrying out the 
proposed research.  The aim of the steps, tasks, and sub-tasks were to meet two control 
objectives.  The first objective was to establish a suitable test-bed.  The second objective, and 
dependent upon the first, was to ascertain quality and viable results. 
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Table 3. Steps, Tasks and Sub-Tasks Research Requirements 
Steps 
No. Task Sub-task 
1 Selection of one of the 16 critical 
infrastructures industries as ranked 
by DHS (a pre-requisite to any 
selection is the necessity for 
operational/production noise) 
Identifying a process or set of processes performed by 
an industry providing an environment rich with stimuli 
 
 
Providing noise abatement 
Ensuring rigidity and stability to structure 
Implementing physical security controls 
Enabling adequate access in and out and to and from 
test-bed 
2 Defining the physical environment 
of the selected mock industry 
(spatial parameters – closet, cabinet, 
room, building, warehouse, yard, 
etc.) 
3 Equipping and defining the mock 
industries’ functions and operational 
assets and processes 
Installing assets 
4 Develop control system network and 
automate processes 
Starting operations  
Configuring processes  
Tuning production processes 
Evaluate assets and conditions for sensor installation 
(i.e., temperature, vapor, audible, vibration, light, 
moisture, pressure, movement) 
5 Develop SDAPU Identify various environmental noise (for use in 
sensory perception) baseline  
Collect data from both noise and 
operational/production processes 
6 Establish operational processing 
baseline 
Analyze and compare data 
Synchronize baselines (tune as necessary) 
Monitor and record operating activity for specified 
duration as required  
Confirm baseline values for consistency/deviation 
7 Develop algorithm for comparing 
control system data to spatial data 
and evaluate the data 
Introduce exploit into control system network  
Observe, record, and monitor behavior of processing 
environment  
Record, monitor, and observe reaction of the SDAPU 
Acknowledge SDAPU alarm  
Document and analyze findings 
 
Selecting the Sector - Step One 
 
The test-bed was comprised of a type of environment that generated various types of 
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activity dynamic enough for producing the stimuli sufficient for stimulating sensor input; 
therefore, identifying an appropriate business, its functions, and type of environment was a pre-
requisite and fundamental step in designing the experiment. Although there are sixteen CI 
sectors classified by DHS as mainstays to America’s security and economic interest, not all are 
involved in manufacturing, and of the few that are, they do not necessarily have the conditions 
for generating sufficient “environmental noise”.   
Environmental noise in a control system environment can be compared to what some 
system manufacturers refer to as a heartbeat.  A heartbeat is described as regular repeated signals 
resulting from systems, and evidencing normal activity within a system.  These signals can be 
configured into the equipment.  If the heartbeat is atypical of the norm, then this means that there 
is an issue.  If there is corruption or unauthorized entry, problems will occur. (DOE, 2014)   
As a way of emulating a legitimate CI facility, the test-bed was designed and built around 
the chemical sector in the form of a “specialty chemicals” processing facility. 
Physical Environment - Step Two 
 
The materials used in fabricating the test-bed manufacturing floor mimicked that of its 
real-world counterpart.  This is an important detail when considering sensory tuning, especially 
as it relates to vibration, noise, and temperature. Vapor detection and visual indicators such as 
those that detect gases and liquids rely more on internal stimulus within a controlled and 
confined area than that in a well-ventilated or open exterior area.  Vapor refers to non-visible 
gases for example such as carbon monoxide.  Visual indicators are such things as movement, 
colors, fumes or moisture.  For example, wetness detected on an exterior concrete pad might be 
more indicative of rain than a leaking pipe.  However, wetness detected inside a facility should 
not be from rain and most likely is not, but instead is indicative of a leaking water line, tank, 
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pump, or other component related to systems involving liquids.  Therefore, relying on a 
moisture sensor outside a facility for the purpose of detecting moisture from tanks or leaking 
pipes may not be wise while it is raining, as it would be using a pressure sensor and flow meter.  
However, inside the facility a moisture/wetness sensor would be equally practical and efficient 
as a flow meter or pressure sensor. 
All the assets were positioned and mounted horizontally on two, three by five foot 
Durock cement boards’ butted side-by-side forming its base.  Durock cement board was used to 
provide a foundation similar to that of concrete flooring, the material used in the majority of 
industrial commercial production facilities.  There were two-foot-high walls, framed by metal 
studs, enclosing all four sides.  The foundation was elevated two feet off the ground.  Foam 
board insulation was used to fill the cavities between the studs.  A flat metal roof, as used in 
most, if not all, industrial manufacturing facilities was affixed to the top of the scaled chemical 
processing structure (facility).  The roof was insulated similarly to that of commercial buildings 
used for the same purpose.  Insulation foam was used to seal the cracks between the foam 
board. 
Design (Equipping Mock Industry with Operational Assets) - Step Three 
 
The actual processing equipment, Table 4, consisted of COTS products that were not 
necessarily designed to be used in industrial applications, such as production environments.  
However, these products were designed and chosen to closely resemble those used for such an 
application in such an environment.  The assets selected for this research withstood the rigors 
placed upon them.  
The industry selected for this system design was modeled after a CI chemical 
manufacturing facility that processes extremely toxic chemical fluids. Since the fluids are 
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highly toxic, processing is performed through a variety of automated processes without direct 
Table 4. List of Automation Assets used in CI2CS Test-bed 
 
Qty Item Automated Process Purpose 
1 Motor Prime Mover Simulates fuel source for generator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Generator    Powered mini-grid Produces power to simulate grid 
4 Pumps    Fluid Transfer Transfers fluid from supply tanks to product tank 
then back to supply tanks to recycle batch process 
1 Robotic Arm Assigned Movement Simulating the fill, alignment, placing, and 
emptying test tubes    in and out of centrifuge rotor 
1 Centrifuge Spin down fluids Separating dense particles from less dense particles 
within fluids 
 
human interaction. These automated processes are accomplished using pumps for fluid 
transfer, a robotic arm for material handling, a centrifuge for fluid separation (in a mock 
quality control sampling process), and a SEIG that although functional, only simulated 
supplying power to the robotic arm.   
The control system assets, also referred to as critical cyber assets or cyber systems (if 
made up of more than one cyber asset), would normally have had occasional human 
interaction, but in this case, were in fact continuously monitored during each production 
cycle.  The control system cyber assets included a: firewall; network tap; two switches (one 
managed and one unmanaged); one notebook; and, three laptops.  Table 5 contains an 
inventory of the control system cyber assets including its function and purpose.  
As much of a limitation COTS products proved to be, it would equally contribute to 
the expected, albeit accelerated, degradation of performance that would occur from a 
compromised environment, especially when brought on suddenly or sporadically, such as that 
from a virus introduced into the control system or simply a mechanical failure. However, in 
an otherwise stable and normal operating environment, the sensor network baseline would 
naturally trend toward the declining performance in-between maintenance intervals, so that 
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Table 5. List of Cyber Assets used in CI2CS Test-bed 
 
Manufacturer Qty Type Function Purpose Model OS/Firm 
      ware/Soft 
      ware 
 
Dell 1 Laptop Engineer 
Workstation 
Programming Test-bed 
Control System 
(Connected Components 
Workbench) 
Vostro 
1200 
Win 7 
Dell 1 Laptop Operator 
Workstation 
Process monitoring Inspirion Win 7 
Toshiba 1 Notebook Security 
Platform 
Software based IDS – 
Snort 
NB310 Win 7 
Dell 1 Laptop Server KepWare Log 
Server/Historian 
Latitude Win 7 
 
Cisco 1 Firewall Security 
Appliance 
Network device and 
Port management 
ASA 5505 Cisco 
Netgear 1 Managed Switch Networking Managed Control 
System Switch 
ProSafe 
GS108E 
Cisco 
Netgear 1 Switch Networking DMZ ProSafe 
FS105NA 
Cisco 
US Robotics 1 Tap Network 
Aggregator 
Unidirectional 
communication to IDS 
USR4503 None 
 
false positives were eliminated or at least minimized.  No decline in performance was noted 
during this experiment. 
Develop Control System Network and Automate Processes - Step Four 
 
The configuration of the application processes initially involved automating the 
functions of the production assets in order to accomplish their intended task of processing a 
chemical solution by: transferring, back-filling, centrifuging and separating. The substantive 
stimuli outputs focused on during this four-task process included the pumps used for general 
fluid transfer and the robotic arm used in the simulated sampling process.  The functions for the 
robotic arm were controlled with an Arduino Uno.   
The centrifuge, generator, motor, and pumps were all automated; however, a certain 
number of alterations or modifications were made so that the devices would perform as 
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intended.  This particularly related to the centrifuge being fitted with a solid-state relay for 
switching the PLC 12 VDC output to the 110 VAC line voltage powering the test-bed.  The 220 
VAC three-phase motor was connected to a 120 VAC motor controller, also known as a 
variable frequency drive, and was used in rotating the shaft of the SEIG.  The robotic arm was 
the only device that functioned using an Arduino to independently control it.  The remainder of 
the automated assets used in the production process were controlled with an Allen Bradley PLC. 
The task specific functions differed between the Arduino Uno and PLC in that the Uno 
controlled the robotic arm performing the simulated sampling task, that involved the collection 
and placement of a vial from the tank area to the centrifuge area, while the PLC instructed and 
controlled the sequence of tasks performed throughout the entire process; including the 
initialization of the Uno.  A SEIG was used to provide stimuli and simulate a grid; however, it 
did not apply power to the equipment performing any of the automated tasks.  This is explained 
in chapter four. 
After the robotic arm simulated loading the rotor of the centrifuge, the centrifuge 
operated for two minutes.  Two minutes was chosen as a general time used in such a 
process, relative to the type of solution being spun down, and the consistency of the product 
being manufactured, but more importantly it enriched the environment with additional 
stimuli for an ample length of time.   
A complete production cycle was considered finished once the centrifuge rotor came 
to a rest.  However, this only applied before beginning the next cycle and not as it related to 
the data logging during that period of time.  Data logging ended once the OPC server 
registered a zero value for the centrifuge process. 
There were four pumps installed in the test-bed and they were used to move the fluid 
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from two “supply” tanks into the “product” tank.  One of the two pumps connected to the 
product tank pumped the fluid from a supply tank, labeled A, for a set period of time before 
pumping fluid from the supply tank, labeled B, for a set period of time.  Once the transfer 
had been completed, a single pump connected to each of the supply tanks would replace the 
water taken by the product tank pumps.  The entire “batch processing” design for 
transferring fluid resembled that of the DHS, INL test-bed. 
There were only very brief and intermittent pauses throughout the process.  As one 
process ended, another began.  All of these processes, although performed in sequence and 
not simultaneously, provided a sufficient number of stimuli that created a dynamically rich 
environment and offered a large number of variations to the sensory baseline.  A list of 
control system assets such as a PLC, motor controller and HMI are included in Table 6. 
Table 6. List of CI2CS Process Control Assets used in Test-bed 
 
Manufacturer Qty Type Function Purpose Model OS/Firm 
ware/Soft 
ware 
Allen Bradley 1 Motor 
Controller 
Primary 
Mover for 
Generator 
Supplies power to 
mini-grid 
PowerFlex Win CE 
Allen Bradley 1 PLC Logic 
Controller 
Controlling Test-bed 
Processes 
Micrologix 
850 
Win CE 
Allen Bradley  1 HMI Visual 
interface with 
processing 
system 
Monitoring and 
Interfacing with 
control system 
T600 Win CE 
Arduino 1 Micro-controller 
Device process 
controller 
Robotic Arm Simulate collection 
and placement of test 
tube samples 
Uno Sketch 
The test-bed manufacturing processes were controlled by a PLC, sharing a similar system 
configuration to that of the PLC control system implementation example as illustrated in Figure 
1 (NIST SP-800-82, 2015).  Both SCADA and DCS systems use PLCs for managing local 
processes where they provide feedback control as described below (Stouffer et al., 2013). 
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Figure 1. PLC Control System Implementation Example (NIST SP 800-82, 2015) 
A PLC component provides control as part of an overall hierarchical system. Although 
the functionality it provides may be the same as RTUs, they are typically purposed quite 
differently. However, it is not uncommon for them to be used in SCADA systems to perform an 
RTU function.  They are also used as part of a supervisory control scheme for providing local 
control in a DCS (NIST SP-800-82, 2015). 
The operational control of discrete processes can typically be satisfied by a PLC, 
especially where requirements for smaller control system configurations are necessary, such as 
chemical manufacturing and power plant environmental emission monitoring controls (Stouffer 
et al., 2013).  DCS and SCADA topologies differ from that of PLCs, Figure 1, in that the closed- 
loop control they provide does not directly involve a human; therefore, they normally do not 
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have a central control server and HMI (Stouffer et al., 2013).  However, as pointed out in Step 
Three, the test-bed in this study included a HMI.  This test-bed was not a closed-loop control 
system, but instead an open-loop system.   
A closed-loop control system differs from an open-loop system in that the control system 
receives signals from the field devices and reacts or adjusts according to the inputs it receives 
(ABB, 2016).  For example, a ventilation fan may turn on based on the analog temperature input 
received by the PLC.  Likewise, the PLC will send an output to turn the fan off once the 
temperature is within an acceptable range.  In an open-loop system, the controller is not getting 
“feedback” per se, so functions are limited to an essentially on/off scenario.  Some controllers 
may use a combination of both an open and closed-loop system (ABB, 2016). 
  
Figure 2. Three mode proportional-integral-derivative 
 The memory of a PLC permits storing of instructions for specific functions.  (Stouffer 
et al., 2013), Figure 2.  The PID controller is one of the most widely used feedback controllers 
(ABB, 2016).  Using an error signal, the PID produces a control signal (ABB, 2016).  Because 
the desired parameters/conditions for a closed-loop system are normally achieved by tuning the 
system to the inherent conditions without specific knowledge of a plant model, stability can 
often be ensured by using only the proportional term (ABB, 2016).  A pure proportional model 
will result in a control offset; however, the integral term eliminates the control offset and 
derivative term provides damping or shaping of the response (ABB, 2016).   
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PID is called out because a closed-loop PID controlled system could potentially involve 
some, at the least - slight, modifications to the systems behavior, despite it being for the sake of 
improving performance.  It is important to be aware of such parametric and conditional 
changes or modifications for no other reason than, if using a sensor-based parallel risk 
monitoring system on a PID controlled system, false positives are not produced as a result of 
the tuning taking place by the PID.  Arguably the performance of a PID controlled system 
would be more stable and consistent than a non-PID controlled system; therefore, a deviation 
in a PID controlled process, as monitored by the approach used in this research, might suggest 
the PID itself has been compromised.   
Figure 1 shows a fieldbus network for a manufacturing process using a PLC to perform 
its control processes. The test-bed used in this research did not have a fieldbus by definition, 
but instead the individual devices were connected directly to the PLC’s I/O terminals. While 
the PLC controlled the operational processes for three of the four tasks of the 
production/manufacturing environment, the Arduino was used to automate the otherwise 
mechanical processes for one of the production assets. In this experiment, a HMI and 
engineering workstation, with a programming interface-Connected Components Workbench, 
was used for accessing and interfacing with the PLC.  Kiwi’s Syslog Server was used for 
process and file integrity monitoring.  KepServer provided an OPC client/server that was used 
to communicate with the PLC, and served as the PLC historian and data logger.   
Unlike a PLC with its limited processing capability, as depicted by a somewhat simplistic 
illustration in Figure 1, in a typical DCS configuration, Figure 3, one control box can execute 
from 1 to 256 regulatory control loops from geographically distributed digital controllers 
providing various functionality (Stouffer, Falco, Kent, 2011).  The capabilities of a DCS were not 
necessary for this implementation, and clearly outside the scope of this research.  A DCS is 
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Figure 3. DCS Implementation Example (NIST SP-800-82, 2015)  
essentially a master controller to more than one slave controller.  Having less than a two-
controller relationship with a DCS might arguably be considered a waste of functionality.   
Although this experiment used two controllers within the control system process, they 
were not configured in a master/slave relationship.  In fact, the Arduino had no communication 
with the PLC.  Instead, it only provided an input signal, in the form of voltage, to the PLC that 
triggered, then maintained a two-minute output signal to the DC-AC relay being used as the 
on/off switch for the centrifuge.     
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Figure 4. Test-bed components with spatial sensory module (SSM) in place 
 
Develop SDAPU – Step Five 
 
The SDAPU was used for logging and processing the sensory data acquired by the spatial 
sensory module (SSM).  The SDAPU, although originally conceptualized as being a Raspberry Pi, 
ultimately ended up being a Wintel based platform (Dell laptop) running the Windows 7 operating 
system.  The primary reason for the transition from a Raspberry Pi 3’s Arm controller to that of an 
Intel based controller was in large part due to the numerous compatibility issues, caused by the 
collection of software assembled to provide the SDAPU its functionality, it had with the Pi’s native 
Linux based operating system (Karvinen & Karvinen, 2014).  Microsoft has a version of the 
Windows 10 operating system that is compatible with the Pi 3 model; however, some of the 
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applications used in this research as part of the SDAPU were not compatible with Windows 10 
either (Monk, 2013).  Generally speaking, a number of SDAPU applications were not compatible 
with systems running Linux.  Thus, the Wintel platform was used because it was compatible. 
The SDAPU consisted of the following five core programs: CoolTerm, used for capturing 
and logging the sensor’s input serial data; National Instrument’s, SignalExpress, used for signal 
analysis; VMware’s, Workstation, used for hosting Hortonworks; Apache’s, NiFi, used for data 
ingestion; and, Hortonworks Sandbox, embedded with Ambari and Hive and used for real-time data 
processing.   
The SSM was developed using an Arduino Uno as the controller which inherits the C 
programming language used in writing the controller functions.  It resided in a central location as 
seen in Figure 4.  This module works alongside the field devices as seen in the overlay in Figure 
5 later. The SSM was comprised of three primary sensors which were a: DHT11, that measures 
both humidity and temperature; accelerometer, used to measure vibration; and, a sound recorder, 
used for monitoring sound. Initially a geophone was considered and used to measure spatial 
vibrations; however, it could not be sufficiently tuned to this environment.  The automation 
spatial information was monitored during each production cycle. 
Chapter four provides more detail in regards to how the data was captured and processed 
through the presentation of the data.  As a preliminary explanation of the process, the SSM 
monitored the environment as the processes occurred.  The data produced by the SSM was 
captured to the SDAPU and called on demand by the operator at various times during the 
production cycle.  For this research, being a controlled experiment, the calls were only placed 
during the sampling cycle of the four-part process, albeit, at various times during that specific 
process.  The real-time data was processed instantaneously using the Hortonwork’s platform as 
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described in more detail in chapter four. 
The real-time physical environment is comprised of all sensory measurements very 
similar to that of a human; those being: touch, taste, smell, audio, and visual.  The sensor 
network originally included sensors that essentially accounted for the five human senses a 
production technician might utilize if they themselves were performing a routine “walk down” 
or inspection of the production area.  In a chemical processing facility for example, this might 
equate to picking up on certain odors, sounds, colors, activity, vibrations, and temperatures or 
pressures that produce a certain characteristic at certain or all times.   
Two primary stimuli were present in the mock chemical facility test-bed.  They were 
sound and vibration.  This was naturally by design, as many production type processes involve a 
considerable amount of mechanical automation as opposed to mechatronics.  Mechanical 
automation creates stimuli such as sound, vibration and heat.   Mechatronics tends to be more 
refined and although it may create the same stimuli, the stimuli and processes tend to be more 
subdued.   
The temperature aspect was considered and tested during initial baselining.  The ambient 
temperature stayed consistent throughout the course of testing, and the mechanized components 
when operational did not alter the test-bed’s overall climate.  Two other sensors, specific to the 
environmental monitoring included a DHT11, which incorporates a humidity and temperature 
sensor.  Although the temperature, humidity, and relative humidity was monitored and recorded 
during every operation, the environment changed very little throughout the course of this 
research.   
A FLIR thermal camera was used for this experiment and directed toward the four 
pumps that performed the batch process or fluid transfer.  The thermal image quality was good, 
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relative to the part of the process and production cycle taking place.  Unfortunately, the image 
did not normalize until after the first, and sometimes second, production cycle took place.  This 
was caused by the displacement of water from the supply tanks into the product tank.  As the  
Table 7. List of Senses and Corresponding Sensor Type 
Sense Sensor 
Hear Microphone 
Smell Alcohol Gas   
Carbon Monoxide 
LPG Gas  
Hydrogen Gas 
Methane CNG 
Taste pH 
Touch Gas Pressure Monitor 
Vibration meter 
Thermometer 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
Pressure Gauge 
Load 
Humidity and Temperature 
Vacuum Gauge 
See Thermal Imaging 
Color Spectrum 
Video Camera 
Hall Effect 
Motion 
Optical Dust 
 
15-gallon product tank began to fill, the ambient air, during the initial cycle, within the tank 
began to mix and evacuate from the container.  As this air turbulence occurred it would wash out 
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the right one fourth of the image captured by the camera.  This is illustrated and discussed in 
chapter four.   
Table 7 lists the sensors along with their corresponding purpose that were considered in 
the design of the experiment.  The final decision in determining the appropriate sensor(s) used in 
this research was made while observing and monitoring each device as it performed its intended 
task.  The final sensors selected after making several observations is listed in Table 8. 
Table 8. List of sensors used in test-bed 
 
Qty Sensor Purpose 
7 Temperature Motor temp, pump temp, robotic arm servo-2 temp, spatial 
3 Ultrasonic Measuring tank fill status 
1 Humidity Measure relative humidity of internal test-bed environment 
1 Thermal imager Providing visual relation of pump temperatures and relay-valve 
monitoring 
1 Voltmeter Measuring the SEIG voltage output 
4 Flow meters Measuring flow rate between supply tanks and product tank 
1 Sound recorder Measuring process audio noise 
1 Accelerometer Measuring process vibrations and specific robotic arm 
movements 
 
Other sensors used in this research were for the purpose of operational monitoring, such 
as flow meters for measuring flow rates and ultrasonic sensors used for measuring distance.  In 
this case, the distance was between the tank water levels and the ultrasonic sensor.  A complete 
list of sensors used in this research are listed in Table 8. 
An initial concept introduced as part of this research involved comparing sensory inputs 
against that of CI2CS network traffic.  As these systems were independent of one another and the 
goal of the research was to determine whether or not a system or component within the overall 
process was introduced to risk, this concept was not applied.  The IDS, antivirus and firewall 
collectively played a role in preventing and or alerting to an intrusion or virus.  As this was a 
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controlled experiment, the test-bed control system was air-gapped. There was no internet 
connectivity.  Therefore, no intrusions, viruses, or DDoS attacks occurred nor were deliberately 
introduced into this network.   
The security controls were unable to detect the upload of altered code to the robotic arm’s 
processor.  These conventional security controls do not prevent or detect the type of potential 
threat used in this type of configuration.  This reiterates the very point of this research.  
Although, these controls did exist, were in place and configured accordingly, the comparison of 
benign data proved to be pointless.   
Ultimately, the control system network was air-gapped from any external connectivity 
and resided as an independent network to the sensory network.  No control system data was 
needed in the analysis of a production cycle’s performance.   This is what makes this research 
unique.  The only connectivity between the sensor network and the control system network was 
via a voltage signal for the purpose of synchronizing the real-time clock (RTC) of the sensory 
data captured with the start of the process.  Arguably this is not necessary, as a snapshot of the 
sensory data, compared to that of the baseline, would indicate exactly what process was 
occurring at that point in the production cycle.  In this instance, the RTC also validated the fact 
that the process had begun and established the time at which it started. 
As previously mentioned, the purpose of segregating the data between the control system 
and the CI2CS sensory output system was to prevent an infection from one system into the other.  
Since these networks operate independently from one another, sniffer traffic and sensory data are 
explicitly unique and original to their domains.  This means that the real-time state of an object, 
space, or both; at any point in time, as evaluated and indicated by sensory data; can be 
independently and randomly verifiably accurate (in essence “pure”), as it is derived through its 
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own system; and not from the same network where a potentially compromised CI2CS might 
influence or affect the quality and integrity of that data. 
Establishing Operational Baseline - Step Six 
 
The initialization of the cyber security baseline established in this experiment was guided 
by a select set of core references that are recognized by the electricity industry as robust and 
sound.  These references were developed by NIST, SANS, DHS, NERC and the NRECA. 
Although NERC and the NRECA develop guidance specific to the electricity sector, the cyber 
security requirements, accompanied by their technical basis and guidelines can be applied to 
many industries requiring the need for maintaining reliability, regardless of its nature.  This set of 
references includes: 
• NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
 
            Information Systems and Organizations 
 
• NIST SP 80-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security 
 
• NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
 
• NERC CIP standards, version 5/6 
 
• NRECA Guide to Developing a Cyber Security and Risk Mitigation Plan – Update 
 
            1 
 
• SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls, version 5 
 
• DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems 
 
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies 
 
All but one of the references listed provide recommendations and guidance for 
implementing industry cyber security best practices, some more specific to control systems, 
while one mandates compliance requirements specifically for entities within the electricity 
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sector.  These references embody a set of ideal security measures and controls aimed at 
reducing risks in corporate IT and production environments operated by industrial controllers. 
The rationale in considering industry mandates requiring entities within the electricity sector to 
comply with a rigid set of requirements, for the express purpose of reducing cyber risks, is to 
demonstrate the rigor and minimum number of measures and controls deemed necessary for 
achieving a particular industry’s accepted level of risk to one of the DHS designated sectors 
listed as CI in the interest of national safety and economic security.  Another purpose for using 
these requirements in this research was to evaluate systems in an already perceived mature state, 
and establish that the experiment will enhance and improve the security of a control environment 
by determining risks using independent measures versus those linked to the same and potentially 
affected infected control system network.  
According to the DHS, an ideal control system network, if unable to operate as an 
“island” through air-gapping, would be configured using the defense-in-depth configuration 
shown in Figure 5.  There are five zones depicted in Figure 5.  They are the external, corporate, 
data, control and safety zones.  
In the “Safety Zone”, note that the Safety Instrument Systems operate in a state 
disconnected from any network to ensure a positive safety response in the event of an 
emergency. This might include responses to such hazards as fire, overpressure, flooding, and 
electrical. A positive safety reacts by a triggering mechanism set off from a sensor through an 
automated or manual process. It is a local safety feature that cannot be tampered with remotely. 
As depicted in Figure 6, a modification to the DHS defense-in-depth model shows a 
completely independent spatial and device centric risk detection sensory system residing within 
the Control Zone.  It is depicted as appearing on top of the sensors and actuators connected to the 
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Figure 5. Recommended Defense-in-Depth network architecture for CI2CS (DHS, 2009)  
 
Figure 6. Close-up of recommended Defense-in-Depth network architecture for CI2CS 
showing integration of Risk Detection Sensory System within Control Zone (DHS, 2009) 
 
SENSORY SYSTEM RISK MONITORING LAN 
Risk Detection Sensory System 
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RTU/PLC.  For this research, it is a PLC.  The risk detection sensory system was not connected 
nor was it intermingled with the control system communication network in any manner 
whatsoever.  It does, however, require a single, specific, known output signal from a PLC or 
DCS, a PLC in this case, to initialize the SSM’s RTC which synchronizes the start of the linear 
process used in this research and begins collecting data for the SDAPU to analyze and compare 
against the processing baseline.  Although there are currently not as stringent governmental 
cybersecurity regulations in other CI sectors, this experiment will assume that there is a 
minimum set of standards employed across industries defined as CI, such as that of the 
electricity sector, which establishes a certain level of cyber security awareness and controls for 
ensuring the reliability of that industry. Some of the controls identified from the references 
listed above will take into account the “policy” aspect of cyber security and recognize that 
policy requirements and enforcement are crucial in achieving and maintaining a high-level of 
cyber security readiness.  For the purpose of this research, it can be assumed that all policy 
related control(s) were considered and strictly adhered. 
Baselining was performed over a sixteen-hour period with the initial goal being an effort 
to temper and normalize the spatial environment for conducting the remainder of the experiment.  
To further elaborate on this particular phase of the experiment, the test-bed in its entirety, 
meaning the structure and its internal apparatus were operated as designed throughout a number 
of processing cycles, at set intervals, as a means of determining operational normalcy.  This was 
to develop the parameters for an initial functioning baseline and not of the more stringent 
performance requirements necessary for achieving an accurate and consistent operational 
baseline.  Depending on the action or actions necessary and the average run time for a complete 
production cycle to occur, no more than four production cycles in an hour were possible.  The 
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first two hours were essentially spent discovering and researching the source of nuisance stimuli 
emanating during the production cycle, such as rattling, shaking, and vibrations.  After 
determining the nuisance stimuli sources and then securing the various equipment, production 
cycles continued until a total of twelve complete cycles had been observed and monitored for 
significant and recognizable changes.   
Initially, on average, the monitoring and supervision of the production cycles lasted over 
six hours a day with most testing being finished under nine hours.  This schedule took place over 
a six-day period after the initial baseline had been established, and resulted in the acquisition of 
over 100 samples.  Sample data acquired during the initial 50 production cycles were used for 
developing an operational baseline.   
The operational baseline essentially formed the gold standard for all future processes.  
Any operational constraints were ultimately determined by the data quality and that of the 
processing equipment being used. The testing was accomplished without any significant 
incidents or notable observations outside of what was to be expected.   
Sample Design 
 
Algorithm Design, Data Collection and Software - Step Seven 
 
This section describes the algorithm, data collection and software used for conducting the 
experiment used in this research.  It also introduces the exploitation process, and how it was 
introduced into the control system network, through some explanation of the algorithm.  This 
section covers the observation, recording, and monitoring of the test-bed’s environment and its 
characteristics.  The automation equipment that was ultimately chosen to perform the processes 
throughout the product cycle provided a significant, satisfactory and dynamically rich set of 
stimuli which is described in the next section.   
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Data was collected from both the spatial sensory module and control system processes 
during the production cycle’s run and non-run times (dynamic vs static).  This validated the vast 
differences between the two modes. There was a minimum of three stimuli traits associated with 
each automated component.  A temperature sensor could be applied to all the devices used in 
relation to either motor or fluid temperatures.  However, the product cycles ran for a short time 
in general, such that temperature changes were only nominal.  The spatial and robotic arm, 
servo-two, temperature data was recorded.  Temperature data was not used in the risk-baseline 
comparison algorithm due to the nominal differences.   
The most prevalent stimuli in this research were sound and vibration, both of these data 
sets were used as inputs in the algorithm.  This is discussed in greater detail in chapter four.  
Data was collected during system processes for monitoring the system process, but not as part of 
the risk monitoring process.  This included the flow rate and ultrasonic sensor that monitored the 
fluid transfer process.   Arguably, flow rate and ultrasonic values could have been used as part of 
the existing algorithm.  However, because of the reliability and accuracy found in the proposed 
algorithm using just the sound and vibration data, the flow rate and ultrasonic sensor data sets 
were not used for providing additional support for detecting risk. 
The CI2CS baseline was the core dependency for performing a comparative analysis, 
with samples derived from all other production cycles.  As such, it provided the known variables 
used in comparing real-time, random samples. The randomly acquired samples were compared to 
pre-defined baseline data points.  The defined intervals were those intervals identified at specific 
data points along a linear pattern of a specific process.  In this case, the robotic arm sampling 
process was used because of the deliberate manipulation and alteration of the code intended for 
insertion prior to the arm’s actual task being performed.  This was the part of the research design 
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for the express purpose of disrupting the simulated sampling process and distinguishing a normal 
operation from an abnormal one.  An abnormal one implied risk.    
Software 
The primary purpose of the software used in this experiment was for: logging, 
programming, monitoring, analysis, and configuration.  The software provided a means to 
interact with cyber assets connected to the control system network and the micro controllers 
used for performing local tasks in the test-bed. This included applications for network 
monitoring, file integrity checking, malware detection, intrusion detection and equipment used 
for packet sniffing that sits on the CI2CS network that passed data to a syslog server located in 
the demilitarized zone (DMZ). 
Hortonwork’s platform was used to process the real-time data with that of a previously 
established baseline.  The comparison was essentially a line-by-line relative time analysis of 
mean values derived from both the establishment of the baseline, and the snapshot of the 
recently captured data.  Those two values were compared against the acceptable variance for 
that point (within hundredths of a second) in time and it was determined whether or not a 
potential process risk might exist based on the sum of valid data points used in the sample.  This 
means that if n number of pre-determined data points were used for comparing samples, all n 
data points should indicate values within an acceptable range.  A failure to match one or more 
data points was cause to render a graph of the data and study the deviation.  A graph was used 
because it was observably clearer to evaluate the data and for identifying the discrepancy in the 
process.  Based on the strategic placement of data points throughout the operating process, a 
snapshot of system sensor data was analyzed against both NULL and known acceptable values.  
Arguably, data points could be placed along the entire process and be continuously analyzed; 
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however, the massive amounts of data involved would distract from the stark contrasts seen 
between the random samples, discussed in chapter four, that illustrate this process. 
Data Analysis 
 
Sample stimuli assignment values corresponding to different assets are documented in Table 9. 
To further expound on the example of a motor starting, the SDAPU program would expect a 
response that includes an anticipated value derived from stimuli data, as processed by the 
SDAPU that directly corresponds to a motor being turned on.  After start up, the motor 
operating stimuli values would naturally change in response to the dynamic conditions, along 
with the sensor input, as it adapts to the motor’s new current “run” state, thus indicating a 
different conditional state. In an environment with simultaneous processes occurring, the sum 
of these states coupled with a value, derived from a quantitative assessment of each asset, 
would be used in processing, developing, and assigning a quantitative score (also referred to as 
a signature) to be used by the SDAPU for processing and ultimately determining the 
anticipated state of the environment.  Table 10 shows a sample of production assets along with 
their conditional states of motion or rest where stimuli values were assigned and subsequently 
programmed into the SDAPU.  Since this research was designed using a linear process model, 
it was not necessary to calculate multiple process values.   
The independency between the CI2CS network and sensory network was critical for the 
purpose of this research as it is the fundamental premise to this argument: an actual state of 
either the object(s), space(s), or both, sensory data, is evaluated against an expected or 
supposed state of the CI2CS performance, as a comparable similarity should be observed 
between the two; should those established states be calculated (aligned) correctly between one 
another, if not; a dissimilarity should be observed.  In the most basic sense, the I/O data of a
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Table 9. Sample Stimuli Assignment Values 
 
CI2CS should agree with the stimuli it created in its environment.  As an example, when a signal 
occurs that switches on a motor, that information or signal verification is sent to the SSM while 
the dynamic state of the spatial environment is simultaneously processed.  There should be a 
correlation corresponding to the event that when a motor is turned on, stimuli such as sound, 
Stimuli 
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Robotic Arm 
One Rotate Left RORL x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Rotate Right RORR x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Shoulder Raise ROSR x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Shoulder Lower ROSL x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Elbow Raise ROER x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Elbow Lower ROEL x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Gripper Close ROGC x x x x   x      x    6 
Robotic Arm 
One Gripper Open ROGO x x x x   x      x    6 
TankA Fluid Fill TAFF x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankA Fluid Empty TAFE x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankA Fluid 
Maintain 
Volume TAFV   x x    x x  x x x    7 
TankB Fluid Fill TTFF x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankB Fluid Empty TTFE x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankB Fluid 
Maintain 
Volume TTFV   x x    x x  x x x    7 
TankP Fluid Empty TTFE x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankP Fluid Fill TTFF x x x x   x x x  x x x  x  11 
TankP Fluid 
Maintain 
Volume TPFV   x x    x x  x x x    7 
Centrifuge 
Loaded 
At Set Run 
Speed CLASRS x x x x   x      x    6 
Centrifuge 
Loaded 
At Other Run 
Speed CLAORS x x x x   x      x    6 
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Table 10. Example of Conditional States of Motion or Rest 
Conditional States of Motion OR Rest (NULL) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
/O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 A
ss
et
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
C
o
d
e 
(V
ar
ia
b
le
) 
O
n
e 
Tw
o
 
Th
re
e 
Fo
u
r 
Fi
ve
 
Si
x 
Se
ve
n
 
Ei
gh
t 
N
in
e
 
C
as
es
 
Motor Energized Mot
E 
          
Motor Acceleration Mot
A 
Mot
AM 
         
Generator Voltage Gen
V 
          
TankA 
Fluid 
Fill TOF
FF 
TOFF
F 
         
TankA 
Fluid 
Empty TOF
E 
TOFE 
         
TankA 
Fluid 
Maintain 
Volume 
TOF
MP 
TOF
MP 
         
TankB 
Fluid 
Fill TTFF TTFF 
         
TankB 
Fluid 
Empty TTFE TTFE 
         
TankB 
Fluid 
Maintain 
Volume 
TTFE TTFE 
         
TankP Fluid Fill TTFF TTFF 
         
TankP Fluid Temperatur
e 
TTFT
T 
TTFT
T 
         
Robotic 
Arm One 
Rotate Left RAO
RL 
RAO
RL+R
AOS
R 
RAO
RL+R
AOSL 
RAO
RL+R
AOE
R 
RAO
RL+R
AOEL 
RAO
RL+R
AOW
R 
RAO
RL+R
AOW
L 
RAO
RL+R
AOG
C 
RAO
RL+R
AOG
O 
NU
LL 
RAO - Case ROT 
+ Conditional 
State (one to 
many) 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Rotate Right RAO
RR 
RAO
RR+R
AOS
R 
RAO
RR+R
AOSL 
RAO
RR+R
AOE
R 
RAO
RR+R
AOEL 
RAO
RR+R
AOW
R 
RAO
RR+R
AOW
L 
RAO
RR+R
AOG
C 
RAO
RR+R
AOG
O 
NU
LL 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Shoulder 
Raise 
RAO
SR 
RAO
SR+R
AOE
R 
RAO
SR+R
AOEL 
RAO
SR+R
AOW
R 
RAO
SR+R
AOW
L 
RAO
SR+R
AOG
C 
RAO
SR+R
AOG
O 
  
NU
LL 
RAO - Case SHO 
+ Conditional 
State (one to 
many) 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Shoulder 
Lower 
RAO
SL 
RAO
SL+R
AOE
R 
RAO
SL+R
AOEL 
RAO
SL+R
AOW
R 
RAO
SL+R
AOW
L 
RAO
SL+R
AOG
C 
RAO
SL+R
AOG
O 
  
NU
LL 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Elbow Raise RAO
ER 
RAO
ER+R
AOW
R 
RAO
ER+R
AOW
L 
RAO
ER+R
AOG
C 
RAO
ER+R
AOG
O 
    
NU
LL 
RAO - Case ELB 
+ Conditional 
State (one to 
many) 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Elbow Lower RAO
EL 
RAO
EL+R
AOW
R 
RAO
EL+R
AOW
L 
RAO
EL+R
AOG
C 
RAO
EL+R
AOG
O 
    
NU
LL 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Gripper 
Close 
RAO
GC 
RAO
GC 
       
NU
LL 
RAO - Case GRI 
+ Conditional 
State (one to 
many) 
Robotic 
Arm One 
Gripper 
Open 
RAO
GO 
RAO
GO 
       
NU
LL 
Centrifuge  Loaded at 
Set Run 
Speed 
CLA
SRS 
CLAS
RS 
         
Centrifuge  Loaded at 
Other Run 
Speed 
CLA
ORS 
CLA
ORS 
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vibrations, and heat (for this particular example) are generated and recognized as legitimate 
attributes.  
This research could be applied in an actual CI2CS environment with real system 
performance being legitimately validated by this design using an artificial external condition in 
lieu of introducing an actual virus into the system.  An example would be tapping a metal object 
on a motor housing during operation, start-up or shut-down, or any other manually induced 
condition that could simulate an effect on a component caused as a result of a vulnerability being   
introduced into the system and producing the same or similar outcome.  Essentially, anything out 
of the ordinary occurring within that environment should be cause for alarm, if the performance 
of its current state does not match its established baseline.  
Formats for Presenting Results 
 
Study results have been presented in several ways. Most of the results are recorded in 
tables or figures.  The figures were either made up of screen shots or created using programs 
such as Google Sketch Up, Visio, or Adobe Photoshop.  Screen shots from test instrumentation 
were produced from data displayed in that specific tool’s native view, such as that from the 
Textronix MDO 3014 scope or Fluke 289 meter, and then transferred to a PC compliant 
application. National Instruments LabView Signal Express provides its own form of data 
rendering and it was captured via screen shots.  Some SDAPU results were rendered using other 
non-native applications, in order to create a visual representation in graph form, of the sensory 
signals that were collected and analyzed with the aid of the MDO 3014 software. In particular, 
this included noise captured by the sound sensor/recorder.  Results are also documented with 
photographs, where necessary, for capturing an asset’s behavior in the production section of the 
test-bed environment at various points in time during its course of operation. 
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Resource requirements 
Similar to Giani et. Al. (2008), this research incorporated a PLC, field devices, three 
laptops, one notebook, HMI and Cisco 5505 firewall as hardware, along with the list of other 
items included in Table 5.  No other instrumentation was used for the purpose of this research.  A 
complete list of resources is listed in with Tables 4, 5, 6 and 8 as introduced on page 84. 
The test-bed with all of its fabrication, control, cyber, testing, and production components 
was a privately funded research endeavor. All of the aforementioned resources leading up to and 
throughout the course of the research were funded by the researcher.  No grants or outside 
funding was received.  Rockwell extended a ten percent academic discount for the three Allen-
Bradley components through their local distributor, McNaughton-McKay.  Some of the software 
applications previously mentioned were either purchased (at full or academic pricing), used 
during trial periods, or obtained as open source from the internet.  Kepware granted a one year 
extension to their typical 45-day trial period for the use of their Kepware Server application. 
This research did not include any human participants as part of the study; therefore, no IRB 
approval was requested. 
Summary 
 
A control system performs real-time automated processes in real world situations and, 
therefore, is reliability-dependent during such time those automated processes and functions are 
being performed.  An interruption or interference to such a process could, at the most, 
depending on its nature, be life- threatening.  Because CI2CSs control real world automated 
processes and functions, it is imperative to prevent disturbances, deliberate or accidental, to 
volatile and sensitive control systems.  One way of demonstrating changes to a CI2CS, without 
harming or damaging the system, is by developing a test-bed and then applying modifications 
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and new implementations within the test-bed all the while studying the impact, if any, caused as 
a result of introducing those changes. 
This research established a viable and legitimate test-bed that was used for just such a 
study by including assets found in similar test-beds used for research and performance analysis 
of control systems and the production processes which they control.  The test-bed emulated that 
of a chemical manufacturing facility which is recognized as a critical sector to our national 
infrastructure. This test-bed provided a sufficient setting for the observation and monitoring of 
the production environment during its operational phase, so that adequate tuning, evaluation, 
testing and analysis could be conducted.  The test-bed developed for this experiment was used 
for designing and verifying the “concept”; while real time control system data (logs and network 
activity) and corresponding sensory data could be evaluated and analyzed for determining 
potential risk, during off-line processing, in an attempt to validate, document, and demonstrate 
the results from an actual environment.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an objective description and analysis of the findings with the 
results and outcomes from the research.  Here, research contributions in the area of industrial 
control systems from an OT perspective, coupled with that of the real-time processing 
capabilities of “big data”, using data analytic platforms on the IT side of the business to assess 
risk are described in great detail.  Lastly, any limitations and constraints encountered throughout 
the research are stated with recommendations provided for future studies.  
Benefits of Continuous Real-time Independent Risk Monitoring of CI2CS 
 The dependency modern society has placed on electricity as the enabler of greater 
innovation and achievement for improving the progress of humankind has led to stringent 
measures in electric reliability oversight and importance.  This has mostly resulted from the 
efficiencies and enhancements designed into information technology over the past 15 years that 
have contributed to providing a significant convenience factor for CI2CS implementers.  
However, this convenience factor has exposed these entire system(s) to an overall far greater 
security risk.   
An unfortunate side effect of this convenience factor and increase in security risk lies in 
the inevitable and routine discovery of the sometimes-overwhelming number of vulnerabilities 
that exist, especially as some of these technologies mature, both in the exploitation capabilities 
and the manner in which the vulnerability can be exposed.  These vulnerabilities have led to the 
need for continuous risk monitoring of not just the cyber or IT assets interconnected with a 
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control system, but also of the automation and OT system’s field devices they must interface 
with.  This includes any type of automation devices having embedded controllers with 
programmability features in addition to programmatic dependent devices designed and used 
exclusively as master controllers such as a PLC or DCS. 
 Continuous risk monitoring in operational technology has traditionally existed for the 
benefit of the processes being performed and the equipment performing the process.  For 
instance, an electric motor might have temperature and vibration sensors for the purpose of 
monitoring its performance throughout the process; however, that monitoring exists for the sole 
purpose of discovering and potentially determining a production mal-function and or 
establishing maintenance intervals for servicing.  Alarms received from this type of scenario are 
only provided to alert the operator or control technician of a failure in the equipment which 
would subsequently suggest an immediate or pending interruption to that part of the production 
cycle; ultimately causing a cascade effect either upstream, downstream, or both, from that point 
in the process. Thus, there is a need for research to further develop the options relating to 
continuous real-time independent risk monitoring of CI2Cs. 
Data Analysis 
 
In keeping with the research design, the data analysis is covered in three sections.  The 
first of these three sections describe the analysis of the test-bed development and the designing, 
creating, and establishing of an initial operational baseline of a CI2CS process from data 
gathered during the post-installation phase of each test-bed component.  In this section, each of 
the four tasks in the process is discussed and data analyzed.  Baselining in and of itself is a 
continuous process and is also discussed in the next section.   
The next section reviews sensor selection, placement, and analysis of data for defining 
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normalcy.  Data analysis in this section, is derived after all the components of the system are 
installed and functioning properly, and a measure of normalcy is observed relative to the 
system’s initial baseline, so that an operational baseline can be developed for establishing the 
performance standard that all subsequent production cycles will be evaluated and compared to 
for determining risk.  Section three, discusses the introduction of the exploitation of the Arduino 
controller that causes the robotic arm to start behaving erratically and demonstrates the validity 
and success of this research by illustrating how that behavior is distinguished and recognized 
from that of the previously established operational baseline covered in the prior section.  
Findings and summary follow the data analysis. 
Section One – Analysis of Test-bed Development and Initial Baselining    
Data collection for this research took place over a three-month period.  No set of 
experiments ever exceeded an eight-hour interval.  This means that no more than 32 back-to-
cycles were ever conducted in one sitting.  This was not an intentional or deliberate effort, but 
arose more likely from traditional labor practices.  During this period of time, none of the 
components ever failed nor was their performance noticeably degraded.   
Although there were some climate variations over this period of time, none of the 
variations were extreme enough to alter the environment to an extent that there was any 
meaningful impact on the data.  For example, the temperatures within the test-bed were never so 
low or high that it affected the sound (acoustic) acquisition of the operating processes.  Air 
molecules are larger in cold air and thus have an impact on the speed at which sound travels.  
The colder the temperature, the slower sound travels, vice-versa with hotter temperatures.  
Essentially, the overall environmental conditions remained relatively constant. 
Initially, data collection and analysis during the initial phase was intermittent and of 
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irregular quality, as the components used in performing specific system processes were 
installed; activated, then aligned with the corresponding step that followed.  Any issues were 
resolved early in the data gathering process by making adjustments as needed depending on the 
issue.  With each complete production cycle completing in 14 minutes and one second, it was 
possible to run four complete cycles in an hour.  However, more time was needed between each 
cycle for documenting and organizing the data captured throughout various processes.  Early on 
during this phase, while making initial observations of the production cycle in operation, it was 
not atypical to spend from ten to fifteen minutes or even an hour documenting, analyzing, and 
interpreting the results obtained and recorded by various instruments and sensors, as well as, 
troubleshooting a number of performance characteristics directly affected by poor coding 
(programming).  This was particularly noted in values obtained by the flow rate and 
humidity/temperature sensor, as it related to units of measures and their conversions, such as 
liters and Celsius, respectively, which the results obtained during their operation clearly showed. 
Inconsistency in data presentation being represented consistently throughout the entire 
process was resolved early on in the data gathering phase.  In most, if not all cases, be it due to a 
miscalculation in a unit of measure or garbage data in general, replacing a sensor, reviewing the 
code, or electrical grounding resolved the data inconsistency or anomaly, and eliminated certain 
sporadic equipment behavior during subsequent operations.   
As described in the previous chapter, the test-bed imitates a chemical process facility 
that produces a simulated toxic compound.  By virtue of its toxic nature, the production process 
is entirely automated. Although the process was described earlier in chapter three, the key 
process tasks will be analyzed in greater detail in this section in conjunction with the outcome of 
the research and the findings.   
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The simulated CI2CS chemical processing facility consists of four very specific and 
distinct tasks that must be performed in a precise linear fashion in order to manufacture the 
simulated chemical solution.  As discussed in chapter 3, the four tasks are: (1) energizing the 
motor, (2) batch processing (which included four subtasks), (3) energizing the robotic arm and 
(4) energizing the centrifuge.  It is essential that each task is completed in its proper sequence 
and form.  Any deviation from these process tasks is reason for investigation and/or evaluation 
of its cause and would naturally be discovered during the manually initiated sensory comparison 
risk scan.  The completion of each of these four tasks fulfill one complete process cycle.  The 
complete cycle takes 14 minutes and one second to complete.  
Task One - Energizing the Motor Control 
The production cycle was initiated by manually interacting with a virtual (soft) button on 
a touch screen of a HMI or by pressing a physical, normally open button on a controller box, or 
by interacting with the Connected Components Workbench interface from the engineer’s laptop.  
Any one of the three methods could start the production cycle through the PLC which would
 
Figure 7. Controller.Micro850.CI2CS_circuit showing TON function (rung one) and 
variable conversion block (rung two) 
 
trigger the Timer on (TON) delay function, written into the ladder logic on rung one, Figure 7, 
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that sent a signal to the110VAC motor controller which in turn energized a three phase, .5 hp, 
AC inductive motor, for the purpose of imitating a sustainable fuel source such as wind or hydro 
driven turbine, that turns the shaft of the SEIG.  This is a 30 second process that is designed to 
imitate a mini-grid and could be used for powering the CI2CS test-bed facility.   
 
Figure 8. Formulas for determining true, reactive, and apparent power (Kuphaldt, 2015) 
Upon starting the electrical motor, the generator voltage increased within ten seconds 
from a floating .0289 VAC to 327.5 VAC and sustained a 327 VAC average for a twenty-
second-time period.  This can be seen starting at line 324 to 360 in Table 11, SEIG VAC data.  
The voltage then decreased as the motor wound down over a ten second interval. Although the 
apparent power (S), if using the equation in Figure 8, indicated to average 327 VAC, the true 
power (P) proved to never get higher than 36 VAC of constant power; relative to the various 
loads.  According to Kuphaldt (2015), relative to the resistance (R) of the applied load during 
various tests, P was determined by using the formula in the equations shown in Figure 9.  
 In determining P, Kuphaldt (2015) states that “as a rule, true power is a function of a 
circuit’ dissipative elements, usually resistances.”  In the following formulas: I = amps; R = 
resistance; X is a circuit’s resistance as the result of function of reactive power (Q); and, Z is a 
 
117  
 
 
Table 11. SEIG VAC data  
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323 0.0289 
V AC 
23:18.8 00:00.9 23:19.6 0.093
7 V AC 
0.0461 V 
AC 
23:18.8 0.0289 
V AC 
Unstable 23:19.7 
           
324 0.1505 
V AC 
23:19.7 00:00.1 23:19.7 0.150
5 V AC 
0.1505 V 
AC 
23:19.7 0.1505 
V AC 
Interval 23:19.8 
325 0.1638 
V AC 
23:19.8 00:00.9 23:20.7 0.376
1 V AC 
0.2699 V 
AC 
23:19.8 0.1638 
V AC 
Unstable 23:20.8 
326 0.4032 
V AC 
23:20.8 00:00.1 23:20.8 0.403
2 V AC 
0.4032 V 
AC 
23:20.8 0.4032 
V AC 
Interval 23:20.9 
327 0.4295 
V AC 
23:20.9 00:00.9 23:21.7 0.682
6 V AC 
0.5522 V 
AC 
23:20.9 0.4295 
V AC 
Unstable 23:21.8 
335 5.0509 
V AC 
23:24.9 00:00.1 23:24.9 5.050
9 V AC 
5.0509 V 
AC 
23:24.9 5.0509 
V AC 
Stable 23:25.0 
336   OL V 
AC 
23:25.0 00:01.7 23:25.0   OL V 
AC 
  V AC 23:25.0   OL V 
AC 
Interval 23:26.6 
337   OL V 
AC 
23:26.6 00:01.7 23:26.6   OL V 
AC 
  V AC 23:26.6   OL V 
AC 
Interval 23:28.4 
338 292.99 
V AC 
23:28.4 00:00.4 23:28.7 305.6
4 V AC 
299.14 V 
AC 
23:28.4 292.99 
V AC 
Unstable 23:28.8 
339 309.97 
V AC 
23:28.8 00:00.1 23:28.8 309.9
7 V AC 
309.97 V 
AC 
23:28.8 309.97 
V AC 
Interval 23:28.9 
340 314.71 
V AC 
23:28.9 00:01.0 23:29.6 326.5
9 V AC 
323.58 V 
AC 
23:28.9 314.71 
V AC 
Interval 23:29.9 
341 326.01 
V AC 
23:29.9 00:01.0 23:30.7 327.4
5 V AC 
326.61 V 
AC 
23:29.9 326.01 
V AC 
Interval 23:30.9 
342 326.31 
V AC 
23:30.9 00:01.0 23:31.8 327.5
2 V AC 
326.78 V 
AC 
23:30.9 326.31 
V AC 
Interval 23:31.9 
343 327.00 
V AC 
23:31.9 00:01.0 23:32.4 327.4
9 V AC 
326.76 V 
AC 
23:32.0 326.43 
V AC 
Interval 23:32.9 
344 327.51 
V AC 
23:32.9 00:01.0 23:33.5 327.5
8 V AC 
326.88 V 
AC 
23:33.7 326.44 
V AC 
Interval 23:33.9 
357 327.61 
V AC 
23:45.9 00:01.0 23:45.9 327.6
1 V AC 
326.89 V 
AC 
23:46.1 326.49 
V AC 
Interval 23:46.9 
358 326.99 
V AC 
23:46.9 00:01.0 23:47.0 327.6
1 V AC 
326.98 V 
AC 
23:47.2 326.51 
V AC 
Interval 23:47.9 
359 326.61 
V AC 
23:47.9 00:01.0 23:48.1 327.6
1 V AC 
326.97 V 
AC 
23:48.3 326.52 
V AC 
Interval 23:48.9 
360 326.55 
V AC 
23:48.9 00:00.6 23:49.0 326.6
3 V AC 
323.48 V 
AC 
23:49.4 316.18 
V AC 
Unstable 23:49.5 
361 312.11 
V AC 
23:49.5 00:00.4 23:49.5 312.1
1 V AC 
305.88 V 
AC 
23:49.8 299.93 
V AC 
Interval 23:49.9 
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362 295.37 
V AC 
23:49.9 00:00.9 23:49.9 295.3
7 V AC 
275.56 V 
AC 
23:50.7 255.95 
V AC 
Unstable 23:50.8 
363 250.16 
V AC 
23:50.8 00:00.1 23:50.8 250.1
6 V AC 
250.16 V 
AC 
23:50.8 250.16 
V AC 
Interval 23:50.9 
366 193.27 
V AC 
23:51.9 00:00.8 23:51.9 193.2
7 V AC 
174.56 V 
AC 
23:52.6 155.59 
V AC 
Unstable 23:52.7 
367 150.03 
V AC 
23:52.7 00:00.2 23:52.7 150.0
3 V AC 
147.22 V 
AC 
23:52.8 144.40 
V AC 
Interval 23:52.9 
368 138.56 
V AC 
23:52.9 00:00.9 23:52.9 138.5
6 V AC 
112.01 V 
AC 
23:53.7 82.81 
V AC 
Unstable 23:53.8 
369 74.24 V 
AC 
23:53.8 00:00.1 23:53.8 74.24 
V AC 
74.24 V 
AC 
23:53.8 74.24 
V AC 
Interval 23:53.9 
370 65.46 V 
AC 
23:53.9 00:00.2 23:53.9 65.46 
V AC 
61.08 V 
AC 
23:54.0 56.70 
V AC 
Unstable 23:54.1 
371 48.22 V 
AC 
23:54.1 00:00.1 23:54.1 48.22 
V AC 
48.22 V 
AC 
23:54.1 48.22 
V AC 
Stable 23:54.2 
382 0.0308 
V AC 
24:01.9 00:01.0 24:02.0 0.031
2 V AC 
0.0297 V 
AC 
24:02.3 0.0289 
V AC 
Interval 24:02.9 
383 0.0295 
V AC 
24:02.9 00:01.0 24:03.1 0.030
2 V AC 
0.0296 V 
AC 
24:03.3 0.0289 
V AC 
Interval 24:03.9 
384 0.0294 
V AC 
24:03.9 00:01.0 24:03.9 0.029
4 V AC 
0.0294 V 
AC 
24:04.2 0.0293 
V AC 
Interval 24:04.9 
 
circuit’s total impedance as the result of a function of apparent power (Kuphaldt, 2015).  R 
varied depending on the type of load that was applied.   
The various loads tested and considered for performing some functional application as 
part of the research design included the following: 60 and 100-watt incandescent bulbs; Weller 
100/140-watt soldering gun; Eastman 240V, 1500-watt water heating element; and, Wellman 
flat 120V, 1000 Watt, strip heater.  Other than for the soldering gun, load measurements were 
extremely difficult to obtain due to the voltage instability caused as a result of power 
transference from the grid to the loads without some type of voltage regulator, transformer, or 
both.  The power distribution aspect of the SEIG does not directly apply to the research problem 
being studied or the problem being solved.  Stimuli coding for step one of the CI2CS process 
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was (S;V;vAC).  Temperature (T) was excluded in this process, as step one only lasted 30 
seconds and ambient temperatures within the test-bed never exceeded a range of ± two degrees 
during any cycle.  A two-degree shift in either direction from the normal ambient temperature 
was not compelling enough to warrant monitoring or logging temperature sensor data on either 
the electric motor (primary mover) or SEIG for the short interval in which it operated, especially 
without the application of a dedicated and continuous load.  For the sake of electric reliability, 
scalability and safety, the SEIG did not power any of the production or process control devices 
while production cycles were performed and its use was solely as an additional component for 
enriching the environment with additional stimuli and providing variables to monitor as part of a 
holistic approach in considering rudimentary processing components typically included as part 
of this type of facility.   
 Table 11 illustrates the voltages generated between the motor start and stop times, as 
well as, several pre and post samples showing the voltage readings before and after the motor 
operation.  “Motor” operation instead of “SEIG” operation is referenced here, so that it is 
recognized, although, the SEIG in fact produced the voltage output shown in Table 11 beginning 
with line 324 and ending with line 360, the motor’s function related directly to the performance 
of the generator during the times highlighted in blue and red in the table.  However, the SEIG 
alone continued putting out high voltage even after the motor was decelerating.  Several of the 
table line entries were removed between transition points as they were duplicative or 
substantially similar to other lines in that sequence in order to consolidate the information in the 
table.  The brown highlighted color represents voltages less than 74.24VAC.  The yellow 
highlight represents voltages above 74.24VAC and especially over 110VAC, the common 
voltage (110-120VAC) for residential distribution since the bulk of electrical appliances require 
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it, although larger appliances, such as dryers and heating, ventilation and air condition (HVAC) 
components, operate on 220VAC.  The 220VAC capability is accomplished by provisioning two 
110VAC service lines to the demarcation point or “meter”.  Shades of red, lines 341 through 
360, represent an average of the maximum voltage sustaining between 326.01 and 326.55 VAC 
before which point the motor began decelerating, thus resulting in a decrease of voltage output 
by the generator. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Tag 1 Motor Start/Stop Data, 00:00:30 
 
 Figure 9 above is a screenshot of the motor process start and stop time as displayed by 
the Kepware Server software used to communicate and interact with the PLC using OPC.  This 
software was described in more detail in chapter three.  Figure 9 shows the motor start time at 
19:52:11.594 and end time at 19:52:41.624.  The total time indicated here is 30 seconds.  The 
data resolution for the timestamp showing milliseconds is constrained by the software since data 
logging of milliseconds is restricted to three places. 
 In Figure 10 below, a graph shows a visual interpretation of the amplitude (sound) 
readings obtained during a typical SEIG operation where the motor controller begins gradually 
increasing the frequency of the motor, until it reaches a maximum of 60 Hz, all the while 
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increasing the voltage output being generated by the SEIG as indicated in Table 11.  
The first notable state change can be observed by the increase in voltage (amplitude) 
from between -5 and 5 millivolts (mv) to between -20 and 20 mv as the ambient noise is joined, 
or replaced, with the sound genereated by the motor controller’s fan, initiated by the output 
signal from the PLC, and the frequency output to the motor, as the motor RPMs begin to 
increase.  This is observed at the onset of the motor operation and can be seen right before the 
19:47:40 mark on the x-axis of the graph with the amplitude, represented as voltage (V), 
appearing just below the 20 mv vertical-axis line before it.   
 
Figure 10. Motor sound data (Amplitude Readings of Motor Sounds) 
This graph in Figure 10 was derived from the raw data logged during one of the many 
operating intervals.  As such, the time line in this example was created by rendering the raw data  
into a visual representation, so that this particular part of the process could be interpreted more 
easily.  Each process has its own vibration and sound graph as represented by the data obtained 
during the particular interval it was logged.  A graphic, illustrating motor vibrations, at the far 
left of the image, can be seen in Figure 34 later in this chapter. 
  
Ambient test-bed acoustics 
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The millivolt decrease beginning right past 19:48:05 shows where the motor controller 
frequency is decreasing down to 0 Hz, and at 19:48:10 the motor controller signal from the PLC 
output has been terminated; thereby, de-energizing the motor.  There is a trace of motor rotation 
occurring that exists from the residual momentum produced as a result of the generator winding 
down, along with the motor controller’s fan, and the start of PumpPA that causes some 
moderate voltage activity for two seconds between time markers 19:48:10 and 19:48:12, 
peaking between -85 mv and 85 mv.  The sound levels begin to smooth out at approximately 
 
 
Figure 11. Pumping System (front-right PumpPA, front-left PumpA, rear-right PumpPB, 
rear- left PumpB) 
 
19:48:13.500 for the remainder of PumpPA’s operation as shown during the transition depicted 
in the graph in Figure 11.   
Task Two- Batch Processes  
Task Two is the batch process.  Figure 11 above illustrates the flow process sequence for 
2 
1 
4 
3 
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the making of one batch of product per production cycle.  PumpPA began the batch process by 
partially filling product Tank C.  It was then followed by PumpPB directly behind it.  Once the 
product tank had been filled, PumpA, to the left of PumpPA in Figure 11, begins back-filling 
Tank A so that it can re-supply the simulated chemical solution (water) in preparation for the  
 
 
Figure 12. PumpPA ladder logic instruction started the “pumping” cycle 
next batch to begin after the entire production cycle has been completed.  PumpB follows suit 
after PumpA.   
A complete batch means that PumpPA and PumpPB had expelled the contents from tank 
A and B, respectively, before returning the contents from the product tank back to tanks A and 
B.  The term batches refer to the completion of one complete pumping process between the 
tanks.  Rungs three through six, Figures 12 and 13, show the ladder logic used for sequencing 
the batch process. 
On rung one of the PLC’s motor timer TON function, Figure 7, an elapsed Q output, 
circled in red and similar to Figure 12, parameter triggered PumpPA that started the batch 
process for manufacturing the simulated chemical mixture.  PumpPA along with the other three 
pumps used the PLC’s Q parameter of the TON function within the ladder logic programming, 
set with specific times, for filling the product tank, tank C, and back-filling the “supply” tanks, 
tanks A and B.  The pump run times were based on an average of the sampling results for fill 
times of five complete product batches as seen in Table 12.   
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Figure 13. Pumps PB, A, and B ladder logic shown representing sequence of pumping 
process 
 
The batch process for making product was task two of the manufacturing process and 
essentially consisted of four sub-tasks within the overall four task production cycle.  “Product” 
refers to the solution created as a result of combining TankA and TankB into the “Product” 
Tank.   Table 12 identifies the pump and its average transfer rate from its respectable source 
tank and into its target tank.  Fill times were determined after observing and recording the 
results from five separately timed iterations of consecutive pumping samples.   
No sensors were used for obtaining fill times.  Instead, the method employed consisted 
of a stop watch and recognition of fluid reaching a visual indicator (physical line) marked on the 
tank. This required backfilling the source (supply) tank before another iteration could be 
observed and recorded.  The remainder of the tasks within this cycle finished upon the 
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completion of TankB being back-filled.  Stimuli coding for step-two was [S;V;D].  
Figure 14 shows some of the global variables used in CCWs CI2CS project.  The  
 Table 12. Average pumping times for batch processing  
 
 PumpPA PumpPB PumpA PumpB Total 
2:06 2:25 2:19 2:25 09:15 
2:04 2:26 2:18 2:23 09:11 
2:05 2:27 2:18 2:23 09:13 
2:06 2:26 2:17 2:22 09:11 
2:04 2:26 2:18 2:22 09:10 
Average 2:05 2:26 2:18 2:23 09:12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. PLC ladder logic time values  
variables named: PumpPA_On_Time, PumpPB_On_Time, PumpA_On_Time, and 
PumpB_On_Time can be seen with their initial values set to the time intervals established from 
their pumping times determined by averaging and in the prior step.  Here the initial values, as 
seen circled in red, are called (used) when a project’s program is initialized.  After the program 
is initialized, other values, known as project values, can and will be used if they exist and are 
called.  In this experiment, by running processes in a linear manner and supervising each 
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production cycle, the pumping times for each cycle instance defaulted to their initial values. 
 
Figure 15. Tag 2 PumpPA Start/Stop Data, 00:02:05 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Tag 3 PumpPB Start/Stop Data, 00:02:26 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Tag 4 PumpA Start/Stop Data, 00:02:18 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Tag 5 PumpB Start/Stop Data, 00:02:23 
 
Start and stop times for each of the four pumps are shown in Figures 16 through 18.  In 
this instance, PumpPA began at 19:52:41.634 and ended at 19:54:46.665.  The operating times 
for PumpPA and the other pumps all correlate to the times set as part of their initial CI2CS 
project program values; as close as what the program’s data logging capabilities would support.  
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The timestamp column displays the time consistencies within a fraction of a millisecond.  The 
complete batch process can be seen to take place between 19:52:41.634 and 20:01:53.645. 
Task Three-Energizing the Robotic Arm 
Once an entire batch process is completed, a robotic arm is energized and begins 
collecting simulated product samples from the direction of the product tank.  The robotic arm 
process, task three, is triggered by the expiration of PumpB’s Q parameter setting of the TON 
function on rung seven of the PLC ladder logic, Figure 19.  As described in chapter three, the 
robotic arm is controlled by an Arduino controller.  Although the PLC output to the robotic arm 
relay is a one second, 12vdc signal sent to “wake” the Arduino, the entire functional process of 
the robotic arm is controlled by the Arduino.  This is important to remember because in section 
three, it provides the vector that is used to compromise this part of the process while other 
processes continue to run as normal within their respective order both before and after this task.   
 
 
Figure 19. Robotic arm ladder logic 
Although the product sample testing is simulated, the robotic arm functions in the exact 
manner it would, under normal conditions, if it were actually retrieving individual test tube 
samples from a test tube stand near the product tank before simulating the placement of them 
into the rotor of the centrifuge. The robotic arm, after waking and moving into an erect state, is 
positioned at a 90-degree angle to its first functional task of collecting a simulated product 
sample, Figure 20, as seen indicated by the dark blue arrow.  The initialization of the robotic 
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arm, as a result of powering the Arduino controller, places it in a posture and position referred to 
as the start position or ready-wait state.  From there it moves through six complete cycles of 
simulating the retrieval and placement of six individual test tubes from the product tank and into 
the rotor before eventually pausing or resting at a 90° angle between the product tank and 
centrifuge.  A complete functional cycle for the robotic arm means that from the ready-wait 
state, the arm rotates to the 180-degree position from the 90-degree position represented by 
 
Figure 20. Robotic arm ready position in stand-by (start) state (y-axis avg .224) 
the green arrow as seen in Figure 24.  With the arm remaining in that direction, the elbow and 
hand (gripper) proceed to go through a series of movements indicating the actions that would be 
performed if it were to actually retrieve a test tube from a rack located near the product tank.  
Once that function is complete and a simulated collection has been taken, the arm will rotate 
180-degrees from the 180-degree position to the 0-degree position, in alignment with the 
Start (ready-wait) Position 
0° 
90° 
180° 
90° 
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centrifuge, and begin performing a similar motion of placing the simulated product sample into 
the centrifuge, as if actually having the test tubes there to place.  This is represented by the 
yellow arrow in Figure 25. 
While discussed in more detail in section three of this chapter, this independent Arduino 
controller created a vector that was used for introducing the threat into the environment.  The 
threat was recognized by the erratic behavior and obvious deviation from the established 
baseline as a result of this behavior.  Stimuli coding for task three was [S;V;T]. 
The threat actions ultimately achieved the intended purpose of mimicking the results, 
similarly produced by Stuxnet during the uranium enrichment process to the centrifuges at Iran’s 
Natanz nuclear plant, albeit without the presence of uranium or an Arduino.  Based on an 
extensive literature survey of publicly available information relating to the Stuxnet virus, it 
appears that no Arduino was used or involved in the Natanz event.  Rather, the affected 
components were Siemens products. 
 
Figure 21. Robotic Arm Start/Stop Data, 00:00:01 (00:02:18 Arduino run-time)  
Although Figure 21 shows a one second output signal between the 20:01:53.635 start and 
20:01:54.615 stop time, the signal to the Arduino’s input pin was used to instantiate the wake 
function which started running the code within the void setup function of the program.  
Arduino’s IDE software, Sketch, pre-loads with two default functions whenever a new Arduino 
program is created.  The default functions are the void setup and the void loop functions.  The 
robotic arm normal baseline operation process, Figure 22, shows the void setup function 
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containing the instructions that put the arm into the ready-wait state.  The code within the void 
loop function, Figure 23, contained the commands for carrying out the robotic arm’s task specific 
process.   
Figure 22. Arduino’s Sketch void setup function – normal (baseline) operation  
Figure 23 below shows an abbreviated section of code containing the instructions sent to 
the Arduino servos.  Duplicative commenting was removed from the Arduino code for 
presentation in Figure 23.  Comments are preceded by two consecutive solidus or slashes (i.e., //) 
placed side-by-side.  These instructions illustrate the servo’s position, speed in getting to the 
position, and whether or not the instructions are carried out in unison with the command given to 
the servo before it.  There are several delay commands in between many of the instructions.  This 
simply causes a pause (or delay) between commands.  It was very useful for disrupting the 
robotic arm’s performance later in the experiment.  
Figures 24 and 25 below show the robotic arm’s simulated sample collection and 
placement positions, respectively, as it was programmed into the Arduino.  This is beneficial for 
void setup() {  
  pinMode(wakePin, INPUT_PULLUP); 
  pinMode(led, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(centPin, OUTPUT); 
  attachInterrupt(0, wakeUpNow, LOW); //interrupt 0 is used when wakeUpNow function tied to pin 2 goes LOW 
  digitalWrite(centPin,LOW); 
  myservo1.attach(servoPin1); // attaches the servo on pin 1 to the servo object. write degrees 0-180, speed 1-255, run in bckgnd 
  myservo2.attach(servoPin2);   
  myservo4.attach(servoPin4); 
  myservo3.attach(servoPin3); 
  myservo1.write(75,25,true); // elbow set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, run in background 
  delay(1000); 
  myservo2.write(90,25,true);  // shoulder set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, wait until done 
  delay(1000); 
  myservo4.write(90,25,true); 
  delay(1000); 
  myservo3.write(90,25,true); 
  } 
131  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Arduino’s Sketch void loop function – normal (baseline) operation 
interpreting the following Figure 26, showing robotic arm vibration data, in that it helps 
visualize the movement of the arm.  It is also relevant in illustrating the vivid contrasts between 
that of a normally appearing process, as compared to a previously established baseline, to that of 
void loop() { 
for(int i=0; i <= 5; i++){  // added for loop to operate arm six cycles to simulate the collection and placement of six 
test tubes from product tank to centrifuge   i = i++; 
//begin process 
myservo1.write(75,25,true); // elbow set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, run in background 
delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(90,25,true);  // shoulder set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, wait until done 
delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,25,true); 
delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(90,25,true);                   //FIGURE 20 
delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(180,35,true);                //FIGURE 24 
delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(155,35,false);      
delay(1000); 
myservo1.write(70,35,true);  
delay(1000);                   // move the servo to 70, fast speed, run background, write(degrees 0-180, speed 1-255, 
wait to complete true-false) 
myservo4.write(145,75,true); 
delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(90,35,false); 
myservo1.write(0,45,true); 
delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(0,35,true);                    //FIGURE 25 
delay(1000);                                               
myservo2.write(155,35,false); 
myservo1.write(95,55,true);       
delay(1000); 
myservo1.write(60,55,true);       
delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,35,true); 
delay(1000); 
}  
//after process performs six cycles of simulated sampling, the robotic arm returns to rest position, detaches servos 
and goes to sleep  
myservo1.write(75,25,true); // elbow set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, run in background 
delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(90,25,true);  // shoulder set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, wait until done 
delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,25,true); 
delay(1000); 
} 
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an altered one.  The exploited, or altered, robotic Arduino Sketch is presented in section three. 
 
 
Figure 24. Robotic arm position for collecting product sample (product sample simulated) 
 
  
 
 
Figure 25. Robotic arm position for placing product sample into centrifuge rotor 
(product sample simulated) 
 
In Figure 26, Sa represents the simulated sample collection activity and C represents the 
simulated centrifuge placement activity.  The green arrow on the left of the graph indicates the 
First Step 
Second Step 
0° 
0° 
90° 
90° 
180° 
180° 
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Figure 26. Robotic arm vibration (V) data, y-axis  
 
process start time, and the dark blue arrow to the right of the signal represents when the sixth 
cycle completed and the arm returned to the ready-wait state.  This graph is explained in more 
detail in section three when describing and illustrating the differences between a normal and 
potentially compromised abnormal state.  
The variation of sound signals of the robotic arm can be clearly seen in Figure 27.  A 
close look at the sound graph reveals a strong coorelation between the vibration and sound 
graph.  The blue lines in the graph are inserted at cyclic intervals.  The green line to the left 
signifies the process start and the red line to the right indicates the robotic arm’s return to a 
ready-wait state.  A visual observation of the process taking place corrobated the results and 
helped  better understand the transitions between the process steps performed by the robotic 
arm.  By following the write commands in the Arduino code above, Figure 23, and comparing 
both the sound and vibration graphs to each other, each movement can be accurately mapped to 
the baseline.  This mapping ultimately enabled the creation of a mask that was used for the 
selection of different values from sampled data; both during an established baseline operation, 
and an intentionally manipulated code alteration operation.  These values were then used to 
determine the probability of risk and to identify the affected component. 
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Figure 27. Robotic arm sound (S) data 
Task Four-Energizing a Centrifuge 
The last task in the faux chemical manufacturing process involves energizing a 
centrifuge that spins down the simulated product samples.  Upon completion of task three, a 
relay on the robotic arm platform receives a one second 5vdc input, Figure 30, temporarily 
closing a circuit to one of the PLC inputs (this function is similar to the pressing of a physical 
normally open switch) which initializes an output that sends 12 VDC to the dc-to-ac solid-state 
relay, Figure 28; thereby, starting the centrifuge.  The two-minute cycle is controlled by the 
centrifuge’s PT (programmed time) input parameter of the PLC’s TON function on rung eight, 
Figure 29.  The centrifuge’s rotor continues to spin after power has been removed, but 
eventually settles down naturally after a few moments.   
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Figure 28. Centrifuge showing solid-state relay 
The formula for determining risk within the four-task production cycle did not include 
the time it took for the centrifuge rotor to rest after power was terminated.  Stimuli coding for 
task four was [S;V].  If the coasting (deceleration) state of the centrifuge had been included as 
part of the production cycle, a hall effect sensor for measuring rotor speed (sP) would have been 
included in the coding, thus resulting in the parameter [S;V;sP]. 
 
 
Figure 29. Centrifuge ladder logic 
Relay 
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Figure 30. Tag 7 Centrifuge Start/Stop Data, 00:02:00 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Centrifuge vibration data 
The entire process cycle took 14 minutes and one second to complete.  Even with the 
exploited asset, as introduced in this section, but explained in greater detail in section three, the 
time for the entire process cycle could have easily remained the same; however, the exploit 
example in the next section included a three second increase to the overall process cycle.  
Process timing is critical to the discovery and determination of systemic risks.  Monitoring 
sensory input throughout each of the processing tasks in the production cycle at precise time 
intervals is key to discovering those risks.  Therefore, baselining the processes after setting up 
the production environment’s automated functions required a smooth, dependable, durable and 
reliable operation from start to finish. 
The initial baselining was accomplished upon completion of the installation for each 
device.  This process was an important first step for determining rudimentary performance 
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measures and to learn whether the asset met the expectations of how that component interacted 
within the environment at large.  Most importantly it was observed throughout its entire 
operation performing its intended task to ensure that it was adequate for the role it played and 
purpose it served. 
Section Two – Sensor selection, placement and data results for defining normalcy 
Baselining is a repetitive and iterative process for evaluating system performance over 
time.  Baselines can change for a number of reasons.  Baselining can be periodic or continuous, 
based on the implementation or purpose of the system or individual device.  Establishing an 
operational baseline for this CI2CS environment took into consideration the number of controls 
in place and the fact that each process was performed in sequential and independent steps.  This 
section discusses the approach taken in establishing the baseline method used in this research 
which is linear process baselining.   
It is recognized and understood that an alteration to the baseline does not automatically 
constitute performance issues that result in failing components caused by a vicious exploit 
injected into the system, or for that matter, sabotage resulting from an insider threat.  Some 
reasons for baseline changes, particularly as it relates to new construction or geographical 
location, stem from equipment and/or construction “settling in” or cross talk introduced by 
another industry’s automated and/or mechanical processes.  For example, when using sound and 
vibration sensors for monitoring a highly-automated production facility or coal power plant, an 
engineer may want to factor in rail car activity well ahead of arrival, during off-loading, and a 
certain time after departure.  Although the sound from rail car activity may be canceled out by 
the operating commotion of the device in immediate proximity of its dedicated sensors, 
vibration sensors, especially geophones, tend to have a greater range of sensitivity, so that if a 
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piece of equipment is not properly isolated or the sensor is not conditioned properly to its 
environment, false positives are likely to occur.   
As most environments are unique, placement and implementation of different types of 
equipment varies in their operating characteristics.  Some of these deviations can likely be 
attributed to supply chain involvement.  This might include inconsistent quality control, various 
manufacturers making similar but not identical parts, and geographically dispersed assembly 
plants assembling the end-product using different standards and equipment.  In this research for 
example, five of the same pumps (one being a spare) outwardly appeared to be identical, 
however, as shown in section one of this chapter, each pump (excluding the spare) had very 
different sound and vibration signatures.  The baselining method used in the commissioning 
phase consisted of task specific operational functions meeting their expected and anticipated 
task objective.  Table 12, introduced earlier, for example shows the measures used for 
establishing the initial operational baseline for the pumps.  Many of these measures began as a 
temporary way of studying device specific characteristics until risk monitoring sensors were 
permanently installed.   The sensors did allow for some adjustment in programming that 
permitted a way to condition the sensor more closely to its placement.  
Type of Sensors and Installing 
After commissioning the test-bed and establishing a rudimentary operational baseline, as 
described above, additional risk specific monitoring sensors were installed according to the 
coding stimuli assigned to the respective devices listed in the previous section for the functions 
they performed throughout those particular tasks.  The coding stimuli was established during the 
commissioning phase, primarily through observation of a repeated process performing its 
corresponding task.  The enablement of a segregated risk monitoring capability running in 
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parallel to the system’s programmed production cycle was realized at this phase in the 
experiment and led to the installation of a real-time clock (RTC) being integrated into the sensor 
network.   The RTC remained separated from the control system network; however, it was 
initialized through the first output signal received from the PLC.  Any compromise or deviation 
to the initialization process would have become evident during monitoring.  Neither an 
unintended compromise nor a deviation ever occurred. 
 An evaluation of operational performance led to the selection of stimulus specific 
sensors, as identified by the coding in the previous section.  There were three primary, four 
secondary and one tertiary input sensors utilized throughout this experiment.  As listed in 
chapter three, the eight types of sensors used in this experiment, in their respective order of 
importance as described above, included a microphone, accelerometer, temperature, humidity, 
barometric, flow, ultrasonic and thermal.  The data relating to each of the four processes relating 
to the particular sensor is listed and explained in the remainder of this section.  The spatial 
environment for this experiment was coded [S;V;T;H).   
This centralized sensor module provided the frame of reference that monitored all 
processes.  As explained in chapter three, a frame of reference ensures that all processes were 
monitored consistently and equally relative to the sensor’s position to that of the objects 
monitored throughout each production cycle.  Figure 32 below shows a diagram of the spatial 
sensory module and sensors as coded.  The sensors are labeled with their respective sensory 
designation. 
Sensor placement is discussed in more detail in section two of this chapter. The sole 
accelerometer, although attached to the robotic arm, took the role of a centralized vibration 
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Figure 32. Sound recorder, vibration (accelerometer), temperature and humidity (DHT11) 
sensor for spatial environment 
 
sensor, in large part because it was central to all of the processes, and also because the robotic 
arm provided a better placement of the sensor due to the characteristics of its configuration, 
especially in the ready-wait state.  The robotic arm poised in a ready-wait state with the sensor 
mounted to the arm’s shoulder actually improved, or at the least, maintained a certain quality of 
data with sufficient enough input to clearly identify start and stop points between processes, as 
well as, performance indicators during those processes.  The robotic arm’s inherent slack 
between its virtual anatomy such as the shoulder, elbow, hip, etc., created a mechanical 
amplifier in that it protracted the vibrations of not just the robotic arm functions, but those that 
were created by the other devices during their running process as well.  This can be observed in 
DHT11 (H and T) 
Accelerometer (V) 
Sound recorder (S) 
141  
 
any of the graphs originating from the data recorded during those processing cycles.   
In order to establish an operational baseline, it was important that processes maintained 
their functional capabilities and operated within the parameters that were defined when 
documenting the initial baseline.  The processes were run several times after the initial baseline 
to allow the test-bed to settle in.  This was particularly important in one area of the test-bed 
where the supply tanks and product tank were located.  Each supply tank had six gallons of 
water, each gallon weighing 8.34 lbs., and was located in one quadrant of the test-bed.  The 
emptying of the supply tanks into the 15-gallon product tank shifted 100.8 lbs. volume of water 
to an essentially smaller footprint in another quadrant.  Thus, it was necessary to study the 
weight redistribution through several cycles to learn whether a shifting load distribution 
interfered with the establishment of an operational baseline, particularly as it related to the 
vibration sensor.   
Figure 33 displays the vibration data received during one of a number of production 
cycles conducted over the course of this research.  Figure 34 shows sound data rendered in a 
graphic representation of a complete production cycle.  Note transition points indicated by red 
arrows between processes in both graphs.  Details of each task of the process are illustrated 
throughout the rest of this section.  Both of these graphs establish and portray a vivid impression 
of the dynamic processes occurring throughout the entire production cycle.  An early review of 
these two graphs will help guide the rest of the discussion regarding the data obtained not only 
by these two sensors, but also from the other sensors whose values are still useful for holistic 
risk monitoring.   
A careful review of both graphs, Figure 33 and 34, shows that there is a strong 
correlation between the sound and vibration data and provides valuable feedback when 
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compared to previous cycles that took place before this particular instance.  With the exception 
of a few spikes during the sound and vibration recordings, 
 
Figure 33. Vibration (V) graph, selected at random, of one complete production cycle 
 
the graphs represent a fairly stable and fluid process.  The sound and vibration sensors provided 
the most insightful, reliable and dependable data and complemented one another by the 
similarity in their functional characteristics.  The signals obtained from both the vibration sensor 
and sound sensor consistently portrayed an image of tasks in the process taking place with better 
accuracy and an extremely high reliability rate compared to the other sensors used in this 
research.  A comparative analysis between these two data sets ultimately determined whether a 
potential compromise occurred and the probability that some level of risk existed within the 
system.  
 
 
Figure 34. Sound (S) graph of one complete production cycle  
Start Motor-Generator 
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Finish Start 
Start PumpPB 
Start PumpPA 
Start PumpA 
Start PumpB 
Start Robotic Arm 
Start Centrifuge 
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Figure 35. Relational frame of reference to spatial sensory module located adjacent to 
robotic arm 
 
Figure 35 identifies the location of the SSM centrally located for monitoring the stimuli 
emanating around it.  A frame of reference is essential when calculating relative changes to 
stimuli, especially temperature.  Unlike sound and vibration data, where the amplitude can be 
artificially, physically, or programmatically increased or decreased for signal clarity, the input 
from a temperature sensor in relation to the producers of the climate altering stimuli affecting it 
cannot be as easily translated or enhanced.  For example, the first production run on one 
particular day of monitoring started with the test-bed internal ambient temperature at 63-
degrees.  As the production cycles, incrementally increased, so too did the ambient temperature.  
This is to be expected.  The more instances in close proximity of one another that each motor 
and pump operated, the more the temperature for each moving object individually increased 
with that of the ambient temperature.  There was naturally a point of diminishing difference, as 
the test-bed environment was large enough to absorb much of the climate change that was 
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occurring.  Also, it is posited that the production cycles were operated for such short intervals 
that significant temperature variations and swings were not relevant enough to suggest an 
intentional or unintentional attempt to break, damage or compromise a particular object within 
the test-bed environment. 
 
Figure 36. Perspective view of FLIR camera  
 A thermal imager was used to capture temperature characteristics occurring before, 
during, and following the batch process.  Temperature signatures obtained from the thermal 
images were helpful in identifying and monitoring the sequence of the processes taking place 
during the pumping cycle. Figure 36 shows the mounting location of the thermal sensor (FLIR 
camera) used for studying and monitoring thermal activity created by the pump motors during 
their pumping interval.  The imager, encircled in red, captures temperature signatures from the 
devices within the yellow rectangle.  This includes the pump, its motor, and the relay valves, 
encircled in orange.  The camera angle used to capture the view in Figure 36, provides a 
Solenoid Valves 
 
Thermal Imager 
 
Thermal camera perspective 
 
Metal frame 
Gang box 
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Figure 37. Thermal image prior to start of 
batch process (screen shot 17:57) 
 
Figure 38. Thermal image of same batch 
process just beginning to pump (screen shot 
17:59) 
 
Figure 39. Thermal image of same batch 
process finished, PumpB and PumpA motor 
and valve de-energized (screen shot 18:11) 
  
Figure 40. Thermal image of subsequent 
batch process with PumpPB motor and 
valve energized and PumpPA motor and 
valve de-energized (screen shot 18:18) 
 
First thermal indication 
of PumpPA valve being 
actuated (note bright 
yellow pixel) 
PumpB valve 
PumpPB valve 
PumpA valve 
PumpPA valve 
Vivid yellow 
to orange 
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perspective for the preceding four images, Figures 37 - 40.   
Some details were lost from view as external stimuli altered a portion of the image; 
thereby, rendering that particular portion of the results unusable.  This can be seen in the Figure 
37 above.  Because the results demonstrated an inconsistency and untimely irregularity in the 
readings, the thermal camera was only used as an “event” and not a “risk” monitoring sensor.  
An event sensor was used for general purpose process monitoring.  The red circle in Figure 37 
captures the purple pixels in the lower left center of the figure above that illustrate the metal 
frame of pump A.  This can be clearly seen, and is labeled, in Figure 36 as well.   The orange 
and yellow pixels, yellow circle, mid-center of the figure show the metal electrical box, also 
labeled in Figure 36, housing the motor wiring from all four motors, and the aluminum strap it 
was mounted to.  These colors, the purple, red, and yellow represent a slight temperature 
increase to other items around it.   
In the Figure, 39, above, over a ten-minute period, the heat signature shown in Figure 38 
above begins to fade ever so slightly.  The heat dissipation is most notable in the mid-center 
area, encircled in yellow, in Figure 38, where the vivid yellow seen in the previous figure, 37, 
has faded from yellow to orange.  Pump PA and pump PB’s solenoids are not distinctly visible 
as the other two pump’s A and B are in Figure 39.  Although the thermal signature produced by 
the solenoids (valves) were not expected to be so prevalent; they were not unanticipated.   
It was unknown that the solenoids heat signature would be as prevalent as they turned 
out to be.  All four solenoids are clearly identified in Figures 39 and 40 above.  The two 
orange/purple and orange/purple/yellow pixels in the right upper and lower quarter of Figure 39 
show the residual heat still emanating from their earlier pumping interval when the solenoids 
were energized, while the two yellow/white and yellow/white/orage pixels in the upper left 
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quarter on the left indicate that pump A has completed its pumping interval and pump B has 
recently finished.  Figures 39 and 40, both show the stimulus emanating from all four of the 
motors as well.  All solenoid valves in Figure 38 are encircled in yellow.  Figure 39 illustrates a 
process, subsequent to the one that just completed and illustrated in Figures 38 and 39 above, 
where PumpPA has finished and PumpPB is begnning.   
Table 13 Sample serial capture of DHT11 raw data using Cool Term 
20:31:56 Humidity Temp C Temp F Relative Humidity in C Relative Humidity in F 
388674 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388687 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388702 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388716 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388730 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388745 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388759 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
20:31:56 
     
388788 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388802 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388816 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388831 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388845 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388859 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388874 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
20:31:56 
     
388888 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388902 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388917 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388931 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388945 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388959 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
388973 49.00% 17.00 *C  62.60 *F  16.03 *C  60.86 *F 
 
Table 13 presents a sampling of DHT11 data obtained during one of the several dozen 
runs taken over the course of testing using CoolTerm.  The DHT11 sensor was used to obtain 
the information recorded in Table 13.  The data represents the stimuli of the internal test-bed 
environment at the time a production cycle was in progress.  Although, seemingly insignificant, 
and for this research only used to memorialize the current atmospheric conditions of the space 
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used by the automation assets at the time of the research, this data is critical in recognizing 
performance standards and characteristics when there are dramatic changes in temperature.  The 
test-bed did not experience any dramatic temperature changes. 
Table 14 Sample serial capture of flow rate raw data (PumpPA) 
Liters per hour 
64 L/hour 
536 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
552 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
568 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
560 L/hour 
 
The data shown in Tables 14, 15, 16, and 17 appears in its raw state; however, a header 
row was appended to each of these tables in order to identify the data being presented.  Table 14 
lists a partial instance of flow rate data from pump PA.  The leading data consisted of zeros until 
the pump began running.  The zeros were removed from the table for brevity.  The first value, 64 
L/hr., displayed in the first line following the header row, accounts for the void in the supply 
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line.  In this sample the flow rate is seen to normalize between 552 and 568 liters.  This is 
properly indicated by the majority of 560 L/hour entries.  The difference between the minimum 
and maximum values would have to be noted here, and factored into any equation relying on this 
data for calculating risk.  
Tables 15, 16, and 17 show fill states between tanks during the batch process.  This 
begins with the data presented in Table 15.  An ultrasonic sensor, which is used to measure 
distance, was used in acquiring this data.  Initially an Arduino, in combination with physical 
conductors, acting as a switch, was used to sense tank water levels.  The Arduino’s limited 
controller capabilities and insufficient number of interrupt pins prevented an 
Table 15 Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw pre-fill data (in inches)  
Tank A Tank B Product Tank 
2 2 55 
2 3 54 
2 3 55 
2 3 54 
2 3 55 
2 3 55 
2 3 54 
2 3 55 
2 2 55 
2 2 55 
2 3 54 
2 3 56 
2 3 56 
2 3 56 
2 3 55 
2 3 55 
2 3 54 
2 3 56 
 
implementation of this type of switch, such that an alternative type of sensor was installed.  In 
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Table 15, it can be seen that the water level of tank A is two inches away from the sensor.  The 
water level for tank B fluctuates between two and three inches from the sensor, and the level of 
the product tank fluctuates between 54 and 56 inches.  The reason for this is because each tank 
maintained a small amount of water after moving its contents from one to the other, staying right 
above the opening of the supply line in order to prevent air from entering into the system.  
Table 16. Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw data (in inches) - begin product tank fill  
Tank A Tank B Product 
Tank 
3 3 55 
3 3 55 
3 3 55 
4 3 55 
3 3 55 
4 3 56 
4 3 56 
4 3 56 
4 3 56 
4 3 54 
4 3 55 
4 3 55 
4 2 54 
4 3 55 
4 3 55 
  
In Table 16 above, PumpPA has started filling the product tank.  It was noted in the 
previous table that the product tank averaged a 55-inch distance between the existing water level 
and the sensor.  Since the product tank is much larger in volume than Tank A, fill values for the 
product tank will take longer before changes in the filling capacity are indicated.   
Table 17 below illustrates the data anticipated while pump PB is operating.  The data in 
this table indicates that pump PB is filling because the values in Tank A’s column is a consistent 
36 inches from the water level to the sensor.  This translates into Tank A being empty, less the 
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small amount of water used for sealing the supply line.  Unless there was a compromised or 
defective controller, faulty wiring or sensor, it would be unlikely that tank B would indicate a 
value less than its fill capacity, averaging between a two and three-inch reading, while Tank A 
Table 17. Sample serial capture of ultrasonic raw data (in inches_ after PumpPA finished 
and PumpPB has started 
Tank A Tank B Product Tank 
36 13 29 
36 13 28 
36 14 29 
36 13 29 
36 13 28 
36 14 29 
36 13 29 
36 14 28 
36 13 29 
36 13 29 
36 13 28 
36 13 29 
36 13 29 
36 14 28 
36 13 29 
36 14 29 
36 13 28 
36 14 28 
36 14 29 
36 14 28 
36 14 28 
36 14 29 
36 14 28 
36 14 28 
36 14 29 
 
displayed a 36-inch distance between its water level and sensor.   
The accelerometer raw data results are listed in the Table 18; however, they will be 
explained in greater detail in the next section.  An accelerometer uses three axes for determining 
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gyroscopic positioning.  In this research, as described earlier, the accelerometer was placed on 
the robotic arm.  Due to the orientation of the X and Y axis, the sensor could be X or Y dominant 
relative to the mounting position, or orientation, and the relationship it has with the device to 
which it is attached.  The Y axis was dominant in this installation; therefore, data from the Y axis 
column was used in developing an algorithm for determining probability of risk. 
 The data presented in Table 18 shows the values for the X, Y, and Z axes as listed under 
their applicable columns.  However, the first column indicates an absolute time the data was 
recorded interspersed with the relative time, displayed in milliseconds, that the sensors in the 
test-bed environment were being logged, whether the production cycle had started or not.  The 
graph displayed earlier in this section, Figure 34, used the data derived from that listed on the Y-
axis column.   
The values in the Y-axis column of Table 18 are between 0.216 and 0.245.  The fact that 
these values are positive indicate the position of the robotic arm is rearward or away from the 
working area.  Negative values indicate that the arm is forward, or reaching out toward the work 
area.  This could also be expressed as rear or front of center.  If Y-axis values registered an 
average of one or negative one, it indicates that the robotic arm was either zero or 180-degrees, 
in other words, parallel to the base.   
By examining the Arduino code in Figure 23 earlier, it is noted that the arm segment 
between the base and the elbow is set to 90 degrees.  This is not a true 90-degrees in relation to 
the x, y, and z planes of the accelerometer, but instead, it is to the servo’s position in relation to 
the arm’s mount.  There is also the introduction of slack (jitter) due to the poor quality in 
manufacturing of the robotic arm.  Therefore, the specifications, quality and tolerances 
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associated with the bearings, mounts, and servos used in the construction of the robotic arm all 
Table 18. Sample serial capture of accelerometer raw data using Cool Term 
Absolute Time in HH:MM:SS 
with Relative Time in Milliseconds 
X-axis Y-axis Z-axis 
20:31:56    
388674 -0.207 0.238 -0.952 
388687 -0.214 0.217 -0.95 
388702 -0.222 0.236 -0.948 
388716 -0.229 0.245 -0.953 
388730 -0.226 0.236 -0.948 
388745 -0.221 0.224 -0.949 
388759 -0.216 0.227 -0.948 
20:31:56 
 
  
 
388788 -0.198 0.229 -0.952 
388802 -0.21 0.229 -0.953 
388816 -0.157 0.216 -0.944 
388831 -0.213 0.225 -0.949 
388845 -0.218 0.225 -0.956 
388859 -0.217 0.229 -0.951 
388874 -0.214 0.228 -0.959 
20:31:56 
 
    
388888 -0.214 0.227 -0.951 
388902 -0.223 0.222 -0.956 
388917 -0.216 0.225 -0.954 
388931 -0.213 0.228 -0.95 
388945 -0.212 0.229 -0.953 
388959 -0.216 0.228 -0.948 
388973 -0.215 0.235 -0.948 
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contribute to the total amount of slack inherited by the system.  As long as the asset’s 
specifications and design nuances are recognized, understood, and properly factored into the 
process or set of processes, early in the implementation phase, it is possible to capture usable 
data.  The design nuances were recognized and properly factored into the analysis such that 
valid usable data was obtained. 
Section Three – Introducing the Exploit (Breaking the Robotic Arm) 
Prior to performing any of the studies involving the automation processes taking place 
during the production cycles, it was necessary to energize the test-bed.  Due to safety reasons 
and maintenance activities, the test-bed was de-energized after every set of experiments; not 
each production cycle.  It was noted that during the energization, the relay for the robotic arm 
would receive voltage and wake the Arduino causing it to go through six-complete cycles of 
simulating the collection and placement of test tubes that imitated a quality control sampling 
process.  These actions were to be expected since the Arduino was programmed to do this.  
However, after the initial energization, the Arduino controller remained energized which 
prevented the arm from functioning out of sequence despite the sleep mode function it received 
after performing its assigned task.   
An Arduino controller reset function is different from the sleep and wake function.  The 
most significant difference between the two functions is that a reset causes an interruption to the 
controller’s power, whereas a sleep and wake function do not.  This operational characteristic 
along with the way the robotic arm’s functional process was configured, as part of the overall 
automation system helped identify a vector and created an opportunistic situation for 
introducing an alternative set of instructions to the Arduino controller while powering up, or in 
synchronization with its normal operating cycle.  The following two graphs, Figures 41 and 42, 
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illustrate what shape a normal sound and vibration signature, in comparison with the established 
baseline, should take while performing its programmed tasks of collecting and placing a 
simulated product sample from the tank to the centrifuge.  
 
Figure 41. Sound graph showing intervals and transitions of the robotic arm process  
In Figure 41, a sound graph provides a visual representation, creating a sound signature, 
illustrating the first cycle of a normally performing/functioning robotic arm.  In other words, this 
particular graphic represents that this task instance is operating or performing to the established 
baseline.  This graph focuses in on the appearance of a singular cyclic task being performed during 
this task in the process.  By providing a vivid visual account of each complete cycle, a timely 
selection of the relative time and its expected corresponding voltage can be used as variables for 
determining risk.  It is with these graphic representations that certain variables were chosen and 
used for that purpose.   
Figure 41 incorporates both leading and trailing data to show the transitions between the 
actual start and finish of the collection and placement cycle.  The red-line labeled as R-W State 
R-W 
State 
Sa C One-cycle 
Start
C 
Finish 
Begin next cycle 
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is the arm’s “home” position, referred to as the ready-wait state and holds there until the 
Arduino controller receives the wake command. There is a short pause before the robot rotates 
counter clockwise to the 180-degree position and begins moving through the motions described 
in the last section.  The yellow vertical line in Figure 41 indicates where and when this cycle 
finished and the next one began.  The significant voltage activity observed in this graph between 
30 and -30 millivolts at an absolute time of 19:32:55.000, indicative of when the data was 
rendered into creating this graph for figurative purposes and not at the time the data was 
produced, represents the rotation from the 180-degree to the 0-degree position, relative to the 
arm’s attachment to the rotating base.  Sa refers to the simulated sample collection and C refers 
to the simulated placement into the centrifuge.  
Figure 42 is a graphic rendering of the vibration data collected during the robotic arm 
step of the production cycle.  A sample of the vibration data was introduced in the last section; 
however, it is described in more detail here.  Figure 42 shows the vibration characteristics from 
each of the six individual cycles performed at the time this particular process took place.  The 
red lines between two adjoining circles delineates between where one cycle started and the other 
ended.  As can be seen there are a few runts, not anomalies, but none that indicate an extreme or 
significant shift or alteration to the established baseline.  Any vibration or sound data point can 
be exaggerated by even a slight disturbance to the functioning asset: however, an awareness of 
these occurrences can aid in filtering out garbage or extraneous noise.  
A precisely-timed upload to the Arduino proved that a synchronized execution of a 
modified code, designed for the purpose of causing a malicious consequence, could be 
accomplished during the transition between the PumpB back-fill process and the robotic arm 
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Figure 42. Robotic arm vibration data, y-axis  
 
sampling process without detection; however, the first erratic action in response to the altered 
programming would trigger an alert.  An alert was presented in the form of a graph in the same 
way all activity was rendered during the assessment process; however, in the instances where 
the Arduino’s program had been modified to disrupt the process, the graph line resulting from 
the discovered deviation contrasted sharply with that of the baseline graph. 
The timestamps, as recorded by the data historian during logging of the data used to 
create the graph above indicates a start time of 13:47:38.500 and end time of 14:01:36.832, 
thereby, the total time for this production cycle was 13 minutes, 58 seconds, and 332 
milliseconds.  This would indicate a difference of just under three seconds between the total 
time for this particular production cycle from that of others described in section two of this 
chapter.  The reason for the time discrepancy lies in the modified code of the Arduino controller.  
In this instance, referring to Figure 43 below, the code was uploaded to the Arduino controller 
following the energization of the test-bed’s main power strip.   
The Arduino was powered by its own dedicated 12 VDC power supply and did not 
remain in a constant programming or monitoring capable state; however, a USB 2.0, type B 
cable was kept plugged into the USB port should monitoring or programming be necessary.  A 
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USB connection provides the distinct capability of not only supplying power, but also of having 
the capacity to monitor and program the controller.  This capacity includes the aspect of 
monitoring serial data transmitted to or received from the controller, and or uploading 
programming instructions (Blum, 2013).  A controller with an independent power supply is 
unaffected by this arrangement.  An Arduino will perform the last programming instructions 
received by the controller whenever power is applied.   
 
 
Figure 43. Sound graph of full production cycle showing deviant behavior caused by an 
altered robotic arm controller program  
 
The application of power through either a USB connection or from a dedicated power 
supply will not impact an Arduino’s process as long as one form of continuous power exists.  In 
other words, as long as the controller is in an energized state, attaching a USB cable will not 
disrupt the controller’s condition.  Likewise, if a USB cable is attached, detaching a live power 
supply plug from an Arduino power jack will not have an impact on the processes taking place, 
with one exception.  If an Arduino controlled peripheral device is powered by the Vin (voltage 
in) pin on the Arduino board, the reference voltage, if greater than five volts of direct current to 
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that device will be affected; thereby causing an undesirable and possibly unpredictable response 
from that device (Blum, 2013).  The Vin pin is marked as such because of its relation to the 
power input.  This is not to be confused with Vout (voltage out), although it might seem more 
appropriate and in standing with conventional nomenclatures.  This is simply not the case here.  
Peripheral devices can receive greater than five volts DC when powered by the Vin output pin. 
Figure 43 shows a sound graph of a complete production cycle, from start to finish, 
including the section where the process indicated a deviation to the sound signature, or set of 
input signals, normally produced during the sampling step of the production cycle and that of 
the established baseline.  Figure 44 shows how the normal sound signature appears compared to 
that of Figure 45 showing the sound signature as it appears after the robotic arm’s programming 
instructions have been modified. 
 
 
Figure 44. Normal sound signature from one cycle of the robotic arm process  
The major difference between the two graphs, Figure 44 and 45, are shown by the stark 
contrasts involving the frequency and occurrence of the delay command appearing along each 
sampling cycle.  In the previous, Figure 45, there is an incremental and sequential rythmic 
pattern to the delays placed between the different arm movements.  These delays can be seen 
Normal Cycle  
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across one complete sampling cycle starting between timpstamp 19:32:45.000 and 
19:33:05.500, marked by red lines, and the voltage axis between -7.5 and 5 mv.  In the 
following Figure 45 there is only a singular drawn out delay between each sampling cycle.   
 
 
Figure 45. Sound signature of robotic arm process after malicious code upload 
In Figure 45 the sampling process falls between 14:18:55.750 and 14:19:05.500.  The 
volts still average between -7.5 and 5 mv during delays.  Referring to the graphs Figures 44 and 
45, the point at which the process deviates from the established baseline and a potential risk 
emerges is clear.  The fact that a deviation has occurred in a process related function and the 
primary controller, the PLC in this case, rather than the Arduino, has not been compromised, 
largely based on the control system configuration and security controls in place, it is with 
high confidence that a systemic risk can be determined to have emerged from within or has been 
introduced into the system.   
Figure 46 shows the vibration data sample from the very same process with the 
malicious code.  Both a delay and cycle occurrence are indicated on the graph.  As can be seen 
here, the arm was forward during  
Malicious Cycle 
 
Delay 
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Figure 46. Vibration signature of robotic arm process after malicious code upload  
 
 
Figure 47. Modified Arduino code having a direct impact on robotic arm’s actions 
the delay.  The sharp spike down, following the delay, indicates the abrupt movements the arm 
was going through in between the delays.  
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Vibration Data-Malicious Code Results
Delay
Cycle
void loop() { 
for(int i=0; i <= 5; i++){  // added for loop to operate arm six cycles to simulate the collection and placement of six test 
tubes from product tank to centrifuge   i = i++; 
//begin process 
myservo1.write(75,25,true); // elbow set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, run in background 
//delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(90,25,true);  // shoulder set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, wait until done 
/delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,25,true); 
//delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(90,25,true); 
//delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(180,35,true); 
//delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(155,35,false);      
//delay(1000); 
myservo1.write(70,35,true);  
//delay(1000);                   // move the servo to 70, fast speed, run background, write(degrees 0-180, speed 1-255, wait to 
complete true-false) 
myservo4.write(145,75,true); 
delay(13000);  
myservo2.write(90,35,false); 
myservo1.write(0,45,true); 
//delay(1000); 
myservo3.write(0,35,true);  
//delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(155,35,false); 
myservo1.write(95,55,true);       
//delay(1000); 
myservo1.write(60,55,true);       
//delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,35,true); 
//delay(1000); 
}  
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 Figure 47 illustrates the code transformation used to produce the results as documented 
in Figures 45 and 46.  The Arduino code in Figure 47 highlights the extended 13 second delay 
added between sampling cycles.  It was determined that each individual delay could be 
consolidated into one strategic location within the code to maximize its effect.  This kept the 
total time for the product sampling task in line with the baseline if it were not; however, as seen 
in Figure 48, affected by the three delays in sleep mode being commented out as well.  The 
original delays that were placed between most commands were commented out.  Commenting 
the command out prevents it from firing.  This accounts for the three seconds lost from the 
overall production cycle, which could be accounted for from within the PLC’s programming 
capability; however, it could also be independently discovered while sampling was performed as 
part of a real-time risk assessment process during the centrifuge task of the process.  As it relates 
to sound and vibration monitoring, the assessment would still be based off time and voltage 
values.  
Since this was a controlled experiment, the sampling was conducted on demand.  This 
means that each part of the process or tasks performed during the production cycle were 
supervised and monitored, and risk assessments were user initiated while the process was 
running.  The raw data that was introduced in section two of this chapter populated a file, Figure 
49, created at the start of each experiment, regardless of the number of cycles that ran.  However, 
//after process performs six cycles of simulated sampling, the robotic arm returns to rest position, detaches servos and goes to 
sleep  
myservo1.write(75,25,true); // elbow set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, run in background 
//delay(1000); 
myservo2.write(90,25,true);  // shoulder set the initial position of the servo, as fast as possible, wait until done 
//delay(1000); 
myservo4.write(90,25,true); 
//delay(1000); 
} 
 
 
Figure 48. Sleep instructions showing delay commands commented out 
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most of the files were created at the start of each cycle and not used to capture simultaneous, or   
 
Figure 49. Example of capture files and default file names generated by Cool Term  
back-to-back, runs.  Figures 50 and 51 show a screenshot of the logging program with its built in 
real- time logging feature used to capture serial data from the sensors used in this research.   
 
Figure 50. Cool Term data logger with real-time capture capability 
 
There were three steps required in determining whether or not the system was placed at 
risk as a result of a cyber related incident versus a mechanical or performance related type of 
event:   
• establishment of baseline for task evaluated, 
• sampling of real-time data, and 
• processing data with Ambari’s Hadoop Distributed File System Hive 
incorporated into Hortonworks Data Platform. 
 
No device other than the robotic arm used an independent controller for controlling a process 
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performing a specific task.  All other devices were controlled by the PLC.  The detection of a 
performance type of event based on a mechanical failure or operational quality issue was not 
applicable for this research. 
 
 
Figure 51. Logging features of Cool Term showing timestamp feature 
The first step in evaluating risk required the establishment of a baseline, especially for 
the task being evaluated.  The data used in establishing the baseline was determined by 
averaging a collection of samples from both sound and vibration taken during fifty, closely 
supervised production cycles; after the test-bed had been officially commissioned and 
performance indicators registered consistently throughout each step of the process. The 
commissioning is discussed in section one above.   
Appendix A lists a fraction of data, which is part of the baseline, and was used in 
creating Figure 52.  This sample is used to illustrate the approach that was taken when testing 
real-time values and comparing them to the baseline values as a way of determining risk.  The 
vibration sample was graphed to further illustrate the point.  Figure 52 shows a portion of the 
baseline used for random sampling comparison.  Figure 53 shows a random sample that was 
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compared against the baseline shown in Figure 52. 
 
 
Figure 52. Baseline vibration sample   
 
Figure 53. Random sample one - normal 
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Figure 54. Random sample one data compared with baseline  
The second step in calculating risk, required the sampling of real time data consisting of 
time and voltage (amplitude) values for sound, and or time and inertia values for vibration.  
Figures 53 shows a random data sample taken during the robotic arm product sampling cycle.  
This data was obtained on-demand by the user and compared against acceptable baseline values 
during a defined interval at a specific point in time, relative to the process taking place.  Since 
 
Figure 55. Random sample two – abnormal (malicious) 
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this was a controlled experiment and the affected asset had been defined, test samples were only 
taken during the step, or interval, at which point the simulated product sampling took place and 
a deviation from the baseline was expected to occur.  This alleviated the production of 
extraneous data and the need to explain it as such.   
Figures 54 and 56 show a stark contrast in baseline comparisons between sample one, 
Figure 53, and sample two, Figure 55.  In order to make this comparison, a call to the data file, 
as introduced in Figure 49 earlier, was made while in the process of performing the data capture.  
This data was then ingested using Apache NiFi.   
 
Figure 56. Vibration data showing sample two data deviating from baseline  
The third and final step in evaluating and determining a potential risk was accomplished 
by taking the data ingested with NiFi and processing it using Ambari’s Hadoop Distributed File 
System (HDFS), Hive, incorporated into the Hortonworks Data Platform.  Although this 
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platform is Apache based, it integrates with Microsoft Azure, and can be used with Azure’s 
cloud-based capabilities.  This operation was performed within the locally segregated sensor 
network; not in the cloud.  A query created in Hive, compared the mean values of pre-defined 
data points, illustrated as orange and yellow squares, Figure 56, already established in the 
“baseline” table, to the data recorded in the “live” table at the point in time the data was 
captured.  Comparison times between the baseline and the live data capture were based on 
relative processing times.   This was an instantaneous process.   
The mean was calculated using the general mean equation.  The variance, likewise, was 
calculated using the general variance equation.  Sample baseline, Figure 52, and random one 
and two data, Figures 53 and 55, provided in appendix A, B, and C, were used to determine the 
values for that point in time, as it relates to the data points shown in Figure 56.  The data 
provided in the appendices were calculated, and applied, using the standard mean and variance 
equations.  
Figure 56 identifies data points along the baselines of the X-axis.  These data points were 
used in the query as a comparison reference to the live data.  The intervals are noted by line 
numbers based on data points along both the upper and lower baseline, depicted in the graph as 
marker numbers, 136 for example, circled in red.  These points are located at specific time 
intervals across the upper and lower baseline.  The upper baseline is designated along the 
horizontal red line, between the upper and lower orange limit lines.  The lower baseline limits 
are not illustrated, however, the lower baseline is, as illustrated by the horizontal green line in 
Figure 56.  These data points represent a small portion of the process.  However, they are 
sufficient for defining strategic points along the process and essentially create a sampling 
template that can be applied across identical processes.   
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For the event illustrated in Figure 56, the orange squares represent the match between 
the running process and the baseline.  The yellow squares represent NULL data, or indicate 
extreme variances such as the one that can be seen just past marker (time reference) 703, circled 
in green.  The first deviation, represented by a yellow square, actually occurs at marker 20, as 
pointed out by the red arrow. The second deviation identified occurs at marker 352.  Although it 
is clear to see that other deviations appear to have occurred between marker 150 and 170, not 
represented, and most definitely at marker 243, not represented, there were no data points 
assigned to capture it.   
Findings 
Preliminary data analysis was conducted early in the initial phase of the experiment to 
establish the functional requirements necessary to carry out the automated processes.  This 
initial analysis helped determine the most effective placement of the assets used to perform 
those processes, and to develop an understanding of the characteristics and types of stimuli each 
asset produced.   
After an initial baseline was developed, the bulk of the data gathered throughout this 
experiment was generated during the repetitive production cycles that ran for several hours at a 
time.  Several conditioning and commissioning runs were performed during the establishment of 
the operational baseline, after the development of an initial baseline, prior to capturing the 
production data used in the comparative analysis process of the risk detection phase. 
The research demonstrated that a well-designed and carefully carried out control system 
production process can be independently monitored in a parallel fashion to its inherent 
monitoring capability, and that such monitoring can be instrumental in providing a reliable and 
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accurate determination that a potential cyber induced risk to a CI2CS process has occurred.  
This research involved a CI2CS test-bed that performed a number of automated processes 
operating in a linear fashion.  It was determined that an analysis of data from the random 
sampling, during the initial baselining, confirmed that multiple tasks performed simultaneously 
could also be processed and de-synthesized in such a way to enable threat detection and 
identification of a real-time risk.  Such an analysis involved the use of a complex algorithm and 
sensor implementation scheme.  An approach introducing machine learning could operate within 
the constructs similar to the methodology used in this research. 
Summary of the Results and Outcomes of the Research 
The entire functional concept of the CI2CSs final design should be understood from start 
to finish when considering the implementation of an independent parallel IT/OT risk monitoring 
solution.  In today’s IoT universe, many of the filters necessary to help define the anticipated 
spatial environment for CI2CS facilities can be ascertained with the vast amounts of data readily 
available, most of it accessible in real-time, or pre-scheduled, and they can be factored in ahead 
of time, prior to the production run-time.  This would include information from a number of 
sources such as transportation, atmospheric activity, or local events.  Specifically, it would take 
into consideration factors such as flight paths and schedules of commercial travel or logistical 
operations, including train and trucking schedules, weather reports, types of local events that 
would suggest higher than normal commuter activity along adjacent transportation corridors, 
agricultural activity (for facilities in rural areas), and other local industry activity that might 
have an impact on monitoring equipment situated within those settings.  This is not unrealistic 
when comparing the orders of magnitude involved in tuning or conditioning an extremely 
stimuli-rich environment to one that is stimuli-poor, such as that created in a hydro facility 
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during generation or pumping operations to that of a small pharmaceutical manufacturer 
respectively. 
In summary, this research demonstrated that the security resilience of an IT/OT system 
cannot exclusively be comprised of a cyber-centric solution where the reliability and 
dependability of an entire security layer is placed in a potentially compromised IT/OT system’s 
all-inclusive network.  A compromised IT/OT network could be laden with vulnerabilities, as a 
result of defunct security controls, and/or corrupted processes.  Stuxnet is a prime example of 
where the control system network was compromised, unbeknownst to operators, as the HMI did 
not indicate any issues with the centrifuge, yet a few of the centrifuges were self-destructing.   
CI2CS IT/OT security is far different than conventional IT security alone; therefore, 
outside-the-box thinking of different defense-in-depth strategies are required in order to meet 
the challenges and nuances stemming from such an environment.  The conventional COTS 
security controls deployed in an IT setting are not necessarily suited for an OT/IT environment 
as is.  In fact, this research demonstrated that the automated asset(s) within the OT process itself 
can be deployed or used to complement a sensor within the system.  An asset’s very behavior 
and performance characteristics within an OT environment indicate a certain state of normalcy 
if consistent with previously established performance indicators; until it does not, thereby, 
requiring some type of investigation as to its cause.  In this approach to assessing CI2CS risk, 
essentially each asset with a dynamic purpose composes a single element of the entire risk 
detection network.  The community can benefit from this research by re-thinking the 
conventional IT/OT security implementation and looking past the limited IT capabilities 
surrounding the security implications present when marrying an IT security solution with an OT 
problem.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
 
Introduction 
 Many of the industries designated as United States CI by the DHS are under constant 
cyber-attacks by threat actors from various nation states whose primary intent and centralized 
focus is on disrupting the American way-of-life, or as a means of testing our resiliency to such 
attacks should they be required toward a greater detriment in the future.  In either case, the motive 
is sinister and the results could be catastrophic.  The industries that are part of our CI, whether 
regulated or not, are expected to possess the capability of being able to protect themselves against 
the type of cyber-attacks anticipated, and in-fact are rapidly emerging, in the Twenty First 
Century.  Internal bad-actors and supply chain integrity are two of today’s more notable threats.   
This research has developed and demonstrated a protection capability for defending against 
such an attack by taking an outside-the-box approach for detecting, assessing, and then 
determining the probability of real-time CI2CS cyber risk.  Instead of subscribing to the 
conventional practices currently employed, and accepting the limitations they face, a novel and 
real-time method for performing CI2CS risk assessments was developed.  This approach aims to 
confront those type of Twenty First Century threats; particularly as supply chain concerns persist 
and are treated with such high importance and current regulatory intervention.   
Conclusions 
The research conducted illustrates that linear processes functioning within a control system 
environment can benefit from having an independent and segregated sensory network performing 
parallel monitoring functions of those processes for the purpose of determining real-time risk 
probabilities by continuously evaluating those processes against previously established baseline 
data.  It also supports that by adding additional monitoring tools and developing a more robust 
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algorithm for determining risk probabilities, such as HMMs, this model can be expanded to take 
into account the often-simultaneous processes that occur during production cycles, as well as, the 
capability to recognize and filter out undesirable and unnecessary stimuli. 
Research Problem 
CI2CS currently lack the capability for effectively and independently monitoring real-time 
vulnerabilities across their critical cyber assets because of their unique architecture, sensitive and 
volatile environments, and real-time physical and critical processes.  As such, systemic and/or 
operational failure, causing both a safety and reliability concern, exist while conducting 
vulnerability assessments.  Therefore, as a precaution, CI2CS vulnerability assessments that have 
been conducted and performed in a laboratory environment, with the resulting states compared to 
that of a live environment, have failed to observe the various dynamic states and conditions that 
some ICS, such as generating facilities and critical manufacturing, continue to operate under due to 
the constraints and limitations of a simulated ICS environment.  This includes, but is not limited to, 
network noise, number and device types, varying temperatures, sounds, vibrations, and networking 
schemes.  This research took into account the various dynamic states of a control system 
environment running various processes and devices, and incorporated an independent and passive 
real-time method for monitoring and alerting to a systemic threat within an operational CI2CS 
environment by considering the inclusion of stimuli emitted during its operation as part of the risk 
detection equation. 
Research Goal 
The primary goal of this research was achieved by developing an approach that took into 
account the unique architecture, sensitive and volatile environments, and real-time physical and 
critical processes of a CI2CS environment in identifying and alerting an operator to a real-time 
suspected or actual risk across a network of critical cyber assets. Alternatively, because it is crucial 
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that threat and vulnerability detection is done in a timely fashion, this research increased the ability 
to discover and mitigate vulnerabilities or threats that might have otherwise gone unnoticed for a 
prolonged period of time until an off-line assessment could have been conducted. 
Research Contribution 
The major contribution of this research pivots around the unique approach of separating a 
cyber risk monitoring network from the control system network and the security controls operating 
within the control system network.  If a control system network becomes compromised, it could 
very well render the security controls affiliated with that network ineffective.  Just as safety zones, 
or networks, operate in a completely disconnected and independent state from a control system 
network, a risk monitoring network running in parallel to the control system processes, but 
disconnected from the control system network, provides a viable and reliable solution for 
recognizing and identifying risks potentially associated with cyber related compromises.  Another 
contribution of the research is in the area of ICS from an OT perspective, coupled with that of the 
real-time processing capabilities of “big data”, and using data analytic platforms on the IT side of 
the business to assess and determine the potential presence of risk.   
Implications 
The intent and purpose of this research was not to focus on any one particular CI industry, 
but instead its aim was to include all industries utilizing automated processes where control 
systems could find themselves exposed to vulnerabilities.  The steps set forth in this research can 
make an immediate impact on smaller industries engaging automation by offering a simple, yet 
cost effective, solution and using relatively inexpensive sensors, sensor controllers, and open 
source software that allows for real-time risk analysis, monitoring, and detection.  
Of particular concern in today’s threat landscape is the possibility that malware is 
purposefully and deliberately being introduced into control systems, and/or the components from 
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which they are made, at some point through the supply chain as they evolve from a chip and into a 
system.  This deliberate embedment of malware or device tampering, if such a thing were to occur, 
must be for the purpose of corrupting processes, permitting back door access, or modifying 
configuration settings that simply render the asset useless or unreliable either immediately upon 
implementation or at some other point in time.  There is nothing to suggest that an act such as this 
has not already been accomplished prior to, or following, Juniper’s firewall hack of 2015 (Wired, 
2015).   
Although the implication of such threats may be nothing more than a ruse to heighten 
industry’s sensitivity to cyber security awareness, it has the potential for creating paranoia and 
lowering the level of confidence towards vendors who develop and build COTS IT solutions 
(designed and manufactured in good faith) for the express purpose of protecting and defending 
critical assets, by preventing such attacks from occurring.  Between vendor uncertainty and 
increasing compliance requirements brought on by an overreaching regulatory agency’s strict 
cyber-security standards, the ability to conduct an independent passive real-time risk assessment is 
valuable.   
Some of the CI identified are involved and engaged in real-time processing, such as, the 
gas, electricity, and manufacturing sectors.  All of the industries in these sectors are in need of a 
real-time risk detection solution that does not interfere with the processes taking place.  This 
research designed just such a solution in that it provided real-time parallel monitoring of control 
system processes, so that any baseline deviations occurring during the production cycle were 
detected, analyzed and determined to be either potential risks or anomalies within the linear 
process. 
Constraints and Limitation of the Study 
Limitations 
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The study, albeit successful in the detection and determination of risk, had a few 
constraints worthy of mention prior to the start of any future research using this test-bed design as 
a template.  The equipment used in this research, with exception of the Allen-Bradley products, 
were not explicitly rated for “industrial” use.  This resulted in continuous physical monitoring 
throughout each production cycle to ensure that the functional dependability, capacity, and 
integrity required throughout the experiment was maintained during the process.  Because of this 
limitation, the test-bed was designed to operate within specified time parameters.   
Based upon off-line and component specific experimentation, as different devices were 
evaluated for test-bed use, this time constraint was set between 10 and 20 minute intervals per 
production cycle, so that certain mechanical parts were not stressed to failure.  This was 
particularly important with the robotic arm where the initial installation and early operation of 
setting up the experiment, prior to baselining, resulted in the destruction of three servo motors.  
However, these issues helped formulate the rationale which decidedly led to determining the 
attack vector, and how such an attack might be accomplished.   
The test-bed’s actual, physical placement limited the more extreme temperature swings a 
facility would endure if it were located outside and exposed to the natural environment.  This 
could include rain, a thunderstorm, and or lightning, which could contribute to the internal sound 
stimuli.  Extreme heat or cold might involve cycling interior environmental conditioning systems 
such as a forced air furnace or air condition.  This research observed peculiar thermal patterns at 
the onset of each experiment because of air currents caused as a result of fluid transfer.  The air 
eventually normalized as subsequent processes were run.  
Some process monitoring equipment, particularly the thermal imaging camera, lacked 
certain features that would have made it more practical for use as part of the spatial sensory 
module.  One feature of interest would have been the capability to mask out certain zones within 
177 
 
 
the test-bed, as to provide a clearer and more defined thermal signature.  Surprisingly, the results 
from the thermal imager were not quite what was expected.  Despite the thermal camera sensing 
the dynamic changes in temperatures from several sources, some details were lost from view as 
external stimuli altered a portion of the image; thereby, rendering that particular portion of the 
results unusable.  This only occurred during the initial two production cycles and throughout 
approximately half of the third, and only affected a portion of the test-bed’s climate.  The result, 
however, demonstrated an inconsistency and untimely irregularity in the readings, and; therefore, 
was only used as an “event” and not a “risk” monitoring sensor.  An event sensor was used for 
general purpose process monitoring.   
Delimitations 
The test-bed was designed as an open-loop versus a closed loop system.  This allowed 
direct and dedicated monitoring of test-bed processes without interference from the controller’s 
proportional, integral, and derivative (PID) functionality disrupting the logging of sensory data, as 
a result of applying process corrective measures.  This was explained in more detail in chapter 
four.  Essentially a closed loop system has the capability to make processing adjustments relative 
to sensory input.  This capability would be useful and expected in a non-linear type of experiment.  
The test-bed testing intervals for the product cycles were under 15 minutes each.  Because 
the product cycles ran for a short time in general, the changes in temperature to the overall 
environment, as a result of machine activity, were only nominal.  For example, the spatial and 
robotic arm, servo-two, temperature data was recorded, but the temperature data was not used in 
the risk-baseline comparison algorithm due to only observing a nominal difference between each 
production cycle.  In other words, the automated activity was not demanding enough to have an 
effect on the test-bed’s interior climate.   
There were some delimitations resulting from software usage agreements.  Testing was 
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carefully coordinated, so that it was conducted at such a time where the KepServerEx, and NI 
Sound and Vibration Toolkit software provided maximum benefit.  Both applications were trial 
versions that had 30 day limitations; although, NI Sound and Vibration Toolkit did offer an 
extension of up to 45 days, upon request, and KepServerEx still provided all of its features after 
the 30-day trial period; albeit at two hour intervals.  Kepware eventually extended their trial 
version to one year.  Overall, this had minimal impact on this experiment, as each production cycle 
was under 15 minutes; therefore, allowing the experiment to perform eight complete cycles prior 
to the two-hour expiration. 
Hardware and software compatibility created another delimitation and prevented at least 
one preconceived system to be replaced.  The Raspberry Pi, first mentioned in chapter three, 
which was intended to be used for capturing and processing SSM data, was not capable of hosting 
certain, ideally suited software preferred for data logging.  This caused the need to replace the 
Raspberry Pi system with a system having an Intel based core processor. 
Recommendations for Additional Research 
Future research could include a similar configuration recreated in a real operating 
environment; minus the actual exploitation or introduction of malware in manipulating the 
control system.  Then manually applying and deliberately modifying baseline data so that the 
deviations are used to simulate threats in demonstrating the sensory perception module, and 
corresponding comparative analysis application, recognize and alert to the anomaly or potential 
threat.  This could cause an operating and performance condition similar to that of what the 
Stuxnet malware was designed to do, and in fact succeeded in doing, at Iran’s uranium 
enrichment facility. 
Because this research focused on a linear-based processing environment, multi, and or 
simultaneous-process risk determination was not calculated, as there was one ongoing process at 
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any one time during the production cycle.  Future research could take into account multiple 
processes occurring simultaneously and the necessity for applying machine learning and pattern 
recognition in order to process and recognize anomalies or inconsistencies in such instances where 
they were discovered.  A strong knowledgebase in CI industry remains a critical area of concern in 
performing and adhering to cyber-security best practices.   
Summary 
 The ability to continuously monitor and recognize real-time risk(s) in ICS without 
compromising the performance or processing taking place at a facility/plant is a crucial cyber-
security control we must consider in today’s geopolitical landscape where nation state bad-actors, 
alongside that of the common hacker attempt to take advantage of the vulnerabilities resulting 
from IT’s integration into the OT universe and then capitalize on those vulnerabilities by creating 
or delivering the exploits necessary to destroy it.  Being unable to run vulnerability scans in a real-
time processing environment has challenged industry to find other methods for discovering and 
determining real-time risks to CI2CS.  One of these methods involves the creation of an 
independent sensory zone that sits beside the process automation sensors running throughout the 
control system, and then applying an independent parallel process for monitoring those sensors.  
This process then compares the asset’s functional data to that of the asset’s environmental sensory 
performance data, which is specifically conditioned to the spatial environment in which it and the 
devices it monitors reside; thereby, determining the probability of whether or not a real-time risk 
exists within that environment and, if so, indicating the affected asset.  
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Appendix A
 
 
 
 
Baseline Accelerometer Data Sample from Robotic Arm Interval 
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0.147 
0.322 
0.097 
0.042 
0.252 
0.247 
0.237 
0.271 
0.354 
0.083 
0.337 
0.325 
0.126 
0.147 
0.634 
0.14 
0.191 
0.078 
0.306 
0.215 
0.196 
0.383 
0.256 
0.078 
0.301 
0.214 
0.045 
0.118 
0.31 
0.242 
0.033 
0.335 
0.332 
0.234 
0.632 
0.144 
0.242 
0.477 
0.365 
-0.033 
0.166 
0.408 
0.01 
0.269 
0.104 
0.384 
0.054 
0.318 
0.556 
0.194 
0.369 
0.206 
0.033 
-0.142 
0.189 
0.27 
0.212 
0.171 
0.375 
0.193 
0.141 
0.434 
0.229 
0.254 
0.271 
0.55 
0.213 
0.155 
0.403 
0.281 
0.054 
0.272 
0.423 
0.209 
0.2 
0.361 
0.335 
0.023 
0.315 
0.296 
0.289 
0.242 
0.244 
0.33 
0.203 
0.242 
0.257 
0.293 
0.209 
0.246 
0.262 
0.232 
0.244 
0.25 
0.253 
0.265 
0.278 
0.271 
0.276 
0.23 
0.281 
0.234 
0.513 
0.354 
0.299 
0.275 
0.428 
0.125 
0.095 
0.285 
0.098 
0.063 
0.065 
-0.295 
0.061 
-0.052 
0.135 
-0.326 
-0.085 
-0.065 
-0.2 
-0.121 
-0.009 
-0.063 
-0.236 
-0.358 
-0.251 
-0.145 
-0.338 
-0.279 
-0.137 
-0.307 
-0.5 
-0.241 
-0.236 
-0.359 
-0.61 
-0.425 
-0.499 
-0.669 
-0.626 
-0.396 
-0.668 
-0.629 
-0.386 
-0.621 
-0.633 
-0.774 
-0.675 
-0.878 
-0.974 
-0.799 
-0.847 
-0.811 
-0.92 
-0.989 
-1.06 
-0.715 
-0.752 
-0.767 
-0.716 
-0.813 
-0.776 
-0.791 
-0.736 
-0.77 
-0.743 
-0.819 
-0.765 
-0.828 
-0.791 
-0.915 
-0.78 
-0.814 
-0.665 
-0.83 
-0.724 
-0.766 
-0.741 
-0.817 
-0.837 
-0.839 
-0.794 
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-0.731 
-0.756 
-0.736 
-0.815 
-0.694 
-0.796 
-0.749 
-0.818 
-0.775 
-0.835 
-0.749 
-0.888 
-0.71 
-0.779 
-0.708 
-0.883 
-0.692 
-0.763 
-0.814 
-0.711 
-0.806 
-0.68 
-0.847 
-0.711 
-0.845 
-0.75 
-0.827 
-0.793 
-0.8 
-0.802 
-0.818 
-0.703 
-0.858 
-0.76 
-0.909 
-0.679 
-0.869 
-0.702 
-0.876 
-0.683 
-0.841 
-0.768 
-0.854 
-0.685 
-0.793 
-0.735 
-0.864 
-0.685 
-0.788 
-0.929 
-0.779 
-1.057 
-1.186 
-0.707 
-0.526 
-1.197 
-0.895 
-1.049 
-0.227 
-1.007 
-0.654 
-0.799 
-0.76 
-0.808 
-0.863 
-0.743 
-0.786 
-0.734 
-0.714 
-0.805 
-0.834 
-0.851 
-0.828 
-0.749 
-0.799 
-0.796 
-0.813 
-0.738 
-0.816 
-0.761 
-0.774 
-0.735 
-0.79 
-0.808 
-0.693 
-0.813 
-0.779 
-0.787 
-0.687 
-0.846 
-0.811 
-0.827 
-0.741 
-0.782 
-0.767 
-0.834 
-0.76 
-0.751 
-0.857 
-0.692 
-0.798 
-0.805 
-0.819 
-0.777 
-0.769 
-0.836 
-0.791 
-0.786 
-0.721 
-0.795 
-0.752 
-0.804 
-0.782 
-0.873 
-0.779 
-0.796 
-0.738 
-0.733 
-0.789 
-0.829 
-0.729 
-0.799 
-0.761 
-0.857 
-0.786 
-0.923 
-0.862 
-0.686 
-1.044 
-0.889 
-0.706 
-0.723 
-0.987 
-0.225 
-0.646 
-0.758 
-0.342 
-0.32 
-0.644 
-0.677 
-0.232 
-0.705 
-0.865 
-0.599 
-0.266 
-0.429 
-0.018 
0.062 
0.205 
-0.014 
0.377 
0.024 
0.265 
0.129 
-0.209 
0.182 
0.169 
0.283 
0.249 
0.288 
0.241 
0.398 
0.511 
0.289 
0.371 
-0.009 
0.347 
0.322 
0.249 
0.348 
0.184 
0.203 
0.274 
0.221 
0.247 
0.196 
0.288 
0.267 
0.264 
0.206 
0.2 
0.266 
0.249 
0.272 
0.219 
0.27 
0.229 
0.279 
0.257 
0.276 
0.252 
0.224 
0.28 
0.236 
0.268 
0.244 
0.263 
0.232 
0.284 
0.27 
0.26 
0.194 
0.269 
0.263 
0.262 
0.236 
0.257 
0.21 
0.242 
0.241 
0.247 
0.248 
0.243 
0.237 
0.262 
0.209 
0.227 
0.256 
0.271 
0.225 
0.237 
0.255 
0.215 
0.265 
0.25 
0.268 
0.198 
0.233 
0.211 
0.154 
0.201 
0.299 
0.303 
0.123 
0.184 
0.209 
0.237 
0.138 
0.175 
0.335 
0.321 
0.092 
0.145 
0.444 
0.372 
0.566 
0.167 
0.237 
0.203 
0.181 
0.369 
0.199 
0.24 
0.22 
0.229 
0.249 
0.164 
0.2 
0.134 
0.376 
0.097 
0.262 
0.42 
0.194 
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0.22 
0.268 
0.213 
0.253 
0.254 
0.105 
0.223 
0.201 
0.2 
0.158 
0.37 
0.427 
0.217 
-0.007 
0.333 
0.265 
0.175 
0.319 
0.381 
0.147 
0.332 
0.435 
0.187 
-0.073 
0.259 
0.405 
0.206 
0.056 
0.383 
0.18 
0.139 
0.521 
0.161 
0.08 
0.329 
0.314 
0.288 
0.358 
0.295 
-0.105 
0.313 
0.276 
0.296 
-0.094 
0.355 
0.334 
0.237 
0.055 
0.366 
0.081 
-0.076 
0.203 
0.352 
0.12 
-0.072 
0.318 
0.064 
0.202 
0.293 
0.297 
0.041 
0.166 
0.341 
0.222 
0.084 
0.132 
0.2 
0.181 
0.245 
0.323 
0.099 
0.264 
0.286 
0.273 
-0.009 
0.221 
0.277 
0.286 
0.284 
0.072 
0.588 
-0.144 
0.232 
0.234 
0.291 
0.392 
0.318 
0.25 
0.137 
0.269 
0.245 
0.284 
0.234 
0.232 
0.225 
0.247 
0.271 
0.253 
0.151 
0.266 
0.166 
0.334 
0.167 
0.299 
0.191 
0.278 
0.169 
0.106 
0.352 
0.201 
0.18 
0.186 
0.276 
0.192 
0.12 
0.354 
0.187 
0.229 
0.212 
0.229 
0.228 
0.229 
0.222 
0.219 
0.232 
0.236 
0.235 
0.217 
0.255 
0.243 
0.356 
0.283 
0.569 
0.319 
0.257 
0.211 
0.03 
-0.202 
-0.016 
0.026 
0.033 
-0.068 
-0.144 
-0.095 
-0.375 
-0.472 
-0.195 
-0.019 
-0.377 
-0.026 
-0.237 
-0.293 
-0.257 
-0.582 
-0.341 
-0.207 
-0.829 
-0.67 
0.095 
0.252 
-0.641 
-0.727 
-0.781 
0.009 
-0.64 
-0.521 
-0.779 
0.216 
0.127 
-0.271 
-0.045 
-0.498 
-0.985 
-0.556 
-0.619 
-0.749 
-0.783 
-0.799 
-0.208 
-0.627 
-1.128 
-0.396 
-0.823 
-0.906 
-0.989 
-0.847 
-0.711 
-0.878 
-0.883 
-0.793 
-0.716 
-0.87 
-0.851 
-0.817 
-0.603 
-0.857 
-0.747 
-0.714 
-0.602 
-0.848 
-0.748 
-1.011 
-0.76 
-0.807 
-0.688 
-0.845 
-0.81 
-0.833 
-0.705 
-0.822 
-0.791 
-0.912 
-0.836 
-0.725 
-0.787 
-0.817 
-0.827 
-0.777 
-0.896 
-0.833 
-0.77 
-0.706 
-0.904 
-0.834 
-0.773 
-0.816 
-0.742 
-0.818 
-0.739 
-0.475 
-0.841 
-0.821 
-0.757 
-0.312 
-0.809 
-0.898 
-1.061 
-0.718 
-0.734 
-0.521 
-0.767 
-1.068 
-0.839 
-0.61 
-0.75 
-0.967 
-0.94 
-0.942 
-0.707 
-0.91 
-0.574 
-0.831 
-0.841 
-0.829 
-0.788 
-0.733 
-0.778 
-0.793 
-0.795 
-0.778 
-0.84 
-0.796 
-0.782 
-0.801 
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-0.78 
-0.81 
-0.837 
-0.754 
-0.794 
-0.793 
-0.779 
-0.788 
-0.847 
-0.806 
-0.791 
-0.78 
-0.801 
-0.776 
-0.834 
-0.762 
-0.847 
-0.809 
-0.754 
-0.798 
-0.841 
-0.794 
-0.778 
-0.811 
-0.782 
-0.775 
-0.798 
-0.79 
-0.831 
-0.813 
-0.718 
-0.768 
-0.823 
-0.795 
-0.778 
-0.822 
-0.783 
-0.779 
-0.774 
-0.794 
-0.806 
-0.843 
-0.742 
-0.758 
-0.79 
-0.79 
-0.786 
-0.857 
-0.794 
-0.782 
-0.774 
-0.801 
-0.801 
-0.847 
-0.751 
-0.822 
-0.788 
-0.8 
-0.815 
-0.852 
-0.834 
-0.773 
-0.792 
-0.773 
-0.757 
-0.809 
-0.707 
-0.76 
-0.729 
-0.789 
-0.858 
-0.785 
-0.771 
-0.879 
-0.831 
-0.928 
-0.839 
-0.797 
-0.742 
-0.82 
-0.884 
-0.739 
-0.856 
-0.765 
-0.85 
-0.694 
-0.931 
-0.933 
-0.779 
-0.778 
-0.77 
-0.78 
-0.804 
-0.779 
-0.823 
-0.83 
-0.84 
-0.791 
-0.76 
-0.77 
-0.783 
-0.782 
-0.773 
-0.818 
-0.759 
-0.78 
-0.775 
-0.822 
-0.811 
-0.784 
-0.786 
-0.79 
-0.771 
-0.803 
-0.819 
-0.832 
-0.766 
-0.765 
-0.775 
-0.817 
-0.819 
-0.83 
-0.851 
-0.781 
-0.771 
-0.792 
-0.802 
-0.815 
-0.757 
-0.788 
-0.78 
-0.803 
-0.816 
-0.842 
-0.778 
-0.797 
-0.779 
-0.778 
-0.777 
-0.78 
-0.752 
-0.808 
-0.766 
-0.781 
-0.788 
-0.835 
-0.813 
-0.787 
-0.773 
-0.762 
-0.813 
-0.7 
-0.861 
-0.753 
-0.713 
-0.722 
-0.833 
-0.698 
-0.934 
-0.852 
-0.784 
-0.711 
-0.808 
-0.847 
-0.747 
-0.836 
-0.778 
-0.77 
-0.714 
-0.928 
-0.834 
-0.855 
-0.754 
-0.813 
-0.814 
-0.666 
-0.761 
-0.851 
-0.797 
-0.737 
-0.803 
-0.843 
-0.793 
-0.813 
-0.738 
-0.794 
-0.704 
-0.771 
-0.821 
-0.811 
-0.794 
0 
-0.766 
-0.772 
-0.845 
-0.864 
-0.796 
-0.759 
-0.796 
-0.802 
-0.771 
-0.819 
-0.775 
-0.81 
-0.716 
-0.79 
-0.792 
-0.81 
-0.735 
-0.836 
-0.847 
-0.675 
-0.824 
-0.865 
-0.931 
-0.603 
-0.618 
-0.8 
-0.617 
-0.659 
-0.838 
-0.546 
-0.65 
-0.841 
-0.622 
-0.603 
-0.795 
-0.669 
-0.464 
-0.455 
-0.772 
-0.52 
-0.383 
-0.539 
-0.602 
-0.753 
-0.461 
-0.468 
-0.64 
  
-0.441 
-0.442 
-0.293 
-0.306 
-0.42 
-0.432 
-0.34 
-0.343 
-0.208 
-0.312 
-0.269 
-0.178 
-0.253 
-0.091 
-0.418 
-0.207 
-0.275 
-0.076 
-0.124 
-0.075 
-0.048 
-0.124 
-0.092 
-0.11 
185 
 
 
-0.122 
0.022 
-0.129 
-0.073 
0.081 
-0.032 
-0.023 
-0.093 
0.075 
0.063 
0.146 
0.165 
0.069 
0.125 
0.152 
0.187 
0.22 
0.24 
0.3 
0.573 
0.037 
0.123 
0.397 
0.22 
0.24 
0.262 
0.311 
0.324 
-0.021 
0.051 
0.131 
0.261 
0.185 
0.022 
0.356 
0.207 
0.292 
0.186 
0.33 
0.25 
0.217 
0.21 
0.226 
0.217 
0.238 
0.264 
0.261 
0.229 
0.242 
0.176 
0.224 
0.251 
0.22 
0.242 
0.209 
0.219 
0.236 
0.239 
0.222 
0.218 
0.225 
0.224 
0.221 
0.233 
0.236 
0.229 
0.243 
186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
Random Accelerometer Data Sample (Normal) from Robotic Arm Interval 
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0.222 
0.224 
0.223 
0.223 
0.225 
0.227 
0.223 
0.223 
0.224 
0.223 
0.234 
0.226 
0.225 
0.22 
0.218 
0.228 
0.22 
0.219 
0.221 
0.22 
0.218 
0.224 
0.22 
0.224 
0.22 
0.218 
0.225 
0.219 
0.223 
0.222 
0.226 
0.221 
0.217 
0.304 
0.314 
0.142 
0.18 
0.504 
0.268 
0.062 
0.364 
0.383 
0.077 
0.346 
0.579 
0.032 
-0.017 
0.326 
0.252 
0.207 
0.068 
0.468 
0.188 
-0.001 
0.229 
0.258 
0.12 
0.432 
0.246 
0.17 
0.167 
0.228 
0.193 
0.332 
0.103 
0.301 
0.234 
0.091 
0.296 
0.205 
0.18 
0.196 
0.308 
0.227 
0.158 
0.36 
0.322 
0.084 
0.198 
0.33 
0.142 
0.116 
0.465 
0.364 
0.064 
0.15 
0.271 
0.208 
0.292 
0.018 
0.179 
0.402 
0.047 
0.16 
0.321 
0.249 
0.217 
0.282 
0.244 
0.216 
0.276 
0.263 
0.284 
0.253 
0.267 
0.198 
0.273 
0.237 
0.328 
0.288 
0.163 
0.364 
0.21 
0.215 
0.266 
0.273 
0.284 
0.237 
0.238 
0.254 
0.193 
0.256 
0.292 
0.289 
0.244 
0.246 
0.247 
0.258 
0.264 
0.287 
0.261 
0.204 
0.296 
0.346 
0.151 
0.274 
0.282 
0.254 
0.255 
0.236 
0.258 
0.25 
0.263 
0.264 
0.257 
0.257 
0.258 
0.257 
0.258 
0.258 
0.266 
0.255 
0.247 
0.256 
0.28 
0.234 
0.258 
0.251 
0.245 
0.502 
0.37 
0.194 
-0.01 
0.323 
0.224 
0.055 
0.063 
0.352 
0.282 
-0.116 
0.194 
-0.144 
-0.086 
-0.146 
0.044 
-0.027 
-0.076 
-0.055 
-0.123 
-0.156 
-0.334 
-0.138 
-0.283 
-0.368 
-0.267 
-0.207 
-0.193 
-0.354 
-0.023 
-0.419 
-0.601 
-0.54 
-0.29 
-0.457 
-0.519 
-0.51 
-0.472 
-0.524 
-0.664 
-0.693 
-0.604 
-0.612 
-0.667 
-0.682 
-0.581 
-0.864 
-0.66 
-0.556 
-0.912 
-0.875 
-0.448 
-0.838 
-0.781 
-0.751 
-0.752 
-0.826 
-0.847 
-0.783 
-0.763 
-0.787 
-0.865 
-0.805 
-0.72 
-0.74 
-0.783 
-0.741 
-0.739 
-0.788 
-0.854 
-0.805 
-0.759 
-0.762 
-0.7 
-0.764 
-0.814 
-0.695 
-0.802 
-0.758 
-0.814 
-0.749 
-0.846 
-0.724 
-0.821 
-0.728 
-0.746 
-0.748 
-0.854 
-0.643 
-0.811 
-0.712 
-0.837 
-0.76 
-0.862 
-0.691 
-0.865 
-0.737 
-0.711 
-0.761 
-0.838 
-0.671 
-0.824 
-0.767 
-0.855 
-0.745 
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-0.839 
-0.626 
-0.848 
-0.709 
-0.765 
-0.671 
-0.864 
-0.725 
-0.824 
-0.788 
-0.836 
-0.726 
-0.85 
-0.608 
-0.807 
-0.723 
-0.766 
-0.714 
-0.866 
-0.753 
-0.811 
-0.786 
-0.792 
-0.769 
-0.788 
-0.679 
-0.88 
-0.83 
-0.836 
-0.732 
-0.633 
-0.847 
-1.189 
-0.9 
-0.453 
-1.121 
-0.653 
-1.049 
-0.529 
-0.709 
-0.974 
-0.968 
-0.933 
-0.772 
-0.757 
-0.706 
-0.734 
-0.717 
-0.665 
-0.843 
-0.793 
-0.771 
-0.781 
-0.822 
-0.856 
-0.727 
-0.712 
-0.78 
-0.794 
-0.703 
-0.693 
-0.808 
-0.86 
-0.755 
-0.778 
-0.862 
-0.821 
-0.835 
-0.796 
-0.821 
-0.77 
-0.768 
-0.773 
-0.831 
-0.736 
-0.714 
-0.804 
-0.751 
-0.723 
-0.797 
-0.817 
-0.82 
-0.759 
-0.793 
-0.758 
-0.821 
-0.729 
-0.702 
-0.799 
-0.786 
-0.738 
-0.867 
-0.829 
-0.914 
-0.595 
-0.73 
-0.838 
-0.647 
-0.687 
-0.34 
-0.31 
-0.752 
-0.454 
-0.564 
-0.589 
-0.865 
-0.73 
-0.471 
0.023 
-0.229 
-0.524 
-1.108 
-0.414 
-0.53 
-0.536 
-0.634 
-0.399 
-0.354 
0.331 
-0.183 
-0.491 
0.062 
0.275 
-0.059 
-0.956 
0.099 
0.049 
0.466 
0.098 
0.106 
-0.358 
-0.249 
0.028 
0.136 
-0.078 
-0.386 
-0.049 
-0.208 
-0.333 
0.134 
0.212 
0.057 
0.347 
0.221 
0.367 
0.402 
0.311 
0.5 
0.311 
0.259 
0.032 
0.255 
0.31 
0.305 
0.324 
0.146 
0.242 
0.226 
0.279 
0.303 
0.245 
0.33 
0.225 
0.289 
0.189 
0.274 
0.217 
0.271 
0.263 
0.242 
0.278 
0.283 
0.272 
0.268 
0.275 
0.258 
0.294 
0.256 
0.28 
0.227 
0.267 
0.279 
0.293 
0.267 
0.263 
0.235 
0.269 
0.254 
0.206 
0.243 
0.25 
0.255 
0.258 
0.204 
0.299 
0.251 
0.265 
0.152 
0.132 
0.119 
0.222 
0.318 
0.171 
0.22 
0.295 
0.131 
0.049 
0.447 
0.202 
0.27 
0.458 
0.317 
0.263 
0.225 
0.178 
0.25 
0.374 
0.232 
0.278 
0.342 
0.198 
0.152 
0.231 
0.272 
0.329 
0.22 
0.272 
0.266 
0.188 
0.302 
0.483 
0.378 
0.191 
0.14 
0.091 
0.26 
0.314 
0.252 
0.342 
0.136 
-0.173 
0.505 
0.325 
-0.087 
0.462 
0.185 
0.358 
0.351 
0.044 
0.455 
0.181 
0.21 
0.269 
0.327 
0.151 
0.218 
0.381 
0.283 
0.295 
0.141 
0.369 
0.129 
0.184 
0.323 
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0.204 
0.058 
0.735 
0.197 
0.193 
0.342 
0.168 
0.217 
0.209 
0.29 
0.35 
0.052 
0.156 
0.336 
-0.026 
0.412 
0.396 
0.13 
0.282 
0.349 
-0.002 
0.332 
0.313 
0.57 
0.182 
0.311 
0.425 
0.041 
0.321 
0.138 
0.467 
-0.181 
0.126 
0.518 
0.235 
-0.119 
0.273 
0.085 
-0.194 
0.397 
0.366 
0.119 
0.016 
0.297 
0.287 
0.104 
0.244 
0.233 
-0.21 
0.397 
0.025 
-0.035 
0.386 
0.305 
0.556 
0.251 
0.353 
0.392 
0.213 
0.261 
0.2 
0.127 
0.283 
0.271 
0.252 
0.194 
0.281 
0.222 
0.177 
0.256 
0.197 
0.137 
0.167 
0.283 
0.178 
0.082 
0.375 
0.158 
0.208 
0.145 
0.319 
0.142 
0.103 
0.374 
0.2 
0.248 
0.146 
0.25 
0.198 
0.225 
0.295 
0.222 
0.296 
0.087 
0.311 
0.177 
0.251 
0.214 
0.25 
0.252 
0.235 
0.206 
0.26 
0.234 
0.237 
0.209 
0.241 
0.236 
0.217 
0.205 
0.22 
0.215 
0.196 
0.242 
0.21 
0.218 
0.193 
0.244 
0.225 
0.242 
0.228 
0.203 
0.228 
0.308 
0.302 
0.464 
0.199 
0.315 
0.02 
-0.001 
0.328 
0.144 
0.003 
0.278 
0.055 
-0.084 
0.036 
-0.68 
-0.257 
-0.41 
-0.292 
0.28 
-0.785 
-0.21 
-0.249 
0.286 
-0.921 
0.279 
0.52 
-0.481 
-0.398 
-0.076 
-0.123 
-0.913 
-0.098 
-0.271 
-0.405 
0.373 
-1.204 
-0.799 
-1.2 
0.371 
-0.377 
-0.244 
-1.001 
-0.359 
-0.649 
-0.538 
-1.368 
0.295 
-0.888 
-0.67 
-0.816 
-0.873 
-0.777 
-0.819 
-0.826 
-0.829 
-0.759 
-0.747 
-0.838 
-0.783 
-0.766 
-0.855 
-0.854 
-0.784 
-0.677 
-0.915 
-0.809 
-0.735 
-0.779 
-0.851 
-0.751 
-0.811 
-0.778 
-0.803 
-0.77 
-0.826 
-0.835 
-0.815 
-0.723 
-0.809 
-0.836 
-0.766 
-0.754 
-0.883 
-0.797 
-0.742 
-0.718 
-0.847 
-0.753 
-0.829 
-0.822 
-0.787 
-0.764 
-0.852 
-0.822 
-0.813 
-0.844 
-0.795 
-0.774 
-0.799 
-0.686 
-0.902 
-0.767 
-0.787 
-0.79 
-0.78 
-0.783 
-0.869 
-0.722 
-0.771 
-0.879 
-0.477 
-0.682 
-0.899 
-0.784 
-0.812 
-0.918 
-0.923 
-0.67 
-1.1 
-0.591 
-0.762 
-0.797 
-0.803 
-1.045 
-0.391 
-0.946 
-0.825 
-0.763 
-0.814 
-0.785 
-0.802 
-0.823 
-0.776 
-0.78 
-0.781 
-0.814 
-0.766 
-0.825 
-0.778 
-0.828 
-0.803 
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-0.773 
-0.779 
-0.819 
-0.776 
-0.794 
-0.766 
-0.792 
-0.79 
-0.842 
-0.778 
-0.832 
-0.797 
-0.783 
-0.799 
-0.813 
-0.785 
-0.79 
-0.781 
-0.797 
-0.788 
-0.784 
-0.779 
-0.833 
-0.807 
-0.781 
-0.776 
-0.828 
-0.768 
-0.781 
-0.776 
-0.774 
-0.776 
-0.831 
-0.8 
-0.782 
-0.815 
-0.823 
-0.739 
-0.802 
-0.745 
-0.728 
-0.813 
-0.869 
-0.959 
-0.669 
-0.722 
-0.76 
-0.853 
-0.879 
-0.812 
-0.831 
-0.754 
-0.692 
-0.715 
-0.764 
-0.722 
-0.881 
-0.773 
-0.79 
-0.966 
-0.854 
-0.708 
-0.737 
-0.81 
-0.724 
-0.738 
-0.637 
-0.758 
-0.85 
-0.904 
-0.807 
-0.834 
-0.887 
-0.766 
-0.716 
-0.812 
-0.733 
-0.781 
-0.789 
-0.835 
-0.798 
-0.815 
-0.794 
-0.776 
-0.791 
-0.787 
-0.792 
-0.797 
-0.778 
-0.79 
-0.778 
-0.782 
-0.779 
-0.837 
-0.782 
-0.78 
-0.792 
-0.791 
-0.798 
-0.811 
-0.779 
-0.794 
-0.782 
-0.779 
-0.797 
-0.844 
-0.775 
-0.777 
-0.778 
-0.797 
-0.792 
-0.805 
-0.777 
-0.802 
-0.774 
-0.783 
-0.793 
-0.844 
-0.795 
-0.768 
-0.768 
-0.808 
-0.796 
-0.812 
-0.776 
-0.767 
-0.781 
-0.784 
-0.808 
-0.837 
-0.786 
-0.787 
-0.781 
-0.801 
-0.8 
-0.813 
-0.778 
-0.789 
-0.779 
-0.789 
-0.81 
-0.843 
-0.78 
-0.787 
-0.775 
-0.816 
-0.791 
-0.813 
-0.586 
-0.711 
-0.846 
-0.846 
-0.755 
-0.717 
-0.901 
-0.839 
-0.726 
-0.775 
-0.832 
-0.755 
-0.71 
-0.756 
-0.832 
-0.794 
-0.759 
-0.807 
-0.785 
-0.736 
-0.792 
-0.843 
-0.748 
-0.759 
-0.863 
-0.839 
-0.763 
-0.788 
-0.837 
-0.812 
-0.689 
-0.838 
-0.857 
-0.78 
-0.814 
-0.798 
-0.791 
-0.731 
-0.758 
-0.883 
-0.797 
-0.748 
-0.794 
-0.815 
-0.757 
-0.826 
-0.813 
-0.79 
-0.722 
-0.858 
-0.829 
-0.795 
-0.762 
-0.82 
-0.774 
-0.735 
-0.8 
-0.843 
-0.744 
-0.802 
-0.819 
-0.839 
-0.734 
-0.797 
-0.933 
-1.03 
-0.872 
-0.583 
-0.718 
-1.033 
-0.59 
-0.719 
-0.702 
-0.546 
-0.475 
-0.961 
-0.602 
-0.405 
-0.602 
-0.823 
-0.606 
-0.637 
-0.47 
-0.64 
-0.555 
-0.439 
-0.482 
-0.41 
-0.619 
-0.606 
-0.471 
-0.526 
-0.502 
-0.475 
-0.609 
-0.23 
-0.343 
-0.347 
-0.377 
-0.35 
-0.181 
-0.318 
-0.33 
-0.355 
-0.315 
-0.195 
-0.124 
-0.18 
-0.203 
-0.292 
-0.117 
-0.188 
-0.113 
-0.238 
-0.097 
-0.028 
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-0.066 
-0.141 
-0.081 
0.018 
-0.016 
0.275 
0.395 
0.245 
0.122 
0.377 
0.293 
0.305 
0.183 
0.052 
0.166 
0.197 
0.187 
0.209 
0.289 
0.229 
0.267 
0.181 
0.32 
0.187 
0.183 
0.219 
0.215 
0.23 
0.224 
0.253 
0.285 
0.238 
0.264 
0.207 
0.209 
0.216 
0.235 
0.258 
0.231 
0.263 
0.199 
0.218 
0.221 
0.235 
0.24 
0.239 
0.219 
0.221 
0.219 
0.254 
0.237 
0.231 
0.22 
0.228 
0.229 
0.229 
0.233 
0.227 
0.222 
0.232 
0.23 
0.235 
0.233 
0.224 
0.229 
0.236 
0.231 
0.226 
0.237 
0.225 
0.225 
0.226 
0.226 
0.23 
0.232 
0.228 
0.225 
0.226 
0.228 
0.23 
0.232 
0.233 
0.232 
0.229 
0.229 
0.236 
0.231 
0.224 
0.227 
0.229 
0.23 
0.235 
0.227 
0.219 
0.212 
0.229 
0.225 
0.235 
0.236 
0.231 
0.239 
0.229 
0.224 
0.227 
0.229 
0.236 
0.23 
0.229 
0.225 
0.229 
0.229 
0.227 
0.227 
0.224 
0.232 
0.229 
0.229 
0.232 
0.227 
0.226 
0.231 
0.229 
0.232 
0.23 
0.232 
0.236 
0.229 
0.229 
0.228 
0.232 
0.226 
0.234 
0.236 
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Random Accelerometer Data Sample (Exploited) from Robotic Arm Interval 
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.019 
0.236 
0.289 
0.398 
0.169 
0.277 
0.472 
0.189 
0.116 
0.309 
0.215 
-0.067 
0.298 
0.251 
0.397 
0.209 
0.309 
0.251 
0.396 
0.165 
0.122 
0.184 
0.114 
0.338 
0.229 
0.089 
0.461 
0.305 
0.304 
0.298 
0.625 
0.381 
0.131 
0.455 
0.406 
0.424 
0.299 
-0.032 
-0.019 
-0.189 
0.04 
0.023 
0.11 
0.194 
-0.254 
0.252 
0.073 
-0.339 
-0.435 
-0.32 
-0.611 
-0.459 
-0.332 
-0.173 
-0.525 
-0.059 
-0.095 
-0.229 
-0.204 
-0.181 
-0.33 
0.199 
-0.447 
-0.316 
-1.185 
-0.082 
-0.038 
0.806 
-0.307 
0.113 
0.408 
-0.707 
-0.866 
-0.194 
-0.199 
-0.598 
-1.517 
-0.32 
-0.26 
-0.86 
-0.957 
-0.672 
-0.444 
-0.665 
-0.761 
-0.545 
-0.726 
-0.947 
-0.865 
-0.9 
-0.827 
-0.728 
-0.75 
-0.763 
-0.866 
-0.736 
-0.647 
-0.68 
-0.633 
-0.774 
-0.61 
-0.652 
-0.829 
-0.893 
-0.854 
-0.869 
-0.853 
-0.875 
-0.826 
-0.789 
-0.744 
-0.831 
-0.706 
-0.775 
-0.823 
-0.812 
-0.812 
-0.865 
-0.962 
-0.811 
-0.788 
-0.816 
-0.816 
-0.772 
-0.732 
-0.769 
-0.848 
-0.799 
-0.774 
-0.81 
-0.76 
-0.879 
-0.766 
-0.741 
-0.729 
-0.859 
-0.821 
-0.745 
-0.813 
-0.846 
-0.778 
-0.692 
-0.789 
-0.867 
-0.712 
-0.638 
-0.666 
-1.063 
-0.679 
-0.556 
-0.742 
-0.678 
-0.618 
-0.845 
-0.724 
-0.481 
-0.699 
-0.736 
-0.816 
-0.604 
-0.48 
-0.722 
-0.794 
-0.466 
-0.576 
-0.604 
-0.488 
-0.424 
-0.487 
-0.512 
-0.649 
-0.491 
-0.359 
-0.724 
-0.305 
-0.52 
-0.577 
-0.312 
-0.302 
-0.215 
-0.48 
-0.372 
-0.417 
-0.258 
-0.412 
-0.073 
-0.196 
-0.377 
-0.146 
-0.112 
-0.22 
-0.197 
-0.202 
-0.02 
-0.031 
-0.233 
-0.104 
-0.138 
-0.151 
-0.005 
0.014 
0.014 
-0.041 
0.063 
0.047 
-0.093 
0.02 
0.111 
0.035 
0.028 
0.126 
0.095 
0.085 
0.145 
0.181 
0.211 
0.184 
0.278 
0.24 
0.311 
0.278 
-0.12 
0.093 
0.59 
0.055 
0.208 
0.292 
0.325 
0.018 
0.356 
0.479 
0.252 
0.192 
0.413 
0.234 
0.024 
0.217 
0.451 
0.158 
0.142 
0.349 
0.293 
0.182 
0.254 
0.3 
0.31 
0.169 
0.127 
0.308 
0.122 
0.081 
0.33 
0.217 
0.262 
0.523 
0.187 
0.108 
0.433 
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0.26 
0.182 
0.165 
0.33 
0.464 
-0.103 
0.135 
0.502 
0.129 
0.178 
0.301 
0.344 
0.028 
0.407 
0.489 
0.098 
0.159 
0.286 
0.318 
0.035 
0.17 
0.529 
0.088 
0.102 
0.406 
0.338 
-0.043 
0.271 
0.389 
0.065 
-0.013 
0.525 
0.256 
-0.068 
0.364 
0.432 
0.132 
0.177 
0.355 
0.456 
-0.125 
0.319 
0.451 
0.063 
0.078 
0.215 
0.349 
0.013 
0.264 
0.5 
-0.036 
0.095 
0.386 
0.286 
0.061 
0.481 
0.44 
0.014 
0.124 
0.47 
0.373 
0 
0.271 
0.52 
-0.084 
0.098 
0.396 
0.264 
0.077 
0.392 
0.574 
-0.011 
0.166 
0.495 
0.131 
0.134 
0.47 
0.255 
0.193 
0.221 
0.309 
0.087 
0.113 
0.331 
0.227 
0.312 
0.085 
0.409 
0.328 
0.003 
0.192 
0.423 
0.26 
0.106 
0.275 
0.352 
0.05 
0.274 
0.524 
0.305 
0.011 
0.484 
0.493 
-0.012 
0.104 
0.341 
0.402 
0.253 
0.193 
0.296 
-0.04 
0.082 
0.263 
-0.223 
-0.026 
-0.304 
0 
0.036 
-0.205 
0.063 
-0.093 
-0.206 
0.026 
0.112 
-0.126 
-0.421 
-0.361 
-0.051 
-0.769 
-0.355 
-0.387 
-0.265 
-0.443 
-0.24 
-0.348 
-0.479 
-0.577 
-0.225 
-0.463 
-0.545 
-0.578 
-0.458 
-0.628 
-0.803 
-0.603 
-0.386 
-0.68 
-0.526 
-0.525 
-0.585 
-0.709 
-0.737 
-0.824 
-0.919 
-0.386 
-0.833 
-0.868 
-0.761 
-0.781 
-0.815 
-0.791 
-0.816 
-0.787 
-0.759 
-0.773 
-0.839 
-0.774 
-0.699 
-0.739 
-0.76 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.726 
-0.801 
-0.793 
-0.758 
-0.783 
-0.787 
-0.779 
-0.763 
-0.738 
-0.701 
-0.852 
-0.816 
-0.75 
-0.729 
-0.847 
-0.782 
-0.797 
-0.739 
-0.767 
-0.771 
-0.7 
-0.723 
-0.874 
-0.731 
-0.732 
-0.842 
-0.83 
-0.774 
-0.815 
-0.702 
-0.749 
-0.822 
-0.743 
-0.836 
-0.831 
-0.773 
-0.746 
-0.718 
-0.863 
-0.741 
-0.757 
-0.76 
-0.821 
-0.811 
-0.777 
-0.737 
-0.688 
-0.777 
-0.849 
-0.777 
-0.83 
-0.786 
-0.741 
-0.78 
-0.806 
-0.699 
-0.751 
-0.799 
-0.687 
-0.824 
-0.822 
-0.74 
-0.775 
-0.844 
-0.823 
-0.807 
-0.681 
-0.763 
-0.779 
-0.832 
-0.716 
-0.757 
-0.766 
-0.802 
-0.76 
-0.771 
-0.693 
-0.803 
-0.771 
-0.761 
-0.681 
-0.803 
-0.792 
-0.776 
-0.83 
-0.782 
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-0.792 
-0.782 
-0.751 
-0.688 
-0.842 
-0.838 
-0.749 
-0.772 
-0.828 
-0.774 
-0.792 
-0.695 
-0.74 
-0.791 
-0.832 
-0.726 
-0.746 
-0.755 
-0.815 
-0.775 
-0.786 
-0.731 
-0.779 
-0.754 
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-0.776 
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-0.798 
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-0.792 
-0.838 
-0.694 
-0.755 
-0.725 
-0.826 
-0.777 
-0.789 
-0.722 
-0.796 
-0.768 
-0.733 
-0.725 
-0.84 
-0.748 
-0.724 
-0.801 
-0.799 
-0.784 
-0.8 
-0.723 
-0.743 
-0.817 
-0.85 
-0.733 
-0.745 
-0.816 
-0.786 
-0.777 
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-0.729 
-0.782 
-0.732 
-0.735 
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-0.775 
-0.714 
-0.791 
-0.814 
-0.679 
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-0.828 
-0.729 
-0.791 
-0.758 
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-0.797 
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-0.758 
-0.727 
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-0.818 
-0.737 
-0.78 
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-0.809 
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-0.802 
-0.792 
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-0.729 
-0.813 
-0.784 
-0.721 
-0.778 
-0.864 
-0.722 
-0.772 
-0.77 
-0.769 
-0.774 
-0.761 
-0.7 
-0.796 
-0.769 
-0.709 
-0.771 
-0.792 
-0.769 
-0.779 
-0.934 
-0.77 
-0.805 
-0.79 
-0.776 
-0.768 
-0.871 
-0.745 
-0.78 
-0.761 
-0.83 
-0.763 
-0.814 
-0.7 
-0.728 
-0.772 
-0.724 
-0.706 
-0.792 
-0.76 
-0.774 
-0.811 
-0.751 
-0.739 
-0.791 
-0.752 
-0.718 
-0.859 
-0.805 
-0.741 
-0.784 
-0.828 
-0.719 
-0.792 
-0.663 
-0.763 
-0.758 
-0.852 
-0.696 
-0.767 
-0.758 
-0.787 
-0.779 
-0.804 
-0.699 
-0.803 
-0.784 
-0.701 
-0.842 
-0.829 
-0.75 
-0.77 
-0.798 
-0.836 
-0.778 
-0.703 
-0.73 
-0.794 
-0.838 
-0.739 
-0.754 
-0.75 
-0.803 
-0.778 
-0.796 
-0.7 
-0.789 
-0.788 
-0.735 
-0.785 
-0.813 
-0.752 
-0.706 
-0.802 
-0.81 
-0.712 
-0.702 
-0.78 
-0.761 
-0.781 
-0.781 
-0.726 
-0.768 
-0.784 
-0.749 
-0.718 
-0.848 
-0.789 
-0.751 
-0.82 
-0.815 
-0.8 
-0.759 
-0.746 
-0.779 
-0.792 
-0.704 
-0.729 
-0.824 
-0.827 
-0.745 
-0.823 
-0.767 
-0.8 
-0.805 
-0.755 
-0.687 
-0.846 
-0.704 
-0.745 
-0.792 
-0.817 
-0.768 
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-0.821 
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-0.781 
-0.698 
-0.735 
-0.856 
-0.766 
-0.723 
-0.812 
-0.819 
-0.687 
-0.815 
-0.737 
-0.729 
-0.846 
-0.805 
-0.747 
-0.776 
-0.832 
-0.772 
-0.788 
-0.679 
-0.757 
-0.795 
-0.818 
-0.737 
-0.744 
-0.761 
-0.88 
-0.753 
-0.834 
-0.71 
-0.773 
-0.815 
-0.712 
-0.715 
-0.853 
-0.737 
-0.776 
-0.842 
-0.819 
-0.798 
-0.804 
-0.756 
-0.801 
-0.81 
-0.727 
-0.748 
-0.76 
-0.806 
-0.797 
-0.798 
-0.704 
-0.809 
-0.808 
-0.74 
-0.823 
-0.813 
-0.813 
-0.699 
-0.756 
-0.784 
-0.729 
-0.713 
-0.81 
-0.759 
-0.783 
-0.767 
-0.779 
-0.72 
-0.795 
-0.749 
-0.727 
-0.813 
-0.859 
-0.752 
-0.768 
-0.831 
-0.78 
-0.791 
-0.682 
-0.75 
-0.758 
-0.835 
-0.714 
-0.763 
-0.744 
-0.796 
-0.769 
-0.825 
-0.67 
-0.798 
-0.734 
-0.702 
-0.824 
-0.842 
-0.753 
-0.788 
-0.79 
-0.829 
-0.776 
-0.692 
-0.744 
-0.744 
-0.821 
-0.708 
-0.746 
-0.759 
-0.811 
-0.764 
-0.828 
-0.714 
-0.813 
-0.756 
-0.778 
-0.724 
-0.867 
-0.736 
-0.758 
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-0.811 
-0.79 
-0.807 
-0.749 
-0.747 
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-0.722 
-0.762 
-0.751 
-0.811 
-0.759 
-0.771 
-0.699 
-0.804 
-0.759 
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-0.754 
-0.781 
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-0.838 
-0.782 
-0.79 
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-0.714 
-0.811 
-0.845 
-0.731 
-0.773 
-0.809 
-0.771 
-0.78 
-0.694 
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-0.77 
-0.797 
-0.724 
-0.751 
-0.76 
-0.773 
-0.778 
-0.818 
-0.705 
-0.806 
-0.771 
-0.724 
-0.775 
-0.852 
-0.723 
-0.79 
-0.798 
-0.806 
-0.772 
-0.738 
-0.787 
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-0.775 
-0.827 
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-0.794 
-0.691 
-0.758 
-0.748 
-0.86 
-0.763 
-0.728 
-0.747 
-0.788 
-0.788 
-0.768 
-0.679 
-0.782 
-0.803 
-0.715 
-0.734 
-0.786 
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-0.787 
-0.836 
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-0.798 
-0.805 
-0.751 
-0.791 
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-0.707 
-0.796 
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-0.712 
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-0.768 
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-0.692 
-0.805 
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-0.746 
-0.783 
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-0.802 
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-0.797 
-0.732 
-0.728 
-0.813 
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-0.759 
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-0.814 
-0.778 
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-0.709 
-0.767 
-0.813 
-0.755 
-0.745 
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-0.692 
-0.803 
-0.778 
-0.718 
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-0.807 
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-0.754 
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-0.833 
-0.759 
-0.771 
-0.826 
-0.789 
-0.811 
-0.797 
-0.761 
-0.775 
-0.836 
-0.736 
-0.753 
-0.739 
-0.825 
-0.802 
-0.794 
-0.705 
-0.818 
-0.773 
-0.747 
-0.71 
-0.823 
-0.749 
-0.79 
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-0.794 
-0.81 
-0.812 
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-0.709 
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-0.729 
-0.763 
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-0.838 
-0.782 
-0.783 
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-0.509 
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-0.853 
-0.728 
-0.423 
-0.159 
0.454 
-0.9 
0.13 
-0.261 
-0.054 
0.31 
-0.484 
0.05 
0.445 
0.42 
-0.46 
-0.408 
0.12 
0.15 
-0.351 
0.173 
0.445 
0.233 
0.352 
0.218 
0.072 
0.397 
0.333 
0.437 
0.247 
0.173 
0.317 
0.146 
0.31 
0.229 
0.509 
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0.237 
0.24 
0.492 
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0.12 
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0.272 
0.188 
0.159 
0.237 
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0.246 
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0.24 
0.301 
0.143 
0.308 
0.132 
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0.203 
0.15 
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0.068 
0.427 
0.288 
0.223 
0.072 
0.408 
0.204 
0.193 
0.339 
0.329 
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0.365 
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0.181 
0.297 
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0.247 
0.251 
0.077 
0.278 
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0.135 
0.146 
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0.446 
0.138 
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0.331 
0.137 
0.349 
0.262 
0.156 
0.153 
0.438 
0.199 
0.319 
0.304 
0.068 
0.396 
0.035 
0.202 
0.316 
0.438 
-0.087 
0.477 
0.298 
-0.056 
-0.029 
0.262 
0.289 
0.233 
0.313 
0.238 
0.082 
0.061 
0.242 
0.309 
0.104 
0.171 
0.433 
0.123 
-0.018 
0.312 
0.063 
0.038 
0.298 
0.356 
0.163 
0.168 
0.219 
0.189 
0.322 
0.176 
0.626 
0.273 
-0.203 
0.059 
0.179 
0.163 
0.135 
0.016 
0.021 
-0.187 
-0.402 
0.156 
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-0.443 
0.063 
-0.183 
-0.45 
-0.943 
-0.602 
0.05 
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0.262 
-0.105 
-0.058 
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0.264 
-0.159 
-1.336 
-0.009 
-0.82 
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0.077 
-0.822 
-0.349 
-0.937 
-0.515 
-0.544 
-1.683 
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-0.316 
-0.914 
-0.219 
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-1.418 
-1.153 
-1.113 
-0.446 
-0.602 
-0.873 
-0.891 
-0.848 
-0.785 
-0.815 
-0.705 
-0.96 
-0.83 
-0.578 
-0.816 
-0.956 
-0.649 
-0.658 
-0.577 
-0.756 
-0.941 
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-0.836 
-0.778 
-0.87 
-0.876 
-0.767 
-0.802 
-0.78 
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-0.744 
-0.86 
-0.805 
-0.85 
-0.874 
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-0.783 
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-0.727 
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-0.841 
-0.786 
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-0.782 
-0.757 
-0.768 
-0.783 
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-0.743 
-0.842 
-0.776 
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-0.769 
-0.852 
-0.796 
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-0.863 
-0.945 
-0.672 
-0.623 
-1.105 
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-0.545 
-0.504 
-0.848 
-0.534 
-0.549 
-0.303 
-0.791 
-0.843 
-0.488 
-0.829 
-0.757 
-0.658 
-0.662 
-0.633 
-0.606 
-0.451 
-0.698 
-0.578 
-0.546 
-0.356 
-0.63 
-0.58 
-0.284 
-0.347 
-0.545 
-0.504 
-0.464 
-0.276 
-0.458 
-0.666 
-0.216 
-0.281 
-0.41 
-0.258 
-0.365 
-0.185 
-0.278 
-0.22 
-0.153 
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-0.126 
-0.141 
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-0.014 
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-0.021 
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-0.1 
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-0.081 
0.094 
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0.117 
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0.143 
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0.297 
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0.146 
0.302 
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0.233 
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0.068 
0.274 
0.237 
0.128 
0.27 
0.367 
0.333 
0.004 
0.381 
0.454 
0.001 
0.241 
0.277 
0.149 
0.21 
0.426 
0.078 
0.09 
0.391 
0.277 
0.127 
0.11 
0.337 
0.603 
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0.29 
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0.211 
0.109 
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0.037 
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0.364 
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0.075 
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0.225 
0.1 
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0.149 
0.405 
0.373 
-0.014 
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0.098 
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0.332 
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0.003 
0.187 
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0.16 
0.191 
0.415 
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0.096 
0.099 
0.374 
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-0.014 
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0.597 
-0.005 
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0.37 
0.098 
0.078 
0.331 
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0.183 
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0.241 
0.29 
0.189 
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0.367 
0.37 
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0.439 
0.412 
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0.24 
0.321 
0.37 
0.1 
0.314 
0.414 
0.195 
0.165 
0.241 
0.28 
0.408 
0.122 
0.158 
0.234 
0.207 
0.177 
0.352 
-0.028 
0.396 
0.479 
0.205 
0.137 
0.343 
0.262 
0.079 
0.286 
0.16 
0.139 
-0.206 
-0.203 
-0.081 
0.11 
-0.788 
-0.664 
-0.312 
-0.191 
-0.578 
-0.012 
-0.374 
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-0.411 
-0.309 
-0.503 
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-0.375 
-0.421 
-0.428 
-0.577 
-0.255 
-0.685 
-0.597 
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-0.59 
-0.834 
-0.515 
-0.487 
-0.747 
-0.603 
-0.419 
-0.694 
-0.994 
-0.653 
-0.891 
-0.706 
-1.045 
-0.671 
-0.819 
-0.773 
-0.768 
-0.813 
-0.754 
-0.765 
-0.727 
-0.85 
-0.785 
-0.744 
-0.788 
-0.806 
-0.763 
-0.731 
-0.719 
-0.751 
-0.731 
-0.752 
-0.833 
-0.746 
-0.773 
-0.779 
-0.852 
-0.754 
-0.803 
-0.766 
-0.814 
-0.762 
-0.834 
-0.746 
-0.795 
-0.735 
-0.788 
-0.749 
-0.812 
-0.728 
-0.788 
-0.818 
-0.691 
-0.817 
-0.759 
-0.806 
-0.705 
-0.838 
-0.791 
-0.805 
-0.714 
-0.787 
-0.721 
-0.743 
-0.758 
-0.813 
-0.772 
-0.815 
-0.821 
-0.787 
-0.779 
-0.79 
-0.78 
-0.728 
-0.764 
-0.716 
-0.807 
-0.703 
-0.785 
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-0.841 
-0.752 
-0.778 
-0.727 
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-0.784 
-0.762 
-0.793 
-0.775 
-0.842 
-0.744 
-0.793 
-0.752 
-0.8 
-0.735 
-0.836 
-0.73 
-0.802 
-0.724 
-0.835 
-0.815 
-0.76 
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-0.759 
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-0.752 
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-0.782 
-0.842 
-0.772 
-0.793 
-0.773 
-0.787 
-0.732 
-0.837 
-0.758 
-0.768 
-0.778 
-0.845 
-0.78 
-0.776 
-0.744 
-0.77 
-0.779 
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-0.77 
-0.857 
-0.744 
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-0.758 
-0.817 
-0.778 
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-0.772 
-0.808 
-0.736 
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-0.817 
-0.764 
-0.812 
-0.72 
-0.793 
-0.752 
-0.756 
-0.795 
-0.767 
-0.839 
-0.782 
-0.76 
-0.748 
-0.86 
-0.738 
-0.747 
-0.746 
-0.792 
-0.725 
-0.841 
-0.693 
-0.853 
-0.762 
-0.783 
-0.693 
-0.874 
-0.71 
-0.802 
-0.777 
-0.756 
-0.813 
-0.84 
-0.732 
-0.774 
-0.872 
-0.761 
-0.738 
-0.734 
-0.773 
-0.7 
-0.799 
-0.796 
-0.786 
-0.727 
-0.82 
-0.894 
-1.027 
-0.835 
-0.639 
-0.996 
-0.712 
-0.54 
-0.611 
-0.219 
-0.289 
-0.543 
-0.483 
-0.889 
-0.326 
-0.675 
-0.452 
-0.237 
-0.514 
0.058 
-1.191 
-0.294 
-0.302 
-0.738 
0.058 
-0.438 
-0.307 
-0.924 
0.297 
-0.626 
-0.338 
-0.371 
0.065 
0.057 
-0.036 
0.269 
-0.175 
-0.283 
0.029 
0.135 
0.003 
0.035 
0.297 
0.126 
-0.059 
-0.136 
0.162 
0.222 
0.218 
0.203 
0.557 
0.235 
0.364 
0.379 
0.199 
0.25 
0.227 
0.256 
0.259 
0.344 
0.252 
0.28 
0.249 
0.262 
0.211 
0.205 
0.125 
0.373 
0.295 
0.228 
0.121 
0.308 
0.179 
0.186 
0.294 
0.253 
0.186 
0.244 
0.331 
0.16 
0.379 
0.357 
0.204 
0.275 
0.187 
0.152 
0.163 
0.03 
0.335 
0.333 
0.146 
0.35 
0.262 
0.096 
0.119 
0.349 
0.197 
0.265 
0.224 
0.183 
0.038 
0.48 
0.201 
0.196 
0.229 
0.057 
203 
 
 
0.32 
0.013 
0.042 
0.249 
0.25 
0.336 
0.15 
0.539 
0.17 
0.104 
0.684 
0.182 
0.284 
0.107 
0.328 
0.332 
-0.145 
0.794 
0.165 
0.01 
0.489 
0.164 
0.641 
0.241 
-0.17 
0.737 
0.322 
0.113 
0.133 
0.403 
0.287 
0.187 
0.36 
0.166 
0.549 
0.543 
0.14 
0.162 
0.41 
0.237 
-0.193 
0.316 
0.323 
0.139 
0.211 
0.273 
0.152 
0.032 
0.408 
0.297 
0.124 
0.204 
0.345 
0.171 
0.145 
0.357 
0.279 
0.215 
0.224 
0.312 
0.087 
-0.004 
0.2 
0.227 
-0.081 
0.107 
0.209 
-0.085 
0.042 
0.193 
-0.234 
0.537 
-0.209 
0.065 
-0.183 
0.337 
0.265 
-0.913 
-0.518 
-0.864 
0.26 
-0.1 
-0.71 
-0.002 
-0.784 
0.106 
-0.326 
-0.429 
-0.206 
-0.095 
-0.986 
-1.408 
-0.425 
-0.699 
-0.705 
-1.229 
-0.602 
0.161 
-0.207 
-0.888 
-0.569 
-0.566 
-1.225 
-0.469 
-0.893 
-0.933 
-0.997 
-0.866 
-0.794 
-0.883 
-0.76 
-0.778 
-0.76 
-0.912 
-0.59 
-0.856 
-0.776 
-0.657 
-0.775 
-0.969 
-0.64 
-0.705 
-0.782 
-0.92 
-0.686 
-0.887 
-0.879 
-0.887 
-0.768 
-0.73 
-0.745 
-0.773 
-0.825 
-0.825 
-0.749 
-0.716 
-0.785 
-0.516 
-0.852 
-0.769 
-0.853 
-0.721 
-0.927 
-0.8 
-0.796 
-0.946 
-0.704 
-0.724 
-0.808 
-0.775 
-0.889 
-0.881 
-0.645 
-0.756 
-0.807 
-0.667 
-0.916 
-0.854 
-0.788 
-0.782 
-0.917 
-0.934 
-0.732 
-0.697 
-0.74 
-0.808 
-0.773 
-0.762 
-0.835 
-0.843 
-0.777 
-0.773 
-0.818 
-0.731 
-0.755 
-0.767 
-0.853 
-0.739 
-0.866 
-0.839 
-0.791 
-0.8 
-0.898 
-0.937 
-0.807 
-0.862 
-0.295 
-0.745 
-0.441 
-0.387 
-0.485 
-0.619 
-0.318 
-0.425 
-0.226 
-0.447 
-0.442 
-0.304 
-0.368 
-0.279 
-0.363 
-0.198 
-0.323 
-0.313 
-0.167 
-0.281 
-0.374 
-0.278 
-0.279 
-0.03 
-0.329 
-0.076 
-0.063 
-0.126 
-0.003 
-0.137 
-0.111 
0.02 
-0.09 
0.049 
-0.045 
-0.004 
0.096 
0.007 
0.11 
0.099 
0.074 
0.102 
-0.012 
0.151 
0.144 
0.144 
0.177 
0.137 
0.145 
0.116 
0.248 
0.293 
0.533 
-0.077 
0.416 
0.023 
0.257 
0.204 
0.252 
0.301 
0.083 
0.21 
0.213 
0.244 
0.207 
0.324 
0.371 
0.325 
0.35 
0.393 
0.274 
-0.078 
204 
 
 
0.463 
0.482 
-0.119 
0.267 
0.477 
0.168 
-0.098 
0.677 
0.201 
-0.104 
0.247 
0.374 
0.223 
0.006 
0.508 
0.141 
0.03 
0.282 
0.321 
0.152 
0.173 
0.305 
0.189 
0.192 
0.27 
0.448 
0.163 
0.174 
0.224 
0.191 
0.138 
0.249 
0.291 
0.155 
0.18 
0.273 
0.181 
0.104 
0.224 
0.384 
0.2 
0.135 
0.354 
0.199 
0.038 
0.286 
0.37 
0.147 
0.403 
0.162 
0.398 
0.126 
0.141 
0.345 
0.377 
0.004 
0.393 
0.405 
0.271 
0.003 
0.3 
0.265 
0.03 
0.278 
0.354 
0.175 
0.291 
0.457 
0.259 
-0.021 
0.311 
0.493 
0.083 
0.137 
0.465 
0.164 
0.055 
0.343 
0.319 
0.205 
0.089 
0.445 
0.343 
-0.006 
0.391 
0.396 
0.08 
0.313 
0.323 
0.119 
0.213 
0.145 
0.194 
0.264 
0.269 
0.339 
0.243 
0.328 
0.287 
0.31 
0.244 
0.259 
0.181 
0.405 
0.221 
0.374 
0.388 
0.202 
0.119 
0.206 
0.194 
0.232 
0.252 
0.344 
0.244 
0.157 
0.43 
0.293 
0.037 
0.51 
0.51 
0.024 
0.233 
0.31 
0.014 
0.22 
0.344 
0.22 
0.272 
0.296 
0.438 
0.14 
0.245 
0.318 
0.393 
0.126 
0.408 
0.399 
0.143 
0.38 
0.214 
0.234 
-0.193 
0.26 
0.127 
0.369 
-0.216 
0.361 
0.374 
-0.35 
0.011 
-0.235 
0.114 
-0.16 
-0.172 
0.031 
-0.027 
-0.19 
-0.045 
-0.061 
-0.212 
0.074 
-0.47 
-0.431 
-0.368 
-0.187 
-0.085 
-0.271 
-0.315 
-0.409 
-0.767 
-0.797 
-1.021 
-0.742 
-0.749 
-1.054 
-0.712 
-0.709 
-0.771 
-0.778 
-0.794 
-0.774 
-0.769 
-0.835 
-0.85 
-0.793 
-0.764 
-0.81 
-0.716 
-0.794 
-0.728 
-0.743 
-0.755 
-0.853 
-0.735 
-0.856 
-0.748 
-0.737 
-0.72 
-0.786 
-0.732 
-0.843 
-0.761 
-0.748 
-0.772 
-0.875 
-0.746 
-0.775 
-0.775 
-0.722 
-0.772 
-0.736 
-0.725 
-0.773 
-0.836 
-0.749 
-0.875 
-0.786 
-0.763 
-0.733 
-0.918 
-0.7 
-0.836 
-0.742 
-0.775 
-0.752 
-0.883 
-0.72 
-0.768 
-0.753 
-0.804 
-0.748 
-0.72 
-0.76 
-0.772 
-0.821 
-0.738 
-0.764 
-0.767 
-0.751 
-0.717 
-0.814 
-0.739 
-0.852 
-0.765 
-0.773 
-0.779 
-0.888 
-0.719 
-0.783 
-0.73 
-0.812 
-0.705 
-0.854 
-0.75 
-0.759 
-0.8 
-0.743 
205 
 
 
-0.733 
-0.795 
-0.801 
-0.711 
-0.816 
-0.738 
-0.84 
-0.751 
-0.77 
-0.734 
-0.889 
-0.76 
-0.764 
-0.762 
-0.819 
-0.698 
-0.86 
-0.738 
-0.768 
-0.756 
-0.775 
-0.739 
-0.816 
-0.759 
-0.729 
-0.724 
-0.738 
-0.736 
-0.793 
-0.747 
-0.724 
-0.904 
-0.816 
-0.742 
-0.87 
-0.743 
-0.838 
-0.733 
-0.856 
-0.749 
-0.758 
-0.713 
-0.789 
-0.736 
-0.848 
-0.777 
-0.791 
-0.847 
-0.878 
-0.776 
-0.789 
-0.785 
-0.711 
-0.778 
-0.74 
-0.715 
-0.754 
-0.844 
-0.73 
-0.885 
-0.728 
-0.788 
-0.708 
-0.693 
-0.71 
-0.775 
-0.771 
-0.757 
-0.869 
-0.85 
-0.767 
-0.771 
-0.787 
-0.711 
-0.832 
-0.718 
-0.765 
-0.741 
-0.864 
-0.735 
-0.866 
-0.752 
-0.76 
-0.708 
-0.774 
-0.739 
-0.86 
-0.726 
-0.72 
-0.883 
-0.777 
-0.777 
-0.731 
-0.815 
-0.748 
-0.828 
-0.725 
-0.762 
-0.737 
-0.887 
-0.723 
-0.778 
-0.754 
-0.741 
-0.713 
-0.768 
-0.754 
-0.759 
-0.76 
-0.764 
-0.887 
-0.822 
-0.781 
-0.715 
-0.819 
-0.759 
-0.852 
-0.75 
-0.778 
-0.753 
-0.878 
-0.743 
-0.78 
-0.747 
-0.707 
-0.729 
-0.718 
-0.726 
-0.797 
-0.761 
-0.74 
-0.891 
-0.829 
-0.759 
-0.766 
-0.843 
-0.754 
-0.805 
-0.72 
-0.744 
-0.743 
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